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Samenvatting/Summary 
Deze dissertatie benadert laatantieke epitomes vanuit een literair-theoretisch standpunt; 
de hermeneutische uitdaging bestaat erin om deze teksten, die gewoonlijk beschouwd 
worden als afgeleiden of puur functionele teksten, te lezen zonder daarbij te kijken naar 
de “originele tekst” waarvan ze zijn afgeleid. De dissertatie bestaat uit een inleiding en 
drie casestudies. In de inleiding zet ik uiteen dat de focus van deze studie niet zal liggen 
op epitome als een genre of een tekstuele teksttype wat moeilijk te bevatten zou zijn, zo 
niet methodologisch incorrect), maar wel op wat ik epitomisch schrijven noem. De drie 
casestudies zijn geselecteerd uit werken waarnaar slechts zelden verwezen wordt als 
“epitomes”: het onderliggende idee is om de blik van de analyse te verruimen en aan te 
tonen hoe epitomisch schrijven elke genre-afbakening kan overstijgen. De gekozen werken 
behoren alle drie tot de late oudheid, hoewel hun troebele chronologie inderdaad 
beschouwd kan worden als een resultaat van epitomisch schrijven. Virgilius Maro 
Grammaticus’ Epitomae en Epistolae (7e eeuw N.C.?) zijn absurdistische variaties op het 
genre van de grammaticale commentaar. Solinus’ Collectanea rerum memorabilium (3e-4e 
N.C.?) is een beschrijving van de oecumene die bol staat van de wonderlijke 
monstruositeiten; Fulgentius' Mythologiae zijn een “ongebreidelde”, tenminste naar 
moderne maatstaven, allegorische interpretatie van Grieks-Romeinse mythes. Bij de 
lectuur van deze drie laatantieke staaltjes proza gebruik ik concepten zoals tekstuele 
hechting, ondoorgrondelijkheid, verticaliteit, beweeglijkheid enz. (dit zijn op zich 
geherinterpreteerde en omzeggens “anamorfotische” versies van enkele populaire 
kritische concepten zoals  nomadisme, trace enz.). 
Met een close reading van delen van deze werken wil deze dissertatie aantonen hoe 
“epitomes”, verre van statische literaire producten, bijzonder onstabiel en ongrijpbaar 
kunnen zijn. Door de zogenaamde “epitomische dimensie” te bestuderen als een 
bijzondere con-/dis-figuratie van het proces van tekstuele productie, mondt deze analyse 
bovendien haast onvermijdelijk uit in een problematisering van genealogie, temporaliteit 
en causaliteit binnen ditzelfde proces. 
 
*** 
The present thesis approaches late antique Latin epitomes from a literary-theoretical 
point of view; its hermeneutical challenge lies in reading texts traditionally considered as 
derivative or merely functional by paying scarce or no attention to the correspondent 
“original texts”.  The thesis consists of an introduction and three case-studies. In the 
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introduction I make clear that the focus of the dissertation will be oriented not so much 
on epitome as a genre or textual typology (which would actually be hard to pin down, if 
not methodologically incorrect), but, rather, on what I dub epitomic writing. The three 
case-studies are selected among works seldom referred to as “epitomes”: the underlying 
idea is to broaden the scope of the analysis and to show how epitomic writing can 
transcend any genre demarcation. All of the three works belong to late antiquity, even 
though their blurred chronology might be seen, indeed, as result of epitomic writing.  
Virgilius Maro Grammaticus’ Epitomae and Epistolae (7th c. CE?) are an absurdist variation 
on the genre of grammatical commentary; Solinus’ Collectanea rerum memorabilium (3rd 
– 4th c. CE?) is a description of the oikoumene constantly indulging in marvels 
monstrosities; Fulgentius' Mythologiae are an “unbridled”, at least to modern standards, 
allegorical interpretation of Graeco-Roman myths. These three samples of late antique 
prose are read by drawing on such concepts as textual suture, opacity, verticality, motility 
etc. (themselves a re-interpreted and, so to say, “anamorphic” version of some popular 
critical concepts such as nomadism, trace etc.).  
Through a close-reading of parts of these woks, the thesis aims to show how 
“epitomes”, far from being sclerotic literary products, can be extremely unstable and 
elusive. Moreover, the analysis ushers almost inevitably into a problematisation of 
genealogy, temporality, and causality in the process of textual production, by investigating 
what is here labelled “epitomic dimension” as a peculiar con-/ dis-figuration of this very 
process. 
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Introduction 
1 Reading Severed Heads 
This beginning is also an ending. A fact that is almost unbearably annoying. The redactional 
trick of writing or revising introductions as the final contribution to a work represents a 
very common trap: it is an unwritten law that one should weave connections with what 
will follow, sometimes even comment on it, make it comprehensible or graspable – one 
needs to fall into a circular pattern. And the reverse is no less constraining, “in my end is 
my beginning”: introduction is a form of containment and pre-determination. The creation 
of a pattern – the emergence of circularity – somehow runs against the object here under 
investigation, or, rather, the object that has been constructed through this investigation.  
In fact, the idea would have been to present the readers with a sheer tabula, a space 
that can contain objects with no other aim than bringing them together – tabula as a form 
of spatial demarcation, characterized by a constitutive internal discontinuity (Foucauldians 
might dub it heterotopia).1 If patterns are to be allowed at all, then they should be only 
temporary, fleeting connections between disparate fragments of discourse, ephemeral 
configurations ready to conflagrate as soon as they have been set up. But then again: why 
should we look for correspondence between the objects of investigation and the form of 
their display? How should we justify such an obsession with isomorphism and with the 
reciprocal mirroring of form and content? What would be more circular, in the end, than 
this leaning on the organizing force of mise-en-abyme? What more unified? Perhaps it is 
just impossible to avoid the emergence of echoes and repetitions, to obliterate the 
correspondences between the extremities of the present textual structure; perhaps there 
is no way to prevent the formation of consonances, to hinder the surfacing of rhythm.2 
And where rhythm emerges, a first step is made towards patterning.3 Being able to 
 
 
1 See Didi-Huberman 2018 [2011], pp. 36-46, 55, who has inspired some of the following considerations; Foucault 
2009 [1966]. 
2 On the fundamental role played by rhythm in the emergence of any cultural system, see the still inspiring Leroi-
Gourhan 1969, pp. 94-119; for a broader overview, see Sauvanet 2000a. 
3 For “figural rhythm”, see Leroi-Gourhan 1969, pp. 216-217 and Krauss 1996, pp. 1-27; Sauvanet 2000b, pp. 9-
36. 
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recognize patterns is a bit of a prodrome to reading. Indeed, what is unescapable is the 
legibility of tabula.4 As the most basic tool for establishing a hermeneutical space, a tabula 
is a mechanism that can, precisely, generate correspondences – a machine for rhythms 
and readings. It is also a mechanism for abstraction.5 The very act of bringing things 
together paves the way for schematism, the progressive enucleation of the general from 
the particular. Tabulae always implement a process of semiotization: the objects they 
frame are transformed into meaningful elements. 
It is to Franco Farinelli that we owe the “elegant”6 intuition that Salome’s plate, 
Salome’s table, was actually a map: “That the table of Salome was a map – and even that 
the episode of John the Baptist’s beheading is nothing other than the first complete 
illustration of the terrible consequences of what we casually define today as the process 
of cartographic reduction – is certainly suggested by the term used to describe it, but also 
by the mechanism of language for which the daughter of Herodias (who neither desires 
nor thinks) is a mere mouthpiece: a language that proceeds exclusively by proper names, 
which happens only on maps”.7  
Such a reduction, though, does not “happen only on maps”; it belongs to maps because 
it belongs to “tables”. I thought I would present the severed head of a prophet, but all that 
I can display is a set of names, the aseptic residual of some stultifying abstraction. Be it 
because of the table or because of my gaze as a viewer, be it because of their shared 
capability of semanticizing things by framing them, under such circumstances objects can 
hardly preserve their materiality: in order to be arranged into a signifying constellation, 
objects must lose themselves and abdicate their irreducible difference. Tabulae tend 
inevitably to be operating tables, where the first violence to be perpetrated is synthesis.  
For even the surface of a tabula, ready to be crossed in whatever direction and apt to host 
any heterogeneity, is a unified space – for even heterotopies are, in the end, topoi. 
 
 
4 Didi-Huberman 2018 [2011], pp. 6-8, reflects on the notion of Lesbarkeit, “legibility”, in Benjamin and Aby 
Warburg, whose famous “atlas of images” Mnemosyne is taken as a most telling example of tabula as tool for 
producing readings. On Lesbarkeit as broad cultural metaphor, see Blumenberg 1981. 
5 Didi-Huberman 2018 [2011], pp. 220-235, correctly observes that tabulae, by allowing an Übersicht (“surveying 
gaze”), are also based on the viewer’s ability to übersehen (“to overlook”) something. Tabulae propel creative 
synthesis because, in a way, they help us to miss things.  
6 Westphal 2007, p. 101. 
7 Westphal 2007, p. 101. 
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2.1 Deferring the Object: History 
Although inadequate for conveying the full physicality of flesh and blood, Salome’s plate 
might well still function as an emblem. Indeed, it does not seem totally absurd to assert 
that the object of this investigation might be seen as standing under the sign of the 
Baptist’s severed head. Epitome – for this is the object of the present investigation – bears 
the idea of cutting inscribed in its very name – cutting as a strategy for constructing 
meaning.  
As will soon become clear, my insistence on speaking of an “object’’ under investigation 
is probably an unconscious attempt to compensate for the elusive nature of the epitomic 
phenomenon. Epitome can be satisfactorily defined only as a word; we can outline the 
story of its usage, determine its etymology, list its occurrences with reference to literary 
products – but it remains at best problematic to pin down its real referent. Epitome has 
no format, let alone a genre. We shall soon see that it might be useful to broaden the 
concept to encompass some very general cultural mechanisms connected to the creation, 
preservation, and transmission of information; however, for the time being, the 
interesting thing is that several histories of this non-genre have already been written.8  
Taken in what has become the most accepted meaning – as summaries of previous, 
more extended works, or as companions (compendia) to a given subject – epitomes owe 
a lot to, and are victims of, the most mature season of 19th century positivistic philology.9 
Theodor Mommsen, Heinrich Keil, Alexander Riese and many others contributed to the 
re-edition and systematization of a great deal of works that could be dubbed as epitomic.10 
Nonetheless, they also consolidated a series of critical stereotypes surrounding epitomes, 
namely that: 
1) Epitomes, being inherently derivative, are inevitably inferior to original texts; 
2) Epitomes are symptoms of a certain decline in creativity; 
3) Epitomes testify, at their best, to periods of cultural systematization, but not of 
cultural production; 
4) Epitomes are most typical of Late Antiquity; 
5) Although deprived of any intrinsic interest, epitomes represent a valuable source of 
fragments of lost works and textual variants. 
 
 
8 See Galdi 1922 for Latin literature; Bott 1920 and MacLachlan 2004 for both Greek and Latin. 
9 Drawing on Bott  1920, Opelt 1962, col. 945 distinguishes between epitoma auctoris and epitoma rei tractatae 
respectively. 
10 I am here referring to Theodor Mommsen’s edition of Solinus’ Collectanea rerum memorabilium (1895), 
Heinrich Keil’s Grammatici Latini (1855-1880), Alexander Riese’s Geographi Latini Minores (1878). 
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This last point has often served as an apologetic argument for any scholars brave 
enough to undertake the thankless job of editing such uninteresting material.11 It would 
be illuminating to carry out a fully-fledged study on the ‘‘rhetoric of self-sacrifice’’ that 
permeates late 19th and early 20th century scholarly production, a highly telling 
compromise between two cultural idola: on the one hand the positivistic cult of unbiased 
science, on the other, the post-romantic celebration of ‘‘novelty’’ as a criterion for 
establishing aesthetic hierarchies. This attitude, it should be noted, did not necessarily 
affect the quality of the philological achievements of the time. Ever since Wölfflin’s articles 
in Archiv für Lateinische Lexicographie, scholars seem to have been primarily concerned 
with constructing a history of the term ‘‘epitome’’. Heinrich Bott opened his dissertation 
De epitomis antiquis (1920) with a reflection on the alleged distinction between epitome 
and breviarium, an approach echoed a few years later by Marco Galdi in his thorough 
monograph devoted to epitomes in Latin literature, L’epitome nella letteratura latina 
(1922). Still partially present as an undertone in Ilona Opelt’s article in Reallexikon für 
Antike und Christentum (1962), the distinction reemerged in Rosalind MacLachlan’s 
unpublished dissertation Epitomes in Ancient Literary Culture (2004).12 
Galdi’s book is, in many respects, highly representative of such positivistic attitudes, in 
both its qualities and its limits.13 Next to a rich collection of carefully (and chronologically) 
arranged material, Galdi makes several derogatory remarks about the low intellectual 
value of the works he has been analyzing, exemplified in the very first lines of the 
introduction: “Overall, the tendency to excerpt and summarize larger works is tightly 
connected with the political and moral decay of a nation”.14 Resorting to the “decadence’’ 
paradigm, Galdi produces an argument commonly employed to support pseudo-historicist 
claims. This is far from unexpected, and the same might be said for the strong nationalistic 
and idealistic undertones of statements such as the following: “In ages characterized by 
thriving literary activity – when the production is original and capable of mirroring, to a 
large extent, the flourishing material and spiritual conditions of a population marching 
forward on the path of civilization, and when only one single concern seems to loom over 
writers, that of contributing to the greatness of one’s own country or of celebrating one’s 
 
 
11 Cfr. infra p. 57 Mommsen’s remarks on editing Solinus. 
12 See Wölfflin 1902a; Id. 1902b; Id. 1902c ; Id. 1904; Id. 1906;  Galdi 1922, pp.18-22; MacLachlan 2004, pp. 3-14. 
Rosalind MacLachlan, though, cannot but admit that, p. 24: “The range and variety of epitomes argue against 
there being a neat definition and a simple answer. They seem not to be joined by a common form or to compose 
a genre with prescribed characteristics”. 
13 Cfr. MacLachlan, pp. 14-17, for a critical assessment of Galdi’s theoretical tenets. 
14 Galdi 1922 p. 1: “In generale, la tendenza a fare estratti e compendi di opera di maggiore mole è strettamente 
connessa al fenomeno del decadimento politico e morale di un popolo.” 
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own ancestry – summarizing someone else’s works would be held to be a pointless chore”; 
and “It has already been observed that summaries usually turn out being detrimental to 
works of art. Indeed, an opus integrum, once summarized, is disfigured, since it loses those 
traces of freshness and immediacy, if not of organicity, that were its own”.15 If today these 
claims sound grotesque, or even, in the light of the subsequent European history, utterly 
ominous (Galdi’s nationalistic vocabulary might well remind us of the incipient Fascist 
era),16 it is only because we have somehow displaced the same longing for coherent 
historical reconstruction that influenced the Italian philologist in the 1920s. Indeed, one 
can find many intuitions scattered throughout L’epitome that need only be properly 
relocated to appear as the basis of current historicist discussions on epitome.  
In the wake of Birt and Bott, Galdi stressed the relevance of the introduction of the 
codex to the success of epitome from the 4th century onward, thus pointing to 
technological innovation as a fundamental component of cultural production.  17 This 
perspective would become central in the works of Ann Blair. Although devoted to an 
entirely different historical period (the Early Modern Age), Blair’s studies engage with the 
problem of ordering and disseminating knowledge in times marked by a widespread 
feeling of information overload.18 The theme of ‘‘too much knowledge’’ might actually, at 
least partially, help us to rethink the flourishing of epitomic works in Late Antiquity as a 
phenomenon connected to an increased demand for information-storage technologies 
rather than to a simple decay in the capacity of readers to master long works.19 Similarly, 
Galdi was well aware that epitomized texts were privileged in schools, but we had to wait 
for Rita Lizzi’s considerations on “selective memory” and Kaster’s thorough survey on 
grammarians for late antique schools to lose any reductive connotations as receptacles of 
“rudimentary culture” and be acknowledged as essential triggers of cultural 
 
 
15 Galdi 1922 p. 1: “Nei secoli di ricca fioritura letteraria, quando la produzione è originale e rispecchia in larga 
parte le floride condizioni di ambiente e lo stato d’animo di un popolo che imprime le sue orme sul cammino 
della civilità, e quando una sola preoccupazione pare che incomba sugli scrittori, di nulla trattare che non 
contribuisca alla grandezza del proprio paese od alla celebrazione della propria stirpe, si reputerebbe vana fatica 
l’industriarsi a ridurre opera altrui”; Ibid. p. 3: “Si è già detto che il compendio, di solito, torna a detrimento 
dell’opera d’arte. E nel vero, un opus integrum, compendiato, si sfigura, perdendo quell’impronta di freschezza 
e d’immediatezza, se non di organicità, che gli era propria.” 
16 Cfr., for instance, Galdi 1922 p. 2: “[…] opere immortali e dove è impresso il genio della propria razza” – 
epitomes are not, of course, such works. 
17 See Galdi 1922, p. IV. Cfr. Birt 1907 and Bott 1920. For an overview of late antique librarian production that is 
still useful see, Cavallo 1975. 
18 See Blair 2010, especially pp. 14-22, on “information management in antiquity”.  
19 See Blair 2003 and Ead. 2007.  
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development.20 Finally, Galdi speaks poignantly of a true “compendium industry.”21 No 
one, of course, would be so naive as to confuse Galdi’s use of “industry” with the meaning 
that this word would assume in Critical Theory, nor presume that Galdi meant to oppose 
it, in a typically idealistic way,22 to the more spiritually elevated ‘‘work of art’’; nonetheless, 
the intuition of a cultural industry is already present, almost foreshadowing Santo 
Mazzarino’s path-breaking formula of the late antique “democratization of culture.”23  
This is not to say that L’epitome anticipated all the scholarly trends that would crop up 
in later decades: rather that, given the set of data we have, when looking at epitomes from 
a certain vantage point, the results can hardly be expected to undergo radical alterations. 
Ever since Birt, the object of scholarly observation has been epitomes as the product of a 
socio-historical constellation, precisely not my object here. 
2.2 Deferring the Object: Redemption 
By looking at the same object as Galdi and his contemporaries and forerunners, one is 
likely to fall into a redemptive mood, equal and opposite to their disparaging attitude. In 
short, the most adopted strategy has become to deny the exclusively derivative nature of 
epitomes and to stress, instead, the many different ways in which the original text is 
fragmented, recombined, and transformed. In other words, critics and philologists started 
laying claim to the authoriality of the epitomizer. The apology of the text is hence 
substantiated through the introduction of a new persona: the worthy, skilful author. Even 
today the critical pendulum swings between two poles: on the one side, theories which 
hold that it is impossible to analyse and evaluate epitomes without making reference to 
their purportedly primary sources; on the other hand, the attempt to consider epitomes 
 
 
20 See Lizzi 1990 and Kaster 1988. Indeed, ‘school’ has been an emblematic word for late antiquity ever since 
Henri-Iréné Marrou’s groundbreaking work on Augustine’s education (Marrou 1938). For a classic view on the 
socio-political impact of rhetorical education, see Brown 1992. 
21 Galdi 1922, p. 2. 
22 “Idealistic” in the sense of Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce (1866-1952), whose extremely influential 
Poesia e non poesia was to be published just one year after Galdi’s monograph, in 1923.  
23 See Mazzarino 1974 [1960]. For an assessment and history of Mazzarino’s controversial formula, see Carrié 
2001 and the special issue of Antiquité tardive in which is published. On how a new conception of rhetoric and 
literariness impacted on late antique textual production (Fachliteratur, commentaries, exegesis etc.), see 
Formisano 2012, pp. 512-520.  
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in their own right as self-sufficient literary objects, as the products of creative gestures 
and authorial self-confidence.  
This former standpoint is, for instance, indicatively revealed by what historian Hervé 
Inglebert suggests in his essay on Lactantius’s Epitome of his own Institutiones Divinae (a 
somewhat famous example of self-epitomization): “While dealing with an epitome the 
most important question to be answered is not What, since this is provided by the model, 
but When, which is essential to the very comprehension of the epitome and sums up all of 
the other questions, Why, For whom, and How.”24 According to this view, epitomes are 
functions, in mathematical terms, of previous texts, and the only way to predicate 
anything on them is to know the argument of the function, the input variable: the original. 
The most systematic functionalist interpretation of this kind has probably been 
provided by Markus Dubischar under the concept of the auxiliary.25 To put it in as a few 
words as possible, epitomes, like commentaries, translations, and many other kinds of 
derivative literature, help to make other texts understandable, that is, readable: 
“[Auxiliary texts] render service and help, as it were, to a primary text or corpus that needs 
or deserves this kind of service and help. […] Since the fundamental purpose of a text is to 
be read and understood, texts are in difficulty when they find fewer and fewer readers, 
and perhaps even fail to find readers at all.”26 Drawing mostly on Paul Grice’s theory of 
conversation and Niklas Luhmann’s analysis of sociological systems, Dubischar points out 
that “all communication is based on, and made possible by, reducing complexity. 
Moreover, real communication is initiated by the recipient.”27 Epitomes aim to give birth 
to a new audience for unheard texts by reducing the distance between the cultural system 
in which primary texts were produced and that of the current audience: “Auxiliary texts 
could be viewed as ‘‘gate-keepers’’ placed at a system’s boundaries, securing but also 
controlling the supply with information from the environment.”28 But what about the 
intrinsic opacity of any textual object? How can we determine the borders of the 
pretended original readability? When do texts really start to ‘‘need or deserve’’ help to be 
understood? How thin can the boundaries between two cultural systems be?  
Discussing Vegetius’ Epitoma rei militaris (4th-5th century), one of the most widely read 
Latin texts during the Middle Ages, Marco Formisano has shown how epitomes can 
 
 
24 Inglebert 2010, p. 514: “ La question la plus importante pour un épitomé n’est pas le ‘quoi?’, qui est donné par 
le modèle, mais le ‘quand?’ qui est seule essentielle pour comprendre l’existence même de l’épitomé, et qui 
concentre les questions ‘pourquoi/ pour qui/ comment?’”. 
25 See Dubischar 2010, pp. 41 ff. 
26 Dubishar 2010, p. 42. 
27 Dubischar 2010, p. 61. Cfr. Grice 1975 and Luhmann 1984; Id. 1997. 
28 Dubischar 2010, p. 62 n. 53. 
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effectively establish, not only adapt, translate or preserve, a cultural system, by engaging 
in a complex, dynamic relationship with the past and tradition – in this particular case, 
even by founding a peculiar textuality: “In fact, I would argue that the Epitoma rei militaris 
is more interesting for literary than for technical reasons. It aims to reintroduce to the 
contemporary system the ancient rules applied in Rome during the first stage of empire 
[…] Even the title Epitoma rei militaris, which might best be translated into modern 
languages as ‘The Roman art of war’ or ‘The ancient art of war’ […] is a reminder of the 
close relationship the author wishes to have with the past. Vegetius’s logic is circular: he 
begins from writing, substantiates actions with exempla that also derive from a world of 
books, only to return inexorably to writing. His work inherits, justifies, and sets up a system 
of profound interaction between ‘literary’ past and present action, which becomes the 
axiom of the art of war for the future.”29      
Actually, trying to connect the pragmatic of the auxiliary with the ambiguous field 
disclosed by such concepts as intertextuality, intratextuality, and transtextuality, may turn 
out to be quite a challenge. Not surprisingly, these ideas constitute the basis for the other 
critical pole mentioned above, the one interested in reasserting the creative potential of 
epitomes. One need only look back at Gérard Genette’s classical work Palimpsestes to find 
out that: “no reduction, since it cannot be simply a reduction, is completely transparent, 
meaningless – innocent.”30 It would suffice to select random passages from prefaces to 
late antique Latin and Greek epitomes to discover that their authors were proud to show 
what a difficult task it had been to sum up all of that information, to structure it, to make 
it, as it were, useful.31 They seem to be well aware of the fact that they can lay claim to a 
certain degree of ingenium. Thus, when Markus Mülke, in his essay entitled Epitome – Das 
Bessere Original? (“Epitome – A better original?”), highlights the sophisticated expertise 
that a “true epitomator” (ein richtiger Epitomator) had to display, he resumes a long-
established motif (at least in Late Antiquity).32   
 
 
29 Formisano 2012, p. 525. For a problematization of the interaction between ‘writing’ and ‘war’, see also 
Formisano 2002; Id. 2009; Id. 2011; and the contributions in the volume Formisano – Böhme 2012.   
30 Genette 2003 [1982], p. 349: “aucune reduction, n’étant jamais simple réduction, ne peut être transparente, 
insignifiante – innocente.” 
31 This is what Opelt 1962, col. 959, analysing the most common topoi in the prefaces of epitomes, dubs Nutzen- 
or Zweckenformel, that is, formulas pointing to the “use” that could be made of the epitome. 
32 Mülke 2010, p. 87. 
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2.3 Deferring the Object: Subversion 
Some scholars have taken further steps in the direction of establishing a more accentuated 
textual autonomy for epitomes, adopting other, more radical models of cultural 
transmission.  
In the sociological scheme proposed by Itamar Even-Zohar, goods – material or semiotic 
– having trespassed systemic borders can undergo a process he names cultural transfer: 
the imported goods cease to be perceived as external and are wholly integrated in the 
new economical/cultural repertoire.33 If this osmotic dynamic is fully fulfilled (Even-Zohar 
gives it the name of interference), then “the question of source/origin is no longer 
relevant. For the majority of the members of a community, once introduced into their 
repertoire, the fortune of an item in terms of success or failure becomes a domestic 
matter.”34 This is to say that once texts have undergone interference, once, for example, 
texts have been epitomized in order to fit the requirements of a new reading audience, 
their former status must take second place: the extreme consequence of the auxiliary – 
and anyone dealing with the remnants of ancient literature should agree – is, 
paradoxically, the complete erasure of the source, its replacement. 
In his influential book on rewriting, André Lefevere argues for an overtly dialectical 
interpretation of how cultural systems function.35 His axiom is that they “develop 
according to the principle of polarity, which holds that every system eventually evolves in 
its own countersystem.”36 The point is instrumental in positing the possibility of subversive 
effects achieved through apparently non-subversive procedures: even repetitive textual 
acts such as translating or summarizing are likely to trigger a process of semantic shifting 
that will eventually lead from the original signifying set to its very opposite.  
Subversion, if regarded from the perspective of a redemptive reading of epitomes, 
might be a very convenient tool, and has actually been used as such. Wolfgang Raible has 
drawn attention to different examples of Reduktionsformen, an umbrella concept under 
which he gathers epitomes, compendia ad usum delphini, registers, Japanese haikai, and 
more.37 Grouping epitomes and registers (not to speak of haikai) under the same label may 
sound a little questionable, even without resorting to Genette’s meticulous distinction 
 
 
33 See Even-Zohar 2010 [2005], pp. 70-76.  
34 Even-Zohar 2010 [2005], p. 53. 
35 See Lefevere 1992. 
36 Lefevere 1992, p. 38. 
37 See Raible 1995. 
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between abridgment and condensed text, summary and digest.38 I am nonetheless 
persuaded that Raible’s attempt to find a common ground for practices of textual 
fragmentation and re-assemblage may be of use to extending our idea of epitomization. 
Raible argues that there is something in common between “summaries” and, let’s say, 
Raymond Quenau’s rewriting of Mallarmé sonnets (which Queneau rewrote by picking up 
only the last word of each line): in dismembering a text and putting it together again, an 
ironical, subversive mechanism is taking place.  
Two well-known late antique Latin works have been interpreted in this “subversive” 
light. Aude Doody presents us with the strong clash between authority and authorship 
that she detects in the so-called Medicina Plinii.39 The Medicina Plinii, which is thought to 
have been composed in the 4th century, belongs to a tradition of late antique medical 
compendia which tried to condense classical medical authorities into more accessible 
forms. It draws its material mainly from Pliny the Elder’s Naturalis Historia and most of the 
manuscripts refer to its author as Plinius Secundus Iunior. Doody rightly points out that 
although medicine can be considered the focus of Pliny’s books 20-32, Pliny’s own position 
towards physicians (namely, Greek physicians) is relatively disapproving: no small a part 
of his ideological project consisted in opposing the intellectualistic and, according to him, 
suspicious Greek medical science to natural, reliable, traditional Roman medicine. As a 
consequence, as Doody puts it, “while the Medicina Plinii is dependent on Pliny’s name 
and Pliny’s text for some of its authority, its radical reworking of the Naturalis Historia’s 
approach to medicine could be seen as an implicit critique of Pliny’s organising strategies: 
the book of extracts aims both to co-opt and to supplant the authority of the source-
tekst.”40 An antagonistic attitude thus comes to light: reshaping the original, the 
epitomizer exerts an act of appropriation, whose violence is the conditio sine qua non for 
the emergence of his/her own textual identity.  
The implications of such an antagonistic model were brilliantly exposed by Jeffrey T. 
Schnapp in his essay on Proba’s famous Cento vergilianus de laudibus Christi.41 
Approximatively dated to the second half of the fourth century C.E., this 694 hexameter-
long patchwork of Virgilian lines makes “the greatest poet” of Rome sing the history of 
Christian salvation. To describe what’s going on here, Schnapp turns to the Situationist 
concept of détournement, that is, in the words of Guy Debord, the appropriation, critical 
deflection, and historicization of the meanings of pre-existing artefacts without effacing 
them. In Debord’s definition we can track the same dialectical tension between 
 
 
38 Genette 2003 [1982], pp.341 ff. 
39 See Doody 2009. 
40 Doody 2009, p. 95. 
41 See Schnapp 1992. For an in-depth study of the cento, see Schottenius Cullhed 2015. 
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preservation and obliteration, continuity and discontinuity found in Even-Zohar’s idea of 
interference, now slightly nuanced by the awareness that what was before referred to as 
“replacement” is probably better defined as “erasure”: not effacement exactly, but a sort 
of preservation through obliteration.  
In line with this approach, but with a broader perspective, Marco Formisano has 
repeatedly argued that epitomes traditionally intended – florilegia, centones, but also 
grammatical commentaries, technical treatises, encyclopaedic compilation etc. – can all 
be reduced to a series of common cognitive and textual procedures, namely to 
fragmentation, dislocation, and replacement: 42 “[that is] mechanisms of recollecting past 
textual traditions, fragmenting and dislocating their content and giving them a new form 
– like Hippolytus’s body after the mythical sparagmós.”43 An epitomic dimension would 
thus appear to underlie the entirety of Late Antiquity, consisting in the parcelling and 
displacement of earlier classical culture.44 Formisano accordingly stresses the role played 
by allegory in Late Antiquity: not only is allegory a tool that implements the détournement 
of Antiquity, it affects late antique textuality more generally, a textuality constantly 
“détourning” itself.45 
2.4 Deferring the Object: Unconscious 
Although subversive readings doubtlessly help to free epitomes from interpretations that 
tend to dissolve them into their sources (the obsession, in the last instance, of much 
Quellenforschung, and in many respects the dominant hermeneutical paradigm in the 
study of epitomes), they seem to be no less reductionist than their polemical target. By 
constantly looking for subversive patterns we run the risk of substituting a teleology 
oriented to the original with a teleology projected toward the anti-original. Exchanging 
one fetishism for another does not really seem to be a fruitful way to account for the 
complexity and semiotic richness involved in any writing or re-writing process. The very 
idea of ‘‘subversion’’ is trapped in a dichotomy that opposes apparent meaning to 
concealed meaning; moreover, before turning something upside down you have to 
 
 
42 See Formisano 2001, pp. 154-161; Id. 2007, pp. 282-284; Id. 2012, pp. 522-527.  
43 Formisano 2012, p. 526. 
44 This dialectic somehow also impacts on the status of Late Antiquity within the Western academy. See 
Formisano 2007, p. 280; Id. 2019, pp. 119-125. 
45 See Formisano 2017b. 
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crystallize the object of the subversion, which means to stabilize it, to make it the origin of 
the whole process. In their redemptive efforts, scholars arguing for this geometrical 
reversal not only fail to get rid of the original, but, in the worst of cases, they fall victim to 
the temptation they reproach in more traditional analyses: they act systematically to get 
rid of it, exchanging the redemption of one textual constellation for the condemnation of 
another. Once again, an apologetic gesture has turned into an act of hermeneutical 
violence.  
I am not suggesting that we completely delete what, in Hegelian terms, we should call 
the negative movement of the dialectical process. I take it to be undeniable that the 
Medicina Plinii destabilizes Pliny’s text, and, more generally speaking, I continue to be 
convinced that we can hardly dismiss binary patterns of analysis: what I hesitate to do is 
to arrest this dynamic and to fix it into an oppositional macro-system. I would prefer, 
instead, to track a series of multiple micro-systemic negativities, of infinitesimal shifts, 
whose final sum does not necessarily result in the reversal of the previous configuration; 
it can, but it does not have to. Epitomes, thanks to their status as erasing texts, at once 
preserving and negating a previous textuality, give us the opportunity to study interesting 
phenomena of what we may define as pervasive negativity, which cannot be reduced to 
the static scheme of dialectical reversals. Then, drawing on what Renate Lachmann wrote 
almost thirty years ago in her monograph on Memory and Literature,46 rather than 
subversion, I would speak (though not exactly with Deleuze) of rhizomatization: each time 
a text is fragmented, each time its signifying set is altered, it becomes impossible to 
describe the subsequent signifying process as a linear string, since it is something 
wandering a-teleologically. The space occupied by epitomes is the space produced by 
these wandering signifiers, an inter-textual field. Lachmann holds that the inter-textual 
field corresponds to the domain of memory at the cultural level and to that of dream-work 
at the intrapsychic level. Thus, through Lachmann’s remarks, we arrive at one of the most 
controversial critical concepts from the final years of the ‘‘linguistic turn’’: the so-called 
textual or intertextual unconscious.  
I know it is risky (and perhaps even démodé, just like the whole framework sketched 
above) to dig out a critical tool as elusive as textual unconscious, whose very definition 
varies remarkably according to the critic we choose (Bellemin-Noël, Riffaterre, Culler 
etc.);47 nevertheless, it is precisely this instability that makes it fit for my purpose. If we 
look at the textual unconscious as an interplay of sliding signifiers conditioned but not 
determined by external pressures and drives (in our case they would be represented by 
 
 
46 See Lachmann 1990. 
47 See Bellemin-Noël 1979; Riffaterre 1987; Culler 1984. 
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genre constraints, audience expectations, and even, to some extent, authorial 
intentionality),48 then we might arrive at an analytical model fit for dealing with the 
processes that occur when texts are fragmented, recomposed, and consequently 
destabilized in their semiotic structure, reshaped but not necessarily turned upside-down. 
What I am looking for is a way to safeguard the openness of the whole textual constellation 
at stake, a way to account for the deep dynamicity we can perceive even in the apparently 
static gesture of literal repetition. Gilles Deleuze was right when stating that, in the game 
of difference and repetition no one has gone further than J. L. Borges: his Pierre Menard, 
author of the Quixote, looms as a ghost, a godfather, or just as the unreachable asymptote 
behind any attempt at re-writing. 49 
3 First Steps and Three Words 
Needless to say, I could not find such an object. Nor could I have looked at it. Perhaps 
because, as I cursorily observed before this sequence of deferrals, what I was looking for 
was, in the end, the act of cutting itself: an interstitial space not only between one text 
and another, but also within the same text, or even within a single word; hence the 
difficulty of building a corpus for my research – or rather, the paradox of constructing an 
organism when the purpose should be to contemplate dismemberment.  
In the following three chapters a recurring insistence on tension will become apparent, 
among other idiosyncrasies. The three works selected are all intersected by forces that 
stem from a series of polarities – it is precisely their being a force field that I would like to 
bring to the fore. Yet, deliberately, I did not pay much attention to the kind of tension one 
might expect to be the most typical in epitomes: the one between the epitome and its 
‘‘original(s)’’. Indeed, this issue has been almost systematically avoided in my study: 
among the selected works, only one, Solinus’ Collectanea, might properly fit into some of 
the categories usually employed to describe epitomes. For epitomic writing does not 
necessarily coincide with epitomes. It is more a textual dynamic than a textual form, more 
 
 
48 See Miller 1986; Rajan 1991; Stanford Freidman 1991. 
49 See Deleuze 2003 [1968], p. 152-153: “Sur ce jeu de la différence et de la répétition, en tant que mené par 
l’instinct de mort, nul n’est allé plus loin que Borges, dans toute son œuvre insolite”. 
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a process than an outcome.50 And, it seems to me, the best way to show its effects is to 
see how it works within a given text. I have tried to capture this phenomenon of internal 
splitting, the fissuring of the textual surface. Thus, the tension to which I refer can be most 
often observed between a text and that text itself. The term epitome can thus return to 
its primordial meaning of ‘‘cutting on’’ – we will look at texts that act as self-inscriptions, 
texts that, in a way, cannot stop dismantling and re-writing themselves. In other terms, 
the focus will not be on the literary domains where epitome as a functional object has 
already been the subject of scholarly analysis (namely: historiography, scientific writing, 
Fachliteratur, and versification),51 but, rather, on works that clearly display a tendency 
towards instability – a tendency that only our ‘‘modern’’ gaze would judge to be opposed 
to functionality. 
It is not by chance that the authorial figure is controversial, to say the least, in all of the 
three cases under consideration. Virgilius Maro Grammaticus, the author of two series of 
very peculiar grammatical treatises entitled Epitomae and Epistolae belonging at first 
glance to the genre of commentarii in artem Donati, has been dated variously between 4th 
and 7th century and localized in Gaul, Spain, Ireland, and England.52 His name is obviously 
fictitious, as are most of the auctores he quotes in the treatises. Virgilius Maro 
Grammaticus is for us, literally nothing but a projection of Epitomae and Epistolae, and 
any scholarly attempt to pin down his identity clearly represents an attempt to stabilize 
his unstable text – and vice-versa. 
The prosopographic discourse has played a less important role in the assessment of 
Gaius Iulius Solinus (even though, as we shall see, chronology has been similarly used as a 
criterion for estimating Solinus’ cultural relevance); the reason for this is that positivistic 
philology regarded Solinus’ Collectanea rerum memorabilium as a trivial compendium of 
 
 
50 I am here elaborating on Formisano 2007, p. 284: “epitome constitutes itself as a genre or rather, as I would 
say, as a textual dimension. It becomes a modality of literary expression and an epistemic tool. It is the product 
of a new culture and describes a new geometry of knowledge in granting an original form to materials stemming 
from the tradition.” See also Formisano 2012, pp. 522-528. 
51 As regards historiography, see the overviews in Banchich 2007 and Gasti 2015; there has been a recent revival 
in editions, studies, and translations of Iustinus’ epitome of Pompeius Trogus (Borgna 2018; Ead. 2020; Hofmann 
2018); Eutropius’ breviarium (Bordone-Gasti 2014; Bleckmann-Gross 2018); Festus’ breviarium (Fele 2009); the 
Origo gentis romanae and other sources (Bleckmann et al. 2017). For Fachliteratur, see Formisano 2001. For 
recent translations and commentaries of Vegetius’ influential Epitoma rei militaris, see Milner 1993 and 
Formisano 2003. New translations with commentaries have lately been produce for Iulius Obsequens’ Liber 
prodigiorum (Gusso – Mastandrea 2005) and Lucius Ampelius’ Liber memorialis (König 2011). Similarly, a 
renewed interest can be observed in “miniaturizing” versification, see at least Reitz 2007; McGill 2018. On the 
intersection of visual and textual “miniaturization”, see Squire 2011 who discusses the so-called tabulae iliacae.  
52 On the identification and dating of Virgilius, see Herren 1979. For a thorough treatment of Donatus’ Artes 
grammaticae and their legacy, see the still fundamental Holtz 1981.  
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teratological material drawn from Pliny’s Naturalis Historia, and so Solinus himself did not 
need to be much more than a shadow cast by Pliny, as dull and flat as his Collectanea. I 
hope that my reading will reveal, if anything, the protean nature of this shadow. 
Fabius Planciades Fulgentius, on the contrary, seems to have represented first and 
foremost a prosopographic dilemma for modern scholars: was he the well-known bishop 
of Ruspe (ca. 460-533 CE) or just his namesake? I will not tackle this issue directly: for my 
purpose it is much more relevant that all the works traditionally attributed to Fulgentius 
share an undeniable, almost maddening stylistic outrance: Fulgentius is such outrance.53   
This sequence of authors/works does not, I think, engender any pattern: there is no real 
argumentative progression, no teleological arrangement. Again, patterns and cross-
references will necessarily emerge, but only as a consequence of juxtaposition, not as its 
cause. A first step into epitomic writing will be to accept the absolute permutability of any 
discourse on epitomic writing. 
The very title of the present dissertation tries to reproduce this effect of juxtaposition 
and permutation; three words, vertigo, paradox, and thorns, have been decontextualized 
and then assembled, they are the result of a gesture of disruption and re-configuration. 
The ‘‘original’’ contexts are, as it will appear, the title of the single chapters from which 
each word has been plucked – vertigo stands for Virgilius Grammaticus, paradox for 
Solinus, thorns for Fulgentius. But are these words in some way ‘‘representative’’ of the 
three authors? What is their relationship to their referents? What is their reciprocal 
interaction? In other terms, what is the meaning of vertigo once it comes to be read side 
by side with paradox, and this with thorns? Can we alter this configuration? Can we shuffle 
the title?  
I hope that the three following chapters will help to answer the last two questions 
affirmatively. For the strongest tension residing in epitomic writing is the one regarding 
the determination of meaning as an act of reductio ad unum: what happens to this unum 
once the text has been dismembered? To what extent is the unifying moment in epitomes 
(the re-composition) actually unifying? The selected texts should help us to look into the 
fractured-and-yet-interconnected condition of the products of epitomic writing; all of 
them show a certain distance from themselves, a series of internal fissures: they are 
permeated by cutting.  
 
 
53 Beside the Mythologiae on which I focus in the third chapter, three other works are attributed to Fulgentius: 
Expositio virgilianae continentiae, an allegorical interpretation of the Aeneid that, in many respects, constitutes 
a diptych with the Mythologiae (Wolff 2009); Expositio sermonum antiquorum ad grammaticum Calcidium, a list 
of “abstruse” words (de abstrusis sermonibus) explained (Pizzani 1978); De aetatibus mundi et hominis (Manca 
2003), a world chronicle in lipogramatic form (in the first chapter the letter a is missing, the letter b in the second, 
c in the third and so on).  
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However, by plucking a word for each chapter, I obviously run the risk of moving in the 
opposite direction, that is, of providing the interpretative key for reading every single 
chapter – maybe suggesting, even more inappropriately, that these words are the keys to 
Virgilius Grammaticus, Solinus and Fulgentius. Instead, less univocally, and certainly more 
correctly, vertigo, paradox and thorns are meant to create emblems, I intend for them to 
reproduce the complex semiotic relationship we find in the enigmatic assemblages of 
images and words in the Early Modern emblemata.54 To phrase this as a semiotic 
blasphemy, vertigo, paradox, and thorns must function as images. They are juxtaposed 
not only reciprocally, but also to their respective chapters. They aim to create a tabula. 
Like this: 
 
Vertigo:  The first chapter tackles the problem of Virgilius Maro Grammaticus’ 
baffling textuality. In his ‘‘grammars’’ (Epitomae and Epistolae) not only 
is the Latin language altered, disassembled and re-assembled, but the 
whole tradition of antique and late antique grammar undergoes a radical 
process of demolition and re-configuration. There is an abundance of 
auctores, but, most probably, they are all fictitious; there are several 
quotations, but they are all made up. While commenting on adjectives 
and pronouns, Virgilius portrays a world in which grammarians live for 
hundreds of years, busy with crypto-languages, and cultivating what 
appears to be an esoteric doctrine. ‘‘Parody’’ seems to be too 
straightforward a word for what occurs in Virgilius’s treatises. Time, 
space, and logic (ratio) are made to collapse. Condensation and its 
‘‘absurdities’’ pervade the text. 
 
Paradox:  The second chapter analyses Solinus’ Collectanea rerum memorabilium 
as a force field crossed by centripetal and centrifugal forces, by archival-
encyclopaedic principles and geographic nomadism. Information is 
accumulated in the form of congeries, which can be read as a static heap 
of data and as text that rapidly changes at the same time. Snippets of 
marvelous and bizarre information flow incessantly, sometimes 
engendering unexpected, almost subversive constellations. The 
 
 
54 As is well known, emblems are central to Walter Benjamin’s theory of allegory as expounded in the Origin of 
German Tragic Drama (Benjamin 1998 [1928]). See at least Agamben 1993 [1977], pp. 135-140. For a historical 
and theoretical overview of early modern emblems, see Daly 1998; Id. 2014.   
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Collectanea seems to be a reference book asking to be read linearly – or 
vice versa, an exploded, granular, polycentric narrative. 
 
Thorns:  In Fulgentius’ Mythologiae, epitomic writing shows its most opaque face 
and condensation has become density, both stylistic and thematic. 
Fulgentius’ repertoire of ‘‘untenable’’ allegorical readings of mythological 
stories is no less thickly covered with briers than the fields that the 
‘‘narrator’’, as we shall see, has to traverse in the Prologue. 
Fragmentation and re-composition, the two basic movements of 
epitomic writing, are shown here to be not only the form of the clash 
between burgeoning Christianity and ancient Paganism, but also to 
constitute the very structure of any hermeneutical enterprise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter  1  
Schwindelliteratur as Vertigo-literature 
(Virgilius Maro Grammaticus) 
 
Pourquoi pas? – le signifiant est bête. 
J. Lacan, Seminaire XX: Encore 
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Anything that dies has had some kind of aim in life, 
some kind of activity, which has worn out; but that 
does not apply to Odradek. Am I to suppose, then, 
that he will always be rolling down the stairs, with 
ends of thread trailing after him, right before the 
feet of my children? He does no harm to anyone hat 
one can see; but the idea that he is likely to survive 
me I find almost painful. 
F. Kafka, The Cares of a Family Man 
1.1 Starting from an Afterword 
Grammatica dividit,1 and so does Virgilius Maro Grammaticus. It is difficult to think of an 
author who has stimulated more controversial discussion in scholarship over the last 
decades, nor one whose works have fluctuated so much in critical estimation since their 
first re-emergence in Angelo Mai’s modern edition of 1833.2 
Now, these first remarks are trite commonplace. The very fact of pointing to Virgilius’ 
swinging literary status, to his awkwardness and idiosyncrasy, could be said to have turned 
into a proemial t(r)opos for anyone willing to approach the Grammarian. “Elusive”, 
“baffling”, “fertile of imagination”3, “strano” (weird)4, “a paradox”5, “eccentric”6: these are 
but a few of the labels proposed by Virgilius’ (more benevolent) interpreters. However, it 
is precisely such widely recognized elusiveness that makes Virgilius’ a peculiarly useful 
starting point for reflecting on the dynamics enacted by texts that float in a field of 
perpetual tension, such as epitomes. No solution will be here provided for the many 
enigmas surrounding the author; we will rather seek to plumb the depths of his 
uncanniness, to inhabit (and, to a certain extent, map) his provocative alterity. 
Such alterity, for the sake of truth, has already been inhabited, in Giovanni Polara’s 
critical edition of Virgilius, written towards the end of the 1970s.7 The volume included – 
 
 
1 Sidon. Apoll. Ep. 5.2.1. Cfr. Kaster 1988, p. 19. 
2 A concise but still valuable overview of Virgilius’ scholarly vicissitudes up to the 1970s can be found in Herren’s 
seminal article, Herren 1979, pp. 35-42. Also see Polara 1977.  
3 Law 1995, p. 1. 
4 Polara 1988, p. 109. 
5 Law 1988, p. 121. 
6 Naismith 2008, p. 59. 
7 Polara – Caruso1979. 
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along with an Introduction by Polara himself, an Italian translation, and a Nota on the 
manuscript tradition by Mirella Ferrari – an Appendice (appendix) written by the translator 
Luciano Caruso: “On the Theory and History of Quotation. From Virgilius the Grammarian 
to…” (“Sulla teoria e storia della citazione. Da Virgilio grammatico a…”).8  
Starting from the title of the first subparagraph, “Hibernation” (“Ibernazione”), readers 
of the appendix are immediately confronted with a sudden swerve away from what one 
may expect to find in an afterword to a late antique/early medieval treatise. The surprise 
effect grows more and more alienating as the afterward progresses and the reader 
encounters an apparently chaotic heap of out-of-context quotations, argumentative 
inconsistencies, and randomly juxtaposed considerations on far-fetched philosophical 
issues written in dizzyingly dense language that seems to contain most of the linguistic tics 
common to Italian academic writing of the late 1970s: 
 “Hibernation 
An obsession with deterioration (i.e. with methods of production, dissemination, 
and consumption) as well as the emergence of a new method, disconnected from 
the previous ones, could be seen as the basis for the assumptions underpinning the 
following discourse. Thus far, signification (usually known as ‘interpretative lines’) 
has been examined through the lenses of historians, critics, and philologists, who 
are the false founders of a pretended new era to come. For now, the explanation, 
together with its own theoretical grounds, will be reactive in nature, that is, it will 
draw on testimonies, so as to make clearly visible the fields from where theories 
about the work might get started – and from where they did actually get started.”9  
 And so on for almost thirty pages.  
The most important point is probably that readers accustomed to late 1970s academic 
writing would not have gotten the joke before reading through at least twenty pages, and 
had Caruso not added a final disclaimer, in which he explicitly argues that the appendix is 
an “absurd text” (“testo assurdo”), a playful piece meant to be “a parody, indeed quite a 
 
 
8 Polara – Caruso 1979, pp. 335-378. 
9 Polara – Caruso 1979, p. 335:  
“Ibernazione 
 L’ossessione del deperimento (vedi, metodo di produzione, diffusione e consumo) insieme con l’avvento di un 
metodo diverso, non derivato dal primo, può essere alla base dei presupposti da cui muove questo discorso. Sino 
ad ora il modo di significazione, chiamato di solito ‘linee interpretative’, è stato esaminato seguendo le ragioni 
usuali di storici, critici e filologi, che sono di fatto i falsi installatori della supposta nuova epoca che si apre. Per il 
momento, la spiegazione, e la fondazione della spiegazione, è reattiva, essenzialmente articolata sulle 
testimonianze, di modo che si vedono perfettamente i campi dai quali può partire, e in effetti è partita, la teoria 
sull’opera.” Translation is mine. 
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good one, of academic discourse” (“una parodia, abbastanza buona, di un discorso 
accademico”), such over-intellectualised pastiche might well be taken seriously even 
today.10 The fact is that Caruso had not only been trying to produce a contemporary 
version of what he, following Polara, supposed to be Virgilius’ parodic attitude: a closer 
analysis of the Appendice exposes a strong interest in indeterminacy at the core of 
Caruso’s literary experiment.11 Although claiming that his appendix would be of no real 
use to understanding Virgilius’ works (“so che questa appendice servirà poco a 
‘comprendere’ l’opera di Virgilio Grammatico”),12 Caruso had been surreptitiously arguing 
against any other way of tackling Virgilius’ text. In fact, if anything at all is to be grasped 
from the aforementioned passage, it is a protest against historians, philologists et similia. 
It should nonetheless be noted that the statement is uttered through the persona loquens 
of a convoluted academic scribbler, and, as such, it had somehow to be marked by a 
typically 70’s dismissal of ‘‘traditional science.’’ Caruso’s writing both mocks and employs 
the tenets of contemporary academic discourse. The peculiarity of his scholastic game (a 
game played among scholars, contesting scholae, and against the schola) thus lies in its 
deliberately undecidable nature. Nothing could be set further away from the 
monodirectional rationality of the academic discourse – and yet, at the same time, the 
appendix does not really resemble a virulent example of academic subversion.13 
 
The problems are more subtle in Virgilius’ case, his alterity more unstable and displaced. 
 
 
10 Polara – Caruso 1979, p. 367. 
11 Determining the exact meaning and extent of the term “parody” when referred to Virgilius Grammaticus is one 
of the main problems tackled in the following pages. A “parodic” reading of Virgilius has been popularized outside 
the circle of Virgilian scholars by Mikhail Bakhtin’s influential work on Rabelais, where Virgilius is somehow 
connected to the well-known Coena Cypriani. Interestingly enough, the Russian scholar spoke, more precisely, 
of semiparody: “Another ancient parody is the ‘Grammatical Virgil Maro’ (Vergilius Maro Grammaticus), a 
semiparodical learned treatise on Latin grammar which is at the same time a parody of the scholarly wisdom and 
of the scientific methods of the early Middle Ages”, Bakhtin 1984, p. 14.  
12 Polara – Caruso 1979, p. 367. 
13 It is not my aim here to judge Caruso’s gesture in terms of its less or more revolutionary efficacy, nor to enter 
the major topic of academia and western political discourse in the 1970s. Suffice to recall Caruso’s own final 
exhortation to Polara that he “step back into secrecy and keep on talking about this topic between the two of 
us, so as to be ready for the imminent explosion of the contradiction on which our society and culture are based; 
we are living in a time of restoration which cannot be contrasted by resorting to these weapons” (“[è necessario] 
tornare alla clandestinità, a farceli fra noi certi discorsi, per prepararci alla prossima esplosione della 
contraddizione su cui è costruita la nostra società e la nostra cultura; questo è un tempo di restaurazione che 
non è possibile contrastare con queste armi”), Polara – Caruso 1979, p. 367. Trained as a philologist and a 
philosopher, Luciano Caruso was a poet, art critic and visual artist himself, a conspicuous figure in the Italian neo-
avant-garde of the 1970s. See Asor Rosa 1992, p. 127. 
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If one had to look for discursive clashes in Virgilius’ text, it would become quickly 
apparent that their constituent parts (i.e. dialectically opposed discourses) are anything 
but easily identifiable: they do not occupy the polarized extremities of a once-and-for-all 
given force field. For example: is Virgilius’ weird linguistic theory to be taken as a claim 
against other grammars, if not against Grammar? As previously touched upon, polemics 
over the supposedly parodic character of Virgilius’ writings are a commonplace in the 
Virgilian critical debate.14 While acknowledging Virgilius’ undeniable originality in 
deforming the ordinary praecepta, the parody-interpretation — which goes back at least 
to Lehmann and has been repeatedly maintained by Polara — might be understood as the 
most convenient shortcut to accounting for Virgilius’ paradoxicality. 15 By way of positing 
the object on which Virgilius carries out his supposedly distorting experiments, we make a 
first step towards a definition of Virgilius’ literary practice. Once the model (or the many 
models) are delimited, we need only compare texts, operate differentially (i.e. detect and 
catalogue local overlaps and discrepancies), to finally reach an understanding of Virgilius’ 
fundamental law of permutation.  
On the other critical pole, those who, not being fully satisfied with parody, have taken 
up the shield of ‘‘wisdom literature’’, might be rightly credited with having shaken up 
Virgilius’ scholarship again. They argue that Virgilius’ works cannot be easily aligned with 
other parodies: his treatises are too long and too rich in ‘‘serious’’ grammatical detail to 
be overtly interpreted as parodic texts.16 
Be that as it may, the primary concern of most scholars dealing with Virgilius has 
actually been to look for the one key which would enable them to decode his works, that 
is, to unify the manifold meanings unleashed by his text under one single signifying strand. 
To put it more straightforwardly: the Epitomae and Epistolae would owe their 
awkwardness to the fact of having NOT been correctly interpreted YET.17  
 
 
14 See Law 1988, p. 123; Ead. 1995, pp. 10-11; Munzi 1993, pp. 69-70; and all of Polara’s contributions.  
15 See Polara 1988, p. 110: “in most cases, when Virgilius provides the reader with amusing pleasantries he does 
not draw on any conjecturable archetype, so that we cannot but savour his fertile imagination and creative 
originality” (“nei moltissimi casi in cui [Virgilio] ammannisce al lettore divertenti amenità si distacca quasi sempre 
da qualunque ipotizzabile archetipo a tal punto che si può solo gustare la sua fertile fantasia, la sua originalità 
creativa”). Lehmann’s influential verdict is worthy of full quotation, Lehmann 1923, pp. 21-22: “is he [Virgilius] a 
hustler, or rather a very learned fool? Possibly neither: maybe he was a damned buffoon” (“ist er ein Schwindler 
der mit Gelehrsamkeit protzt, oder ein gelehrter Narr, der seine Schriften ernst gemeint hat? Möglicherweise 
war er keines von beiden, sondern ein arger Schalk”). Schwindelliteratur (“charlatan literature”) is another way 
to designate “fake-literature” and, according to Herren 1979, this term has been used to define Virgils’ works. 
16 This was notably Vivien Law’s ‘‘personal battle’’, see Law 1988 and Ead. 1995, but also Munzi 1993.  
17 Interestingly enough, the most insightful argument for Virgilius’ irreducibility is to be found in Vivien Law’s 
Decoding Virgilius Maro Grammaticus. However, Law’s willingness to discard the current parody reading results 
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I am not sure whether Amsler is right in stating that “to some extent, Virgilius’ precise 
intention forever eludes us”, but I think he does provide a helpful hint with his suggestion 
that: “Virgilius’s text is potentially the super-reiteration of the original antique 
grammatical discourse, but in an anagrammatical mode. Virgilius MARO’s AMOR of ROMA 
reclaims the medulla sensus, the MARROW of extraverbal meaning […] It is prophetic, not 
antiquarian, etymologia. The grammarian and the vatic poet of the Aeneid inhabit the 
same name.”18 
In many respects, Virgilius’s works seem to act as a counter-melody to the Isidorian 
etymological enterprise and the ultimate late antique encyclopaedic (and epitomatory) 
tradition.19 This notion of ‘‘counter-melody’’ should not, however, imply an idea of one-
to-one contrapuntal effect.20 Counterpoint rests on binary oppositions, whereas one of 
the main reasons it is difficult to disentangle the discursive threads that make up Virgilius’ 
writing is that he has a pronounced tendency to make things collapse. 
Collapsed temporality is one way of looking at it. Virgilius’ ‘‘imaginary library’’, a book 
collection purportedly spanning all ages and the entire oecumene, distills a kind of 
knowledge that is inherently supplemental and differed, a cultural construct that at once 
re-establishes and erases its origins.21 In point of fact, taken in its most basic manifestation, 
the Virgilian text is a commentary on books that possibly (who is the reader to judge?) 
never existed: the Epitomae and Epistolae embody the legacy of a possible past that might 
never have happened, and that, at the same time, constitutes the potential future seed 
for a creatively reinvented history. Let us stress once again that Virgilius is not in 
 
 
in a quest for the message and the content of Virgilius’ texts: “That parody plays an important part in Virgilius’ 
writing is undeniable; but it is no more satisfactory as a solution to the problem of his intent than the earlier 
hypothesis of earnest but misguided didacticism. Adopting the explanation of parody goes one step beyond the 
literal reading of the text; it peels off one layer of obfuscation. But it remains on the level of form, leaving the 
content – Virgilius’ message – untouched. Until we delve deeper we will find no solution. Perhaps, though, we 
are wrong to expect a single and all-encompassing ‘global solution’. More of our habits of thought than we realise 
have been permeated by the materialistic exigencies of natural science. In demanding a single solution to a 
problem, a single etymology for a name, a single underlying structure for a sentence, we transfer Aristotle’s 
dictum, ‘two bodies cannot occupy the same space’, to a domain for which it was not intended. No medieval 
reader would have been so simplistic […] Only by shaking off our ingrained craving for a single simple solution 
will we have any hope of understanding the nexus of intersecting planes of significance which Virgilius creates”, 
Law 1995, pp. 3-4.   
18 Amsler 1989, pp. 197-207. 
19 For a theoretical sketch of Isidore’s cultural enterprise and Virgilius’ possible self-positioning within it, see 
Amsler 1989, pp. 132-207.  
20 Nor am I here strictly referring to the well-known Saidian and then post-colonial concept of contrapuntal 
reading. Cfr. Said, 1994 [1993], pp. 66-68 and Ashcroft, Griffith & Tiffin, 2007, p. 49.  
21 Cfr. Naismith 2009. For a general introduction to the thematics of ‘imaginary libraries’ see Werle 2007, pp. 3-
52. On supplementarity and lost books cfr. Braune 2013. 
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contradiction with the grammatical canon – instead, his work represents what the canon 
would have been if it had been different. Likewise, Virgilius cannot be said to be against 
historicity – he plays with the biases of historicity. Virgilius’ text is a space of coexistence 
of times and places, of shared knowledge and supposedly esoteric gnosis. Virgilius’ future 
– Virgilius’ readership – is made of the debris of an irretrievable past – Virgilius’ mysterious 
books and sources –, a future that, as a consequence, turns out to be no less irretrievable. 
An economic way of defining Virgilius’ indefinability could be that Virgilius’ readership – 
Virgilius’ future – cannot exist. At best, it might coexist.  
In order to better grasp (or just to divine) who Virgilius’ readers may be, one could 
resort to the idea of a shifting reader. By shifting reader I mean a reading subject that 
never stops to negotiate its status during the reading process – a sort of photographic 
negative of any given implied reader, constantly ready to be subverted and questioned.22 
Virgilius’ text, ostentatiously based as it is on a proliferation of references (to previous 
grammarians, literature, philosophy etc.), nonetheless requires its readers to forsake any 
demand for referentiality: since the referent is lost, what remains is only the movement of 
reference, its phantasmatic force. Virgilian grammar performs and instantiates what one 
may be tempted to call a longing for meaning - not meaning per se, but its deferral. 
The fact that such a continual deferral of significance is achieved through the 
appropriation of literary forms and practices usually connected to genres that attempt to 
pin down meaning (such as grammatical commentaries and treatises) accounts for much 
of Virgilius’ uncanniness. As already mentioned, much in the Epitomae and Epistolae 
strongly recalls and directly draws on ‘‘Donatian’’ (serious) grammar. In strictly 
quantitative terms, the amount of ‘‘respectable’’ grammatical doctrine actually exceeds 
‘‘Virgilian’’ theory, but the general impression modern scholars have of the whole work 
inclines towards an opposite estimation. Such was not the case, notoriously, between the 
7th and 9th centuries, a timespan that witnessed a marked spread of Virgilius’ works as 
authoritative grammatical treatises.23 This is probably the clearest result of the 
amphibological nature of Virgilius’ writing. My limited purpose in the followed sections 
will be to investigate the contradictory semiotic matrixes that seem to be interlaced in 
Virgilius’ text. An obvious objection may be that resorting to any analytical grid runs 
against the very idea of an undecidable text, a text, such as this one, that teems with lists 
 
 
22 For an interesting reassessment of the very classical problem of “the reader” see Bennett 2008, pp. 11-43. 
23 Especially in the Irish area. For an overview of Virgilius’ reception and presumptive Irish background, see Herren 
1979; Holtz 1977; Id. 1981; and Id. 1983. Vivien Law repeatedly wrote against the scholarly common place of an 
Irish Virgilius while advocating for a need to revise the whole myth of Irish ‘‘latinitas’’ by pointing to the role 
played in the early Middle Ages by Anglo-Saxons centres. Cfr. Law 1982; Ead. 1993. 
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and catalogues and makes itself unclassifiable by performing a plethora of classifications. 
I cannot but agree. 
1.2 Order and Hierarchy 
Virgilius, for all of his tendency towards digression and his apologies for plurality and 
multifariousness, produced a text that is rich in self-reflexive hints at its own structure and 
argumentative development.24 The Epitomae and Epistolae are punctuated by rhetorical 
gimmicks we know only too well from the technical and textbook tradition.25 They present 
themselves as ordered texts. The very concept of ordo is emblematic of Virgilius’ posture 
as a grammarian and constitutes a key word in his authorial self-fashioning as a technical 
writer (primum in ordine ego, “ego will be the first according to the order,” Epist. II, 12; de 
cuius VII speciebus ordinatim expossiturus, “I will discuss the seven forms of the verb 
according to their order,” Epit. VII, 19). 26  
A lexicon of self-pacing runs throughout the text, bringing to the fore its argumentative 
articulation. For obvious reasons, such connectors abound in opening and, even more so, 
closing sections, where they sound formulaic, but, at the same time, suggest a certain taste 
for variation:   
His omnibus licet alio itinere decursis ad nostrum propossitum, hoc est ad metrorum 
narrationem fine tenus recurramus (Epit. IV, 312-314)  
 
Having dealt with all these other topics, let us come back from this digression to our 
original goal, that is, to the discussion of poetic meters 
 
 
 
 
24 On “multifariousness” cfr. Law 1995, pp. 47-56; 77-82. 
25 The seminal work on ancient handbooks is Fuhrmann 1960. Useful surveys of didactical rhetorical strategies, 
although with an emphasis on didactic poetry, can be found in Effe 1977, Volk 2002, and Markovic 2008. For late 
antiquity, see Formisano 2001. On grammar-handbooks, see Holtz 1981, pp. 46-121. 
26 On the rhetorical strategies through which technical writers created and negotiated their own persona, see 
Formisano 2001; Id. 2009; and Doody 2009. Such transitional formulas are very common indeed, even in 
Fulgentius, an only slightly less idiosyncratic author than Virgilius,  Aet. p. 138.10, ordo sumpti exigit operis quo…. 
Cfr. Hays 2003, p. 198: Lact. Inst. 3.1.8, ad hoc igitur me […] susceptae materiae ordo ipse deduxit; Mar. Victorin. 
Defin. (PL 64: 903B), quia ordo propositionis exegerat; Greg. M. Moral. 1.10, nunc ordo expositionis exigit ut…etc. 
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unum uobis huius rei ponam testimonium, quod clausulam dabit epitomae (Epit. X, 
188-190)  
 
I will give you another example of such procedure [i.e. the scinderatio], by which this 
epitome will come to an end 
 
 
Haec tibi, diacone sanctissime, de pronominis ratione breuiter dicta oportunum sibi 
petunt finem (Epist. II, 334-335)  
 
Venerable deacon, my short discussion of the nature of pronouns calls now for a 
conclusion, and rightly so 
 
 
Quia autem hiis dictis supra memoratus Aeneas suum finiuit sermonem, mihi 
quoque hanc epistulam scribenti hic terminus ponendus est (Epist. IV, 149-151) 
 
Since the aforementioned Aeneas wrapped up his speech with these words, I too 
had better use them to conclude my letter  
 
 
Verum quoniam de participio et in hoc et in supra memorato sepe opusculo 
sufficienter edisseruisse me arbitror, oportunum huic epistolae finem dabo (Epist. 
V, 268-270) 
 
Since here and in the short treatise I have mentioned before I think I have sufficiently 
dealt with the pronoun, it is time to conclude this  
The ordo scribendi is, as usual, hypostastized, and functions as an agent resolutely leading 
the persona loquens: 
Disposueram quidam de syllabis longius sermonem protrahere, sed quoniam ad 
metrorum nos pensationem ordo prouocat scribendi… (Epit. III, 31-33) 
 
I actually wanted to expand further on syllables, but the plan of my work requires 
me to move on to exploring poetic meters 
It stands for the constraints of what could be labelled a “well-shaped-discourse” and it 
speaks the language of necessity from the fifth epitome: 
Nunc de conparatione pauca dicenda sunt (Epit. V, 86) 
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Now we have to say a few words on comparison 
 
 
Nunc de genere tractandum est nominum (Epit. V, 124) 
 
Now we have to deal with the gender of nouns 
 
  
De numeris autem hoc tantum dicendum est (Epit. V, 149)  
 
As to the number [of nouns] we have to point out just that… 
 
 
Nunc de cassu sermo paulo longius protrahendus est (Epit. V, 219-220)  
 
Now we have to linger a little longer on the concept of case 
Expressing necessity is a way of voicing a belief in totality: such articulatory jointure-
elements, scattered throughout the otherwise lubricous surface of Virgilius’ treatise, 
provide it with a kind of didascalic rhythmicity while constantly bringing it back to an idea 
of wholeness, to a totality which is, first and foremost, structured. A fantasy of bodily 
organicity presides over the self-representation conveyed by Virgilius’ work when it 
performs as a grammatical text.27 What is more, this textual body is not only structured 
and articulated, it also has an orientation, a way in which it should be preferentially 
traversed: Virgilius’ utterance reddimus, ut potuimus, superiore epitoma rationem 
requirentibus (“In the previous epitome we answered, as far as we could…,” Epit. VI, 1-2) 
implies that the reader (at least on a primary level) is expected to move forward linearly 
following a predetermined path – that is, there are former and latter Epitomae, whose 
position within the system cannot be changed arbitrarily. Such observation, admittedly 
laughable in itself, may seem less obvious if one takes Virgilius’ scinderatio fonorum28 as 
an example of paragrammatic (fragmented, non-linear, constructive) reading and, in the 
 
 
27 For of an overview of the role played by the concept of ordo in ancient rhetoric see Squire 2014, pp. 358-361; 
367-373; for its socio-political implications see Kulikowski 2015. 
28 This is the term employed by Virgilius to refer to a series of techniques of word fragmentation, re-composition 
and permutation that he accurately describes and that cannot but remind modern readers of “cryptographic” 
practices. 
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wake of Amsler, sees in it a mise-en-abyme of Virgilius’ entire approach to (the 
grammatical) tradition.29  
The relevance of linearity or, more precisely, of sequentiality, gains further meaning when 
considered against the backdrop of the debate on the order to follow when exposing the 
partes orationis.30  
The Epistolae faithfully reproduce a series crystallised in Donatus’ Ars minor: nomen 
(Epist. I), pronomen (Epist. II), verbum (Epist. III), adverbium (Epist. IV), participium (Epist. 
V), coniunctio (Epist. VI), praepositio (Epist. VII), and interiectio (Epist. VIII). As for the 
Epitomae, they mostly overlap with the Ars Maior, in spite of some blatant and easily 
noticeable discrepancies (namely: the first Donatian chapter de voce is replaced with an 
epitome de sapientia; the whole third book on linguistic vitia is taken over by the notorious 
epitomes on scinderatio fonorum and etymology, and then by the catalogus 
grammaticorum).31 The question of whether the expositio of nouns should precede or 
follow that of verbs, or, similarly, the apologetic explication of the reasons why even 
pronouns are expounded before the “king of the sentence” (quia verbum simile debet esse 
regi, ‘‘since verbs cannot but be similar to kings’’, Epist. III, 69-70) becomes in Virgilius’ 
hands a place for dealing with the issue of hierarchy.  
In the prefatory section of the epitome De nomine, Virgilius’ beloved master Aeneas is 
said to have written no less than ten volumes on this controversial topic, Epit. V, 1-13: 
 
 
29 Amsler 1989, pp. 206-207. The idea of paragram and paragrammatic reading as a way to approach literary 
phenomena has been popularized by Julia Kristeva and Jean Starobinski (based, as it is well-known, on Ferdinand 
De Saussure’s notes on anagrams. See Starobinski 1971). The paragrammatic textual model, which admits 
contradictory and contrasting meanings within one and the same word, proves particularly apt for approaching 
Virgilius’ textuality. Cfr. Kristeva 1969, pp. 183-184: “l’ambivalence du paragramme poétique: il est une 
coexistence du discours monologique (scientifique, historique, descriptif) et d’un discours détruisant ce 
monologisme […] L’interdit constitue le sens, mais au moment même de cette constitution il est transgressé dans 
une dyade oppositionelle, ou, d’une façon plus générale, dans l’expansion du réseau paragrammatique”; Ibid. p. 
195 “Le paragramme étant une destruction d’une autre écriture, l’écriture devient un acte de destruction et 
d’autodestruction”. This is not the place to draw even a sketchy history of such anti-linear readings – their 
obvious psychoanalytical background would demand almost all of psychoanalytical literary theory to be included, 
for which anti-linearity has become a veritable exordial topos. See for instance Hertz’ reading of Longinus, Hertz 
1985, p. 8: “the movement I follow [in Longinus’ text] is clearly not linear; it does not run in tandem with the 
progress of the rhetorical argument from topic to topic but it is in certain ways cumulative – that is, at certain 
points one becomes aware of at thickening of texture.”   
30 See Holtz 1981, pp. 64-69. 
31 See Law 1995, pp. 5-6;  Polara 1993. 
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De nomine breuiariam epithomam edicturus rogare prius debeo quaerimoniantibus, 
qua diuitia nomen omnibus partibus Latinitatis praelatum sit, cum in Hibernorum32 
eloqutione et conpossitione primatum tenere aestimatur uerbum. Super hoc 
Aeneas X libros edidit, ex quibus unum tantum sumere oportunum puto quassum: 
Nomen, inquit, secundum sensum principium est, non secundum appellationem. 
Cum enim nascitur homo, antequam rem aliquam agat uel discat uel sciat, nomen 
illi inditur. Nomen ergo principalis pars Latinitatis est. 
 
Before starting my short epitome on the noun, I should give an answer to those 
asking why the noun should be granted a privileged place with respect to the other 
Latin parts of the speech, whereas in the language of the Hiberni the first place is 
given to the verb, both in terms of eloquence and phrase composition. Aeneas 
devoted ten books to this subject, but I will refer to just one of them: “The noun”, 
said Aeneas, “holds the first place according to its meaning, but not according to its 
denomination. When men are born, they are given names even before they are able 
to act, learn or know anything. That’s why the noun represents the first part of the 
speech in Latin.” 
Further explicit justification for the adopted (Donatian) order of the partes is also 
conveyed at the beginning of Epit. VI, De pronomine, 3-17: 
Nunc aliud quaestionis inminet genus, cur etiam pronomen uerbum praecedat, cum 
uerbum omnium partium egregium sit. Quibus hoc modo respondendum est, quod 
in divisione omnium partium orationis alii octo partes dixere, nonnulli eundem 
numerum minuentes nomen et pronomen in eandem partem redigendum 
putauerunt; uerbum quoque et participium in unum conglomerantes absordum 
dixerunt uelut a corpore membrum, ita a verbo separare participium; adverbia 
autem et coniunctiones unam partem esse putauerunt, sequestratis praepossitione 
et interiectione; atque ita erat, ut pro octo partibus V annumerauerint. Hac ergo 
ratione pronomen a nomine secernere noluerunt sicut socios a rege. 
 
Now we should answer another kind of question, that is, why in our treatment the 
pronoun comes before the verb, even though the verb is the most important part of 
 
 
32 The lectio Hibernorum, first suggested by K. Sittl, is significantly controversial. Herren 1979, pp. 56-57 accepts 
hibonorum instead, attested in the Parisian manuscript P. This is no innocent decision, since Herren reads 
hibonorum as Hi bonorum, “of the good men of Iona”, and uses it to further support his theory of Virgilius’ Irish 
origin. It is no wonder that Löfstedt, quite convinced that Virgilius should be situated in a Roman language 
speaking environment, restores Sittl’s conjecture. See Löfstedt 1981a; Id. 1981b; Id. 1982; Id. 2003. Herren 
restated his assumptions in Herren 1995, p. 59. For a critical evaluation of Löfstedt’s edition see Holford-Strevens 
2003; Kisdi 2003; Glei 2004. 
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speech. This can be answered by recalling that some grammarians fixed the number 
of the parts of the speech to eight, but some others, by merging nouns and 
pronouns, reduced the number of the categories; they merged verbs and participles 
as well, arguing that to separate them would have been like severing a member from 
the body; they also thought that adverbs and conjunctions were one and the same 
part, while prepositions and interjections constituted another one; as a result, they 
counted no more than five parts of the speech. For the same reason, they refused 
to separate pronouns from pronouns, just like one would never separate a king from 
his fellows. 
Images of bodily and social integrity are tightly connected and play an important role in 
this last passage.  
If we had to give a clearer definition of the nature of this social integrity by privileging 
one element over the others, we could call it monarchy: monarchic imagery is well 
attested throughout the Epitomae and Epistolae, and, as may already be clear, is 
particularly relevant in the discussion on verbs, Epit. VII, 10 -14:33 
 […] quod uerbum principalem partem orationis cuncti astruunt. Nam licet in ordine 
praeesse nomen admittat, tamen in possitione quassorum principatum tenet, cui 
aduerbiorum coniunctionumque agmina omne ius suum dederunt.  
 
[…] since everybody sees the verb as the most important part of the speech. Actually, 
although the noun holds the first place in grammars, the verb is first when it comes 
to structuring phrases: troops of adverbs and conjunctions bestow the right to 
command on the verb.  
The most eloquent passage on this theme is probably Epist. III, 104-111:  
Status igitur uerbi hic est, quod omnis dictio atque ratio uel sententia usque ad uerbi 
locutionem differtur et quodammodo mutificatur: Sicut usque ad regis sententiam 
auctoritatemque nulla populus pope uti potest, nihil loquela, nihil numerositas 
consiliumque proficit, ita etiam uniuersae orationis partes, licet numerosae sint et 
clarae, nisi tamen verbum adfuerit, ifirmantur et nullificantur.  
 
The status [role, condition] of the verb is such that every phrase, thought or 
statement is somehow suspended and silenced until the verb is made explicit. 
Common people, although eloquent, in big number or wise, are totally subject to 
the king’s authoritative opinion; in the same way, all the parts of speech, even if 
 
 
33 Virgilius’ familiarity with the notion of monarchy and its generally positive connotation has been used to try to 
date Virgilius, although quite unsuccessfully. Cfr. Herren 1979, pp. 42-47. 
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numerous and clear in their meaning, are almost weakened and annihilated until the 
verb shows up. 
The universe here reflected is a kosmos, a reality ordered in both socio-political and 
ontological terms. Shortly after, Virgilius rounds off his reflections on the status verbi by 
quoting the “well-known” scholar Originis Africanus, Epist. III, 134-138: 
Sicut et Originis Africanus in quodam uolumine super statu hominis edito sic fatus 
est: Hominis, inquiens, status si coepto permaneat, nihil instabilitatis habebit, sed 
inmotabilis quodam modo et aeternus aestimabitur.  
 
As Originis Africanus said in a book on the human condition: If human beings keep 
sticking to their original purpose, their condition will not be precarious, but it will be 
regarded as unalterable and, in a way, eternal. 
The insistence on stabilitas goes hand in hand with the essentialist thinking that grounds 
the equation verbum = rex. True, Originis Africanus’ statement is about “human beings”, 
not about “grammar”, but a sort of continuum between grammar and 
anthropology/cosmology is one of the most conspicuous trademarks of the Epitomae and 
Epistolae. 34  
It is not difficult to hear some echoes of the most wide-spread, top-down world views 
common in Antiquity and Late Antiquity in the elogium of the status verbi. Our aim is to 
investigate how such imagery, replete with phantasms of order, stability, and autocracy, 
turns out to be blatantly contradicted by Virgilius’ writing. Though, before seeking points 
of friction, let us continue reviewing the different shapes this imagery can assume. 
Another obvious example of straight imagery is provided in the section of the first 
epistola (De nomine), which discusses the casus accusativus, Epist. I, 304-315: 
Nunc de accusatiuo casu. Videtur mihi accusatiuus casus inter ceteros aliquid habere 
cuiusdam praelatiuae firmitatis, sicut et inter ceteras uerborum significationes 
actiuum uerbum. Unde et nonnulli ueterum [estimabant] accusatiuum cassum 
[uerbo actiuo] non nisi de genere masculino sumi omnino debere statuebant. Cuius 
quaestionis solutio haec erit: Genus masculinum dicitur omne quod firmum est; 
unde et fortes feminae dicuntur <uiri>; unde et Rithea, Nini regis uxor, suis 
clientibus dicebat: Nolite me dicere feminam, quia vir sum. Hoc autem dicimus ut 
sciamus, quid sit accusatiuus de genere masculino. 
 
 
 
34 As well as of Late Antiquity in general. Cfr. Amsler’s reflections on late antique etymological thinking, esp. 
Amsler 1989, pp. 44-53, 118-132. On Isidore of Seville’s linkage of grammar and anthropology, see Gasti 1998; 
and Henderson 2007, pp. 121-148. 
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Now let us move to the accusative case. It seems to me that the accusative case is 
the only one to show a sort of firmness that makes it superior to the other cases, 
very much like transitive verbs do if compared to other verbal forms. As a 
consequence, some ancient grammarians assumed that no other accusative than 
the masculine could be used with transitive verbs. The reason goes as follows: 
whatever is firm and strong is called masculine; that’s why strong women are called 
<men>; that’s also why Rithea, king Ninos’s wife, used to say to her courtiers: Don’t 
call me a woman, since I’m a man. I said this in order to prove what the masculine 
accusative is. 
Firmness (firmitas) and primacy (praelatiuae firmitatis) are here explicitly gendered: 
masculinity emerges as the natural place of stabilitas and contributes to further outlining 
the shape of the kosmos.  
As this reference to virility helps to clarify, a relevant role in the pursuit of order is 
played by the principle of verticality. This whole universe could be described, indeed, as a 
set of verticalities, each one ordering the field of politics, gender, epistemology, grammar 
and so on. Verticality is at its most active in the very first epitoma, De sapientia, a text 
which, in many respects, sets the tone for the entire collection. Virgilius opens the epitome 
by opposing earthly (tellea) and heavenly (aetrea) wisdom, Epit. I, 14-18: 
Haec sapientia biformis est: aetrea telleaque, hoc est humilis et sublimis; humilis 
quidem, quae de humanis rebus tractat, sublimis uero, quae ea quae super hominem 
sunt internat ac pandit.  
 
This wisdom is of two kinds: earthly and heavenly, that is, humble and sublime; the 
humble one deals with human things, the sublime one can penetrate and disclose 
whatever transcends the human dimension. 
Such a polarisation is obviously traditional.35 Moreover, it constitutes the conceptual basis 
for the visio Tarquini, a sort of visionary overture introducing the world of the Epistolae 
(Epist. Praef. 1-23). Virgilius claims to have found in some Greek historiae (in Graecorum 
legimus historiis) the story of a certain Persian vates called Tarquinius who used to write 
his prophecies down on tabellae and codiculi without publishing them before they proved 
true. One of the unpublished predictions ran, Epist. Praef., 15-23: 
 
 
35 Cfr. for instance the paradigmatic exordium of Seneca’s Quaestiones Naturales, 1, 1, where philosophy is 
strictly separated from the other disciplines to be then split into two parts, one dealing with human things, the 
other with divine objects: Quantum inter philosophiam interest, Lucili uirorum optime, et ceteras artes, tantum 
interesse existimo in ipsa philosophia, inter illam partem quae ad homines, et hanc quae ad deos, spectat. 
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Vidi [ait uatis] inmensum flumen de celo fluens alto, et hoc flumen uinum erat. Alium 
quoque riuulum uidi e terrae manantem petris, et hic riuulus aque erat; tum orto 
iubari solis raptus est ille riuulus obuiam flumini ab alto labenti, et collecti <duo> in 
unum fluuii uinum effecti sunt. Et unum erat flumen aetrium implens ac tellurem, 
in quo innumeri agni et vituli ludebant bibentesque ex eo inebriati ephitalamium 
canebant, et eorum audita uoce caelum ac terra pariter laetata sunt. 
 
I saw [says the prophet] an immense river flowing from the height of the sky, and it 
was made of wine. I also saw another river, small, gushing from the stones of the 
ground, and it was made of water; then, flowing from the east, the small river ran 
against the river from the sky, they merged, and they became one single river made 
of wine. And now there was but one earthly river flooding everywhere, in which 
lambs and calves were playing and drinking and, drunk as they were, they sang 
epithalamia – heaven and earth rejoiced at their voices. 
In Virgilius’ interpretation of the vaticinatio (Epist. Praef. 24-36), the “heavenly-wine river” 
stands for Christ and the Holy Scriptures, while the “earthly-water river” can be identified 
with the philosophiae eloquentiola; their convergence represents the conjunction of 
mundane and religious wisdom giving birth to a new, joyful dimension of knowledge, as 
embodied by Virgilius’ addressee, the deacon Iulius, an erudite in both the secular and 
religious domains (Epist. Praef. 37-43). The final image of hybridization (that is, the 
christological interlacing of heaven and earth, wine and water), though invested with a 
positive and overtly eschatological meaning, rests nonetheless on an original, irreducible 
bipolarity.   
That this dichotomy is clearly oriented emerges, again, through Virgilius’ emphasis on 
the idea of progression: not only is human knowledge organised along a line that moves 
from earth to heaven but no step of such ladder to wisdom can be skipped or reversed in 
sequence, Epit. I, 19-24: 
Nemo sane in hac me carpat pada, quod ueluti praeposterato telleam aetreae 
ordine antetulerim, cum scandentium hic mos sit, ut ab inferioribus incipiant et ad 
superiora scalatim perfendiant; unde et conparationum gradus hac moda ponimus, 
ut primum possitiuum acsi decelsiorem, dein conparatiuum, exhinc superlatiuum 
ordiamus.   
 
Let nobody blame me for subverting the established order and placing earthly 
wisdom before heavenly wisdom, since it is normal to progress step by step from 
the bottom to the top, just like people climbing a ladder; the same principle lies at 
the basis of the degrees of comparison, which we order as follows: the positive - as 
if it were the lowest one - then the comparative, and, at the top, the superlative. 
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With a typical movement, grammar becomes a mirror for the world, and vice versa.  
The insistence on the gap between earthly and heavenly knowledge, philosophia and 
Hebreorum leges (Epit. I, 31-33), has led some scholars to locate Virgilius in the centuries-
long debate about the place of pagan mundane culture in a christianized world.36 His final 
utterance, Non audemus tamen decelsis celsa subicere (“we don’t dare to subdue what is 
higher to what is lower”, Epit. I, 33) could well be read as a programmatic statement, but 
we do not need to be reminded that a parodic reading would ask us to ironize and subvert 
it. At any rate, what should be taken into account is that Virgilius’ world, be it on a “merely” 
imaginary register, is not only epistemologically split from within, but this same fissure, 
predictably enough, is said to be found in the nature of man: Haec ergo pars sapientiae, 
quae humilis est, sublimi servire debet, sicut et plastum afflae (“Thus, this part of wisdom, 
which is lower, must serve the sublime one, just like the body serves the soul”, Epit. I, 27-
29).37 
“Plastum” (body) and “affla” (soul), two typically Virgilian words, summarize a 
fundamental dualism (or in Virgilius’ case, as we shall see, triadism) no less effectively than 
the opposition “earth” / “heaven”, and they imbue one of the most abundantly attested 
parallels in the history of grammar with a Virgilian allure: human being vs letters.38 At Epit. 
II, 21-27 we read: 
 
 
36 See Law 1995, pp. 47-71; and Naismith 2009.  
37 To account for the long story of the dualism between body and soul here is impossible. Suffice it to recall that 
Vivien Law rightly pointed to the coexistence, in Virgilius, of this bipartite model (body/soul) with a tripartite one 
(body/soul/spirit), Law 1995, pp. 57-76. She stressed the potentially “revolutionary” implications of Virgilius’ 
standpoint in a context in which the tripartite doctrine was (possibly) regarded as dangerous and “heretical” (cfr. 
the resolutely dualist model of Isidore, Etym. XI, 6 ss.). In her view, Virgilius’ choice should be read “in the service 
of his programme of fostering an atmosphere sympathetic to intellectual multiplicity” (59). The present analysis 
is not meant to reject Law’s claim so much as to highlight that, be it tripartite or bipartite, the models proposed 
by Virgilius remain strictly hierarchical, and therefore, at least to a certain extent, operate under the sign of 
singularity. For a history of anima and spiritus in the Christian milieu that is still very valuable, see Verbeke 1945, 
pp. 387-510, to be integrated with Law’s remarks on post-Augustinian disputes, pp. 63-66. See also Dupuis 1967, 
pp. 36-57 and Crouzel 1981 for a discussion of Origen’s trichotomic model. On anthropology and psychology in 
Isidore of Seville, see Gasti 1998.  
38 Cfr. Law 1995, p. 57 n. 3, where a short list of patristic and grammatical texts on the topic is provided. Law 
traces the parallel back to Aug. De quantitate animae XXXIII, 66; another canonical locus is Pris. Instit., 13, 21-27. 
A comparison between vowels and the five senses is made at Epit. XI, 215-217; see also the aforementioned Epit. 
VI, 3-17 for grammatical phenomena explained through bodily metaphors. For the deconstruction of this model, 
see infra pp. 47-48. The relationship between letters and macro/microcosms lay at the core of treatises of the 
kind represented by the so-called On the Mystery of Letters, see Brandt 2007. The notion of God’s Truth as a 
“body of letters” can be shown to be relevant to gnostic thinking, for instance in Marcus Gnosticus’ doctrine as 
we read it in Irenaeus, Adv. Haer. 1, 13-20. See Stroumsa 2016, pp. 108-120, and, for the Platonic context, 
Oberhammer 2016. 
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Et ut aliquid intimatius aperiam, littera mihi uidetur humanae condicionis esse 
similis: sicut enim homo plasto et affla at quodam celesti igne consistit, ita et littera 
suo corpore (hoc est figura, arte ac ditione uelut quisdam conpagibus, arcubusque) 
suffunta est, animam habens in sensu, spiridionem in superiori contemplatione. 
 
And to make my inmost thoughts more evident, it seems to me that the letter and 
the human condition are quite similar: just as human beings consist of body, soul, 
and a kind of celestial fire, in the same way the letter can rely on its form as on its 
body (position and sound function as jointures and articulations); its meaning 
corresponds to the soul, while the celestial fire can be found in the higher degree of 
contemplative speculation that the letter can spawn. 
 
The link between letters and the human constitution is made possible by their common 
hierarchical structure.  
Virgilius develops his anthropological model further in the fourth epitoma by offering 
the reader a fully-fledged psychological theorization. Epit. IV, De metris, includes a long 
digression (for once signalled as such by the author himself) in which Virgilius expounds 
his own “encyclopaedic” system by way of commenting on the various genera 
philosophiae (Epit. IV, 119). Having provided a cursory definition of philosophia 
(philosophia quidam est amor et intentio sapientiae, quae fons et matrix est omnis artis ac 
disciplinae, “philosophy is a form of love and constant proclivity to wisdom, which is the 
source and the matrix of any art and doctrine”) and having reasserted its duplicity (sive 
celesti sive terrestri, “heavenly or earthly”), the author gives a list of the studia of the artes 
(mulae philosophiae)39: poema, rehtoria, gramma, leporia, dialecta, geometria, and 
astronomia. It is not by chance that the explanatio astronomiae (242-262) transitions 
seamlessly, after a usual remark on the untenability of astrology (stars cannot exert any 
influence on human life, since this is a prerogative of the Creator, God), into a more 
general statement on the ultimate goal of all wisdom, Epit. IV, 262-269: 
Omnis igitur humana industria, omnis ad hoc spectat sapientia, ut de inferioribus ad 
superiora conscendat, quo scilicet naturalem omnium rerum notitiam, hoc est 
fisicam, disputans, ethicam quoque, quae ad morum emulumenta pertenditur, 
legitime transcendens, logicam ipsam, hoc est rationabilem supernarum rerum 
attinguat disputationem.  
  
 
 
39 Here, as in other loci, the editor’s choice strongly impacts the text: Löfstedt has chosen mulae instead of the 
far less expressive multae, the lectio attested in Virgilius’ most complete manuscripts (the Neapolitan N and the 
Parisian P). 
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All human effort, all human wisdom aims at rising from lower things to higher ones, 
so that we transcend the discussion of natural things, i.e physics, to get to ethics, 
which deals with the refinement of our behaviours, and we finally reach logic, that 
is the rational discussion of the highest subjects. 
The tripartite ascensional scheme here outlined is applied shortly after to the most 
accurate discussion of human condition to be found in the Epitomae and Epistolae, Epit. 
IV, 270-295:  
Illud quoque omni sapienti sciendum atque scrutandum est, quomodo et qualiter 
sese plastus homo habeat, qui primum plastum ex limo, dein afflam ex superioribus 
et haec ineffabiliter coniuncta habet, dissimili natura in semet ipso perfruens. 
Plastum quidem quasi materia uiliore conpactum, utpute ex liquidis et aridis, frigidis 
et calidis rebus conexum, in famulatum sibi affla, quae est anima, nouerit 
deputatum. Sed quia anima ad hoc tantum imperat corpori, ut animet sicut et omnia 
animantia, ergo, nisi haec anima mentem et rationem habuerit, nihil ab animantibus 
differ, quae motu utroque carent. Sicut anima corpori, ita et mens animae et ratio 
praesulat menti. ‘Mens’ enim de metiendo dicta, quandam subtiliorum sensuum 
mensuram aperit animae, in quam capacitate tali quadam facta superior ratio 
infussa perfecte eam sapire facit in cunctis. Secundum triplicem ergo sapientiae 
quam diximus regulam triplex quoque in homine status est: Anima quidem 
naturalia sapit, in qua est et ingenium de ingenuitate creationis creatoris sibi 
insertum ac nominatum; mens autem moralia intellegit, in qua est memoria, qua 
uisa et audita tenaciter memorat et in ipsa uelut in quodam integro uasse 
congregans innumeris cogitationibus scatet; ratio uero superiora et caelestia 
perlustrans intellectum quodam modo ignitum flammosumque possidet.  
 
Every wise man should try to know and find out how and of what parts the human 
being is composed; first of all, human beings have a body that derives from the 
earth, then a soul that comes from heaven, and these two components, inexplicably 
enough, are bound together, so that human beings show a very contradictory nature 
in themselves. The body is made of humble materials – liquid and dry, hot and warm 
elements –, and it does know that it is inferior to the soul, which is a heavenly breath. 
But if the soul’s effects on the body were limited to animating the body and if the 
soul did not have a mind or any rational component, then no difference would be 
seen between human beings and any other living creature lacking both mind and 
reason. Just like the body is subject to the soul, so is the soul subject to the mind 
and to reason. ‘Mind’ [mens] comes from ‘measuring’ [metiendo], since it discloses 
to the soul the finest nuances of perception, and it is only later that reason, which is 
even more refined, enables the mind to understand everything. Thus, the tripartite 
structure of the human being corresponds to the tripartite structure of wisdom: the 
soul knows natural things –  which includes what is called ‘ingenium’, deriving its 
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name from the nobility [ingenuitate] of its Creator. The mind knows ethical objects 
– which includes memory, through which it can recall whatever has been heard or 
seen and, like a full vase, is replete with countless thoughts. Finally, reason can deal 
with superior and heavenly objects thanks to its intellectual power, which is subtle 
and penetrating like fire. 
What Virgilius proposes is nothing less than an umpteenth variation on the articulation of 
the relationship between knowing subject and known object and the ensuing hierarchy of 
sciences: 
Gradient of refinement   
 
anima mens ratio 
ingenium memoria intellectus 
naturalia moralia superna 
fisica ehtica logica 
 
This system recalls many other progressive models; its progression is based on the 
congruence of micro- and macrocosm.40 Aptly enough, the whole digression concludes 
with an eloquent description of man as mundus minor (Epit. IV, 295-319): the binary 
Weltanschauung is thus completed. 41  
In such a kosmos, measure and coherence cannot but gain in importance, both on a 
moral and a cognitive level. If the field of grammar may turn into a veritable battlefield, 
the words Virgilius puts into the mouth of a certain Lupus, an Athenian Christian 
grammarian known for his expertise in verbs, sound like a vademecum for surviving such 
intellectual war by resorting to rational weapons, Epist. III, 344-352:42 
 
 
40 Cfr. among others Aug. De trin. IX 1-4, XIV 1-3; De civ. VIII 6. See in general Law 1995, pp. 62-71. Law 1995 calls 
this tripartition “obscure”, p. 136 n. 57. It parallels many other tripartite schemes which arrive into medieval 
medical theories, up to the revival of pneumatology in the eleventh century. Most of the (lato sensu) Aristotelian 
physicians distinguished three progressively more refined spirits: the natural spirit, the vital spirit, and the animal 
spirit. See Agamben 1993 [1977], pp. 94-95.  
41 For the phrasing mundus minor cfr., among others, Arnobius, Advers. II 25, p. 95 l. 14; Fulgent. Myt., De art., II 
p.137 l. 14, III p. 141 l. 10. 
42 Cfr. Epist. III, 238-243: De his formis uerborum inter Regulum Cappadocum et Sedulum Romanum non minima 
quaestio habita est, quae usque ad gladiorum pene conflictum peruenit (‘‘Regulus of Cappadocia and Sedulus of 
Rome had no small argument on these verbal forms, a dispute which almost degenerated into a duel with 
swords’’). See also Desbordes 1989, p. 148: “Virgile part lui aussi de la grammaire classique et il en cherche les 
raison: ratio est son maître mot”. 
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Variis [inquit], fili, opinationibus non satis credas, quia tam multae sunt quam et 
cogitationes hominum. Lege ergo singulorum libros et scrutare et considera et uide 
quid in eis congruatum atque unanime (ut ita dicam) quidue diuisum ac desentiuum, 
et quicquid concors et cosentiuum inueneris, hoc suge in corde tuo ueluti quoddam 
salubre ac suaue uinum infunde; quicquid autem discors ac desentiuum repperieris, 
uelut uenenosum ac toxicum penitus euita. 
 
Son, don’t trust all diverse opinions, since they are as many as the thoughts of men. 
Read everyone’s books, examine them, reflect upon them, and try to work out on 
which points they seem to agree or, on the contrary, to dissent, and pick up just 
what they agree on, take it as if you were drinking a healthy and sweet wine; dismiss 
their points of dissent as if they were toxic and poisonous. 
The search for what is congruatum, unanime, concors, and consentiuum, though 
representing an implicit admission of the chaotic state of grammar as discipline, is 
nonetheless exemplary of a trust in organizatory principles, in the existence of a red-
thread that might lead out of a maze of pure linguistic potentialities.  43 The possibility of 
closure, of finitude (measure) as a guarantee for the intelligibility of any given system, 
crops up at different moments.44 Most interestingly, a praise of disambiguation can to be 
found in a section that is unanimously regarded as highly “Virgilian”, the notorious 
Epitoma X, De scinderatione fonorum, 100-103: 
Sciat unusquisque scindentium peritorum hoc in primis curare se debere, ut 
quaecumque sic scindat, soluitio probet, quomodo scindat. Non enim recte solui a 
quodam potest, quod non recte praeponitur. 
 
 
 
43 Cfr. the very explicit statement at Epist. VI, 51-55: Mirandum autem, immo deflendum est totoque lugendum 
affectu, quod cum ceterae orationis partes tum maxime coniunctiones confusae et circumiectae sint, in tantum 
<ut> inter causales et rationales nulla pene distantia sit (“It is not only hard to believe, but even regrettable and 
totally deplorable that conjunctions, just like other parts of speech, are confused and scattered to such extent 
that it makes it very difficult to tell causal conjunctions from rational conjunctions”). De Nonno 2017, pp. 239-
240 points out that non-dogmatic grammarians have always tried to face up to quaestiones de dubio sermone by 
resorting to “variable-geometry systems” (“sistemi a geometria variabile”) in which the principles of consuetudo, 
auctoritas and ratio are made to freely interact - a sort of geometry of chaos. 
44 The risk of a potentially infinite regressio etymologica was notably one of the main arguments in Augustine’s 
critique of etymology, considered as a solid ground for epistemology, a mistrust that led him to situate linguistic 
origin beyond language itself. Cfr. Amsler 1988, pp. 51-53. On Augustine’s “restricted relativism”, see Carlo 
Ginzburg’s discussion of De doc. Chr. III.14.22 in Ginzburg 2010, p.76 ff.  
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An expert in word-scrambling should always take care to provide a key to decode 
the scramble. In fact, no scrambling can be solved if it is not presented in a 
convenient way. 
 
The “scrambling of words”, this passage seems to imply, must remain within the 
boundaries of intelligibility. Virgilius outlines a “deontology of the scrambler”, an ethics 
for linguistic jugglers, which can be condensed into the slogan: “there must be a solution”. 
In other words, in this passage Virgilius pronounces himself against an infinite drift of 
meaning.  
A penchant towards closed signifying constructs emerges no less vividly in a motto 
Virgilius attributes to Felix Alexander, Agenorum magister, Epit. IV, 137-139: 
 
Unaquaque, inquiens, ars intra suas conteniatur metas, ne adulteretur disciplina 
maiorum et nos apud eos accusare cogatur. 
 
Let every art contain itself within its own boundaries, he said, so that the doctrine of 
our fathers won’t be contaminated and we won’t be culpable in their eyes. 
 
Shortly thereafter, the metae that shape and identify the various disciplinary domains 
reverberate in the etymology Virgilius gives for mens, in the above mentioned 
anthropological passage, Epit. IV, 270-295: ‘Mens’ enim de mensura dicta (“‘Mind’ thus 
comes from ‘measure’”).45 Measure is thus one of the many hypostasies of the order with 
which we began our analysis. This appears very clearly in meta-grammatical reflections 
such as the following, Epit. VII, 31-35: 
Ita et verbum quoque ex qualitate ordiendum est, quae ex modis ac formis uelut 
quibusdam certis limitibus determinatur; modus enim non aliud quam certam 
mensuram significat. Ex his itaque modis tractatum incipiamus habere. 
 
Verbs should also be ordered according to their quality, which is defined by modes 
and forms in precise terms; actually, ‘mode’ does not mean anything but ‘measure’. 
Thus, let us start the present treatise by dealing with modes. 
Virgilius has no problem dismissing a theory he does not like by accusing it of running 
contra omnem ordinem rationemque (Epist. I, 111-112). 
 
 
45 Isidore, Etym., XI 12 focuses on memoria and eminere instead. 
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Felix Alexander’s praeceptum adds a further element to the range of ordines we are 
looking for, and a very significant one when it comes to grammar: authority.46 
What is meant here by authority does not exactly coincide with auctoritas, that is to 
say, with the criteria that have defined latinitas since Varro (at least).47 Although the list 
of these criteria varies slightly over time (the Varronian natura, analogia, consuetudo, 
auctoritas; Quintilian’s 1. 6. 1-3 ratio, vetustas, auctoritas, consuetudo etc…) and despite 
some oscillations in meaning, auctoritas can be conveniently described by resorting to the 
definition transmitted by Charisius, GL 1.15.8-12: 
Auctoritas in regula loquendi nouissima est: namque ubi omnia defecerint sic ad 
illam quem ad modum ad aram sacram decurritur; non enim quicquam aut rationis 
aut naturae aut consuetudinis habet: tantum opinione oratorum recepta est, qui et 
ipsi cur id secuti essent, si fuissent interrogati, nescire se confiterentur. 
 
When establishing the rules of a language, authority is the last principle we can 
adopt: after all other principles have proved useless, one can resort to it as to a 
consecrated altar; its argumentative strength does not rely on reason, nature or 
linguistic habits: it is exclusively based on the opinion of rhetors who, if asked about 
the reasons for their linguistic choice, will probably admit that they have no idea. 
Significantly enough, auctoritas designates what falls out of any rational inference and can 
be justified on the sole basis of being attested in some authoritative text. The arbitrariness 
of this procedure is made even clearer by the circular formulation it takes on in the Ars 
Sancti Augustini, I:48 
Latinitas est observatio incorrupte loquendi secundum Romanam linguam. Constat 
autem modis tribus, id est ratione, auctoritate, consuetudine […] auctoritate 
secundum eorum scripta quibus ipsa est auctoritas adtributa. 
 
 
 
46 See De Nonno 2017, pp. 221-235. On the merging of antiquitas and auctoritas in Nonius Marcellus’ De 
compendiosa doctrina, see Chahoud 2007, pp. 79-81. Cfr. also Law 1995, pp.79-82. On auctoritas and origo, see 
Bracken 2006, pp. 9-10.  
47 On the difficulty of pinning down Varro’s exact words, see De Nonno 2017, p. 231. n. 71. On the history and 
oscillations of latinitas as a model of cultural and linguistic identity, see Desbordes 1989. 
48 These are very Augustinian ideas indeed. Cfr. De doc. Chr.2.19: Quid est ergo integritas locutionis, nisi alienae 
consuetudinis conservatio, loquentium veterum auctoritate firmatae? (“What then is purity of speech except the 
preserving of customs different to ours, established by the authority of former speakers?”). See De Nonno 2017, 
pp. 229 ff.; Law 1990; Ead. 1995, p. 80. See Pollmann 1996, p. 153 for Augustine’s merging of auctoritas and 
consuetudo.    
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Latinitas can be defined as the way of speaking correctly in accordance with the rules 
of the Roman language. It is based on three principles, reason, authority and habit 
[…] authority is based on those works to which authority itself is attributed. 
In the Epitomae and Epistolae, authority subsumes all verticalities under a single category: 
indeed, authority structures hierarchy and establishes order, while at the same time 
pointing to their conventional nature.  
In a passage from the first epistle, Virgilius urges his reader Iulius not to dismiss 
apparently wrong word-combinations such as hoc arbor and hoc lapis when they are 
anciently attested, though not by an “undoubted author”, Epist. I, 44-50: 
Moneo itaque te, o frater carissime, ut, quamuis non hac nunc consuetudine 
scribendi utamur, tamen quia hoc apud ueteres pro recto habebatur, si quid forte 
huius modi scriptum repperieris, licet non ad indubitatam auctoritatem 
referendum putes, tamen quod a ueteribus usurpatum est, reprehendere omnino 
non debes. 
 
Let me remind you, my dear brother, that, even if we no longer write in this way 
today, since the ancients thought that it was acceptable, you should not rebuke 
them if they use a linguistic form which cannot be found in unquestionably 
authoritative texts.  
The ueteres seem thus to bear a sort of inherent authority, Epist. III, 352-359: 
Vnde et ego hoc inserui, ut in ratione verborum, quaecumque a maioribus ac 
ueteribus inserta sunt, libenter suscipiatis. Quae autem media sunt et quodam modo 
in ambiguo posita, hoc nec refutabis nec adfirmabis, etsi scriptum audieris, non 
contendes, utrum ad indubitatam auctoritatem aut ad ambiguum exemplum. 
 
I added this information to enable you to pick up whatever you want from what the 
ancients have said about the verb. Moreover, you will neither reject nor confirm 
those forms that might seem to be ambiguous, and if you hear them written, you 
won’t wonder whether they are to be taken as proof of unquestionable authority or 
as examples of ambiguity. 
In spite of all the anti-archaistic trends that can be found in the history of grammar, 
Virgilius is consistent with later attitudes according to which the past is per se 
authoritative, an idea he conveys at many different points in his work: et ne unius tantum 
utamur exemplo, quod a nostris maioribus plerumque uetitum est… (“and not to limit 
myself to one single example (which was forbidden by our fathers)…,” Epit. VII, 96-97); 
multa de impersonali modo dixere ueteres, ex quibus pauca promam (“The ancients wrote 
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a lot about the impersonal form, but I am going to deal with few points…,” Epit. VII, 113-
114).49 
Of the most notoriously striking features of Virgilius’ writing is his taste for biographical 
and autobiographical anecdotes, and the essential role played by the teacher-pupil 
relationship in the Epitomae and Epistolae.50 The world Virgilius portrays is characterised 
by an utmost respect for disciples and their masters – in this sense, Virgilius’ love for his 
own teacher, Aeneas, is exemplarily proposed as a model worthy of imitation. Aeneas and 
his colleagues (and forerunners) make up a gallery of authoritative figures: Ego Aeneam, 
quem falli in nulla erat possibile ratione, sequens confidenter assero…(“In the wake of 
Aeneas, who could in no way be wrong, I argue that…,” Epit. V, 103-105). A faithful disciple 
and a scrupulous grammarian, Virgilius never stops underlining his dependence on 
previous doctrines and/or theories: sed haec licet indubitatam nobis auctoritatem non 
exhibeant, tamen quia a plerisque gnarissimis uiris ussurpata sunt, apertam diffessionem 
inferre non debent (“but, even though these phenomena are not supported by an 
unquestionable authority, we should not reject them, since they are attested by many 
highly competent writers,” Epit. V, 112-115); nos autem sequentes doctorum scita, non 
uulgaribus opinionibus adducimur (“but, by following in the footsteps of erudite men, we 
don’t fall prey to vulgar opinions,” Epit. V, 297-298); sed ego Gratiano magistro fretus, 
cuius in scola decim annos, hoc ita statui (“I’m arguing this relying on my teacher Gratianus, 
whose school I attended for ten years,” Epit. VIII, 136-137). As noted before, the continual 
tension between potential chaos (in the form, for example, of countless, disparate 
explanations of the same grammatical phenomenon)51 and normative order, a tension 
that permeates the whole history of grammar, finds convenient expression in Virgilius’ 
 
 
49 Cfr. Law 1995, p. 79. For the complex relationship between antiquitas and auctoritas in ancient grammar, see 
De Nonno 2017 and Chahoud 2007. 
50 Cfr. Law 1995, pp. 27-29. The most obvious result of this tendency is Epit. XII, the catalogus grammaticorum.  
51 Cfr. Epist. II, 117 ff.: Est pronomen, de quo dubitatio magna habetur, utrum finitum an infinitum sit, ut iste. 
Nonnulli etenim infinitum esse cum quadam diffensionis suae auctoritate hortantur…(“It is highly controversial 
whether iste should be considered as a definite or an indefinite pronoun. Some grammarians argue that it is 
indefinite and support this theory through authoritative examples…”); Epist. III, 750 ff.: Inchohatio in una tantum 
uerbi forma habetur, quae forma ob hoc inchohatiua dicitur, quia praeteritum tempus non habeat, ut calesco. 
Quamquam multi Latinorum diffinite affirment nullum uerbum fieri debere, quod prateritum tempus non 
habeat… (“There is but one inchoative form, which is called this precisely because it lacks the past form, as we 
can observe in calesco. And yet, some Latinists purport that it is impossible that a verb does not have a past 
form…”). 
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textuality: his ostentatious search for the ratio underlying each and every grammatical 
issue ends up in an apology of the most arbitrary ordering criterion, auctoritas.52 
What we hope to have shown is that because of an overwhelming presence within 
Virgilius’ discourse of an ideology of power (based on order, hierarchy, authority, and easily 
formalized into what we called verticalities), the text, even at a “literal level”, is capable of 
alerting the reader to the arbitrariness of this very same power, or, at least, of the 
circularity of its pretensions. It is worth stressing that the reader we are talking about is 
not an ironic one (nor, for that matter, a parodic one): on the contrary, this particular 
process of inherent contradiction is especially effective for those readers who are ready 
to take Virgilius “seriously”. 
1.3 Towards…what? 
Françoise Desbordes has rightly drawn attention to the almost obsessive rationality 
displayed by this author, who has often been labelled a “fool”, but it is to Vivien Law that 
we owe a more detailed analysis of the effects of ambiguity produced by Virgilius’ way of 
dealing with rationality and authority.53 In particular, she has singled out some passages 
from Epist. III, De verbo, that merit further attention: 185-187: Quod quia nulla ueritate 
subnixum atque suffultum est, non ad auctoritatem, sed ad ambiguitatem scribendum 
est (“Though, since this phenomenon cannot be positively proved to be correct, if we find 
it in texts, that is not because of any authoritative witness, but because of the ambiguity 
of the language”); 355-356: Quae autem media sunt et quodam modo in ambiguo posita, 
hoc nec refutabis nec adfirmabis, et si scriptum audieris, non contendes, utrum ad 
indubitatam auctoritatem aut ad ambiguum sumatur exemplum (“you will neither reject 
nor confirm those forms that might seem to be ambiguous, and if you hear of them 
written, you won’t wonder whether they are to be taken as proof of unquestionable 
 
 
52 Cfr. Baratin 1996, pp. 255-257: “la grammaire antique se présente comme la rationalisation d’une 
accumulation […] la grammaire est la science de cette diversité qui est née de l’accumulation, mais pour dire 
cette diversité, ou bien elle ne fait que la répéter, et elle ne sert à rien, ou bien elle la systématise, et, du coup, 
elle ne la dit plus […] l’idée même de système généralisé, susceptible de transcender l’infinie diversité apparue 
concrètement avec l’accumulation de textes, aboutit, à travers sa recuperation scolaire, à server de reflet à une 
bibliothèque limitée”. Virgilian grammar can also be regarded as a means to transcending these limitations. 
53 Cfr. Desbordes 1985, p. 148: “Virgile part lui aussi de la grammaire classique et en cherche les raisons: ratio 
est son maître mot. Mais ce faisant il met au jour les contradictions de la grammaire et, volontairement ou non, 
les approfondit au point de les render irréductible”. 
  45 
authority or as examples of ambiguity”); etc. “Ambiguity,” Law sums up, “is pointed out 
repeatedly, instilling insidious doubt into the reader’s mind. If a grammarian cannot 
convey confidence in authority, who can? By his very inconsistency Virgilius signals his 
view: authority is (as a rule) as inappropriate a means of settling linguistic disputes as it is 
in other situations. Ambiguity, which after all is simply another sort of plurality, is as 
mighty a force in language as in other spheres of activity.”54  
Nonetheless, as we have seen, authority is also ambiguity, they are two sides of the 
same coin. In a similar way, the aporetic redundancy of Virgilius’ linguistic analysis seems 
both to brim with erudition (authority) and to mock the numbing effects erudition might 
engender (ambiguity): an excess of cultural authority turns into its reversal, obtuseness.55 
One could go so far as to argue that ambiguity is employed as a stylistic tool, as the basso-
continuo of a writing style that inevitably becomes more and more ambiguous as it boasts 
of “grammatical” exactness and exhaustiveness – repletion and numbing repetition loom 
everywhere in the Epitomae and Epistolae. 
The relationship between repetition and parodic attitude has been extensively 
investigated. Olbrechts-Tyteca quotes two well-known lines from Hamlet as an example 
(Act II, Scene II): 
King: “Thanks, Rosencrantz and gentle Guildenstern’’ 
Queen: “Thanks, Guildenstern and gentle Rosencrantz” 
The comic effect, Olbrecht-Tyteca maintains, is here produced by means of the disruption 
of Guildenstern and Rosencrantz’s individualities: comicality substitutes previous 
uniqueness (in this case, Guildenstern and Rosencrantz being considered as distinct 
 
 
54 Law 1995, pp. 81-82. 
55 A highly productive obtuseness nevertheless. Such a procedure is well known in literary history and became a 
favourite aesthetic gesture of Modernism, and its precursors. Cfr. Jonathan Culler’s discussion on erudition and 
stupidity in Flaubert’s La tentation de Saint Antoine, Culler 2006 [1974], p. 184: “The attitude of mind which 
makes the vast collection of heresies, theories, images, and objects into instances of stupidity does not dispense 
with them but makes them more powerful as temptations, since in them the mind can attain the kind of 
exaltation and freedom which Antoine expresses in his final paragraph. The supreme accomplishment of 
stupidity as both a property of objects and a mode of vision would be to overcome all alienation by making the 
actual forms of the world disappear and allowing the mind itself to create the world out a universal and 
undifferentiated matter.” See also Sianne Ngai on stuplimity as a conflation of stupidity and sublimity, Ngai 2007, 
pp. 248-297: “stuplimity drags us downward into the realms of words rather than transporting us upward toward 
an unrepresentable divine”, p. 263. Among late antique grammarians, Pompeius (not by chance compared to 
Virgilius, see infra p. 50) provides a suitable example, Holtz 1981, p. 236: “Pompée, par son laisser-aller, sa 
volumineuse enflure, sa vacuité, représente dans la si riche littérature technique des Africains un cas-limite. Les 
règles de grammaire deviennent l’occasion de discussions à perte de vue sur des points de detail. Discussions 
passionnées sur des sujets futiles ou irréels”. 
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persons) through a new and displaced unity (Guildenstern and Rosencrantz becoming 
interchangeable, one and the same thing). In such “comic du lieu de l’unique” lies much of 
the efficacy of parody.56 In his Vorschule der Aesthetik, Jean Paul had already observed 
that if it was true that a detail in someone’s face could turn into something comical if 
transferred to another person’s face, two completely identical brothers were more likely 
to cause fear than amusement.57 The German writer had thus already fully grasped the 
Freudian uncanniness often implied by repetition. Parody, as a form of repetition, can be 
no less uncanny.58  
Paola Mildonian, commenting on mimetic writing modes (pastiche, cento etc.), goes 
further in this direction: parody, being based on repetition and therefore being in essence 
self-reflexive, should be aligned with what Hans Bloomenberg once dubbed “forms of 
Nachdenklichkeit” (thoughtfulness)59 – parody is a gesture of epistemological introversion 
that causes the reader’s (listener’s, beholder’s) attention to shift from the present text to 
another one, creating not only an intertextual space, but also an intratextual one, a fissure 
within the text.60 Just like allegory, parody exploits the multiple meaning of words: by 
pointing to its potential multifariousness, it distances a text from itself.61  
And yet, to return to Virgilius, what if we had some trouble in pinning down the extent 
of such a ‘‘space’’? What if we are not even sure that we are dealing with a ‘‘parody’’, or 
whether our text is actually ironic and referential? The problem could tentatively be 
worked around by abandoning traditional definitions of parody and adopting distancing 
as a main criterion.62 
 
 
56 Cfr. Olbrechts-Tyteca 1974, pp. 97-98. 
57 Quoted by Olbrechts-Tyteca, p. 98 n. 13. 
58 Cfr.  Hutcheon 1995, pp. 32-34; Mildonian 1997, pp. 15-19. On repetition and its paradoxical status, see 
Rimmon-Kenan 1980. 
59 Mildonian 1997, pp. 18-19. 
60 In this sense, parody is most explicitly paragrammatical (cfr. supra p. 28 n. 29). For a series of compelling 
reflections on intratextuality in ancient literature, see Sharrock 2000. 
61 In other terms, parody helps to spatialise the text, allowing for multiple readings and breaking down the unicity 
of the so-called original – in every single text, it seems to argue, many texts always coexist. Moreover, being 
essentially a self-aware game with codes, parody draws our attention to the arbitrariness of codes in general and 
reveals the piece of art for what it actually is, a constructed object. The word “object” is here of no less relevance 
than the adjective “constructed”: every parody seems to perform a reifying gesture with respect to the original 
text. As we shall see in the case of Virgilius, this reification has much to do with the exuberant materiality of the 
signifier – words, when considered through a distancing eye, turn out to be objects. But reification can encompass 
all signifying systems. On this aspect, Mildonian 1997, p. 18 quotes an illuminating saying by the “great parodist” 
Stravinskij: one should not only listen to music, but also see it.   
62 Note the assertive tone with which Frank Wünsch begins his classification, Wünsch 1999, p. 11: “Eine parodie 
bezieht sich immer auf eine Vorlage (ein Original, einen Bezugstext), die sie partiell wiederholt (imitiert, 
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In his monograph devoted to the “impossibility of reading” in modern literature, 
Benjamin Bennett resorts to the concept of intransitive parody.63 He defines it as “parody 
without an object”, a text perceived by readers as referring to another text, but whose 
referent cannot ultimately be proved to exist. Among Bennett’s examples, the most well 
known is probably Thomas Mann’s Death in Venice. The style of the novella, rich in 
classicising metaphors and lavish adjectives, could be read as a parody of the protagonist’s 
(the renowned Gustav von Aschenbach’s) literary style, as far as we can infer it from the 
novella. Furthermore, Death in Venice itself seems to be the very work on Tadzio which 
Aschenbach could not write, producing a full list of supplemental works instead (whose 
titles are actually listed in Mann’s narrative): what we read is thus a text which the 
‘‘author’’ never really wrote, and which parodies texts that we will never read. The game 
is further complicated if we take Death in Venice’s ‘‘real’’ author into account and consider 
Gustav von Aschenbach as his fictional Doppelgänger. 
Intransitivity, auto-reflexivity, and “objectlessness” are labels that might be easily used 
to approach Virgilius’s writing, provided we do not succumb to the temptation of seeing 
them as Virgilius’s programmatic goal. The very existence of a goal would posit an object, 
but the peculiarity of Virgilius’s text lies precisely in its capability of losing itself and 
bringing goal-obsessed readers to the brink of exasperation. ‘‘A self-losing text’’ might 
actually be a way to rephrase Bennett’s intransitive parody: a text that runs parallel to 
another one without ever intersecting it – plus one more fundamental condition: running 
text and unreachable text are one and the same. 
 
 
nachahmt, nachbildet), aber gleichzeitig auch variiert (verändert, adaptiert). Die Art der Variation ist 
gründsäztlich abweichend, unpassend, verzerrend, und verzerrt wird immer dargestalt, daß eine komische 
Wirkung entsteht speziell eine komische Diskrepanz zwischen Original und Parodie”. The emphasis lies quite 
often on intentionality, Wünsch 1999, p. 117: “Die komische Verzehrung der Vorlage ist grundsätzlich bewußt 
und intendiert; sogenannte ‘unfreiwillige’ Parodien werden ausgegrenzt (und sollten der Klarheit halber besser 
gar nicht als Parodien bezeichnet werden).” Cfr. also, with a specifically medieval focus, Bayless 1996, p. 3: “I 
define parody as an intentionally humorous literary (written) text that achieves its effect by (1) imitating and 
distorting the distinguishing characteristics of literary genres, styles, authors, or specific texts (textual parody); 
or (2) imitating, with or without distortion, literary genres, styles, authors, or texts while in addition satirizing or 
focusing on non-literary customs, events, or persons (social parody)”. By now it should be clear why it is hard to 
apply any of these criteria to Virgilius. For a rich bibliography on parody, see Müller 1997, pp. 275-295; for a short 
introduction see Dentith 2000, esp. pp. 1-54. Cfr. Hutcheon 1985 on parody as a combination of repetition and 
distance: p. 6: “Parody is, in another formulation, repetition with critical distance, which marks difference rather 
than similarity”; p. 20: “I see parody as operating as a method of inscribing continuity while permitting critical 
distance”; p. 32: “Parody, then, in its ironic ‘trans-contextualization' and inversion, is repletion with difference.” 
63 Cfr. Bennett 2008, pp. 223-263. 
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Intransitive parody, in other terms, turns out to be one of the several possible formal 
transcriptions of negativity.64 Through their convoluted games, intransitive parodies 
address the contradiction inherent in the hermeneutical process, they stage its circular 
and aporetic character. Yet, what really matters is that contradiction is allowed: it is, in the 
end, a form of assertion. The Epitomae and Epistolae succeed in bringing the positivity of 
any nihilistic game to the fore, and Virgilius sets the signifier free at every level in the text. 
The odd opulence of his language is the predictable outcome of a (literary?) technique 
whose main characteristic seems to be a willingness to dismiss meaning by exhausting it.65 
To adopt some Bourdieunian jargon, Virgilius succeeds in performing an exercise in the 
appropriation of symbolic goods (the prestige of the grammatical tradition) by rejecting 
the very gesture of appropriation (Virgilius makes up false quotations, proposes false 
theories, mentions false grammarians). If he had simply turned the tenets of grammatical 
science into their opposites, he would have fallen into the same mechanism he was 
attempting to erode. Virgilius does not offer the reader an anti-grammar, but, instead, a 
playful grammar.66 In so doing, he simultaneously profits from and mocks grammar’s 
prestige.  
What I have just argued only partly clarifies the relationship between Virgilius’ grammar 
and the grammatica: it does not say anything about Virgilius’ text itself. If the Epitomae 
and Epistolae are, in a sense, parodies of parodying, how can they utter a single word 
without being inevitably self-contradictory? How can any significance subsist, once its 
epistemological ground has been discarded? Virgilius’ text, it is worth repeating, should 
not exist. The tension between negativity and positivity permeates Virgilius’ inconsistent 
argumentation as well as his hypertrophic linguistic display.  
Inconsistency and hypertrophy cooperate in setting the tone of numerous Virgilian 
pages. It might be interesting, for instance, to verify how the discourse on verticality and 
straightforwardness dealt with in the previous section comes to be surreptitiously 
contradicted while also apparently restated in Epist. III. Here, Virgilius reports the theory 
 
 
64 By this term I am referring to the concept as it was intensively discussed from both critical and literary 
perspectives particularly in the 1970s and ‘80s. A thorough investigation can still be usefully read in Kristeva 
1974, pp.101-150 . See also Agamben 1992 [1982], p. xii: “The question that gives rise to this research [the 
connection between language and death] must necessarily assume the form of a question interrogating the place 
and structure of negativity. Our attempt to respond to this question has led us […] to an examination of the 
problem of Voice and of its ‘grammar’ as a fundamental metaphysical problem, and, at the same time, as an 
originary structure of negativity.” 
65 A mouvance which, in its turn, cannot but produce meaning again and again. Cfr. Chin 2007 and Chin 2008, pp. 
72-109. 
66 There is no need to point out that when I say “playful grammar” I am leaning on the extremely serious 
connotations that play and game have gained as (anti-?)metaphysical terms over the last century. 
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of a certain Stoic called Cromas who proposed to accept no more than four vowels on the 
basis that this number would be a better fit in any given numerological scheme, Epist. III, 
622-637: 67 
 
Sciendum proinde est Stoicorum hunc esse morem, ut, cum typum aliquem uel 
numerum praetendere uoluerunt, non tam totam summae plenitudinem quam quod 
ad typum pertineat propositum annumerent. Quorum unus, qui erat ut rebantur 
praecipuus Cromas nomine, ad nos usque peruentans quattuor tantum uocales 
litteras numerandas esse censebat. Cuius rei rationem cum ab eo Aeneas meus 
perquireret, tranquillo reddidit effamine: Scimus, inquit, et nos quidem quinque esse 
litteras, quae uocales dicuntur. Nostrorum tamen ueterum parentum mos 
antiquarius erat, ut nullum numerum absque typo mensurarent; unde quia 
quinquenum in supputatione Stoica numerum nullus cardinalis praecesserit typus, 
quattuor tantum uocales litteras subtracta u principaliter summauerunt. 
 
It should be known that the Stoics, when they wanted to explain the nature of a 
symbol or of a number, did not calculate the actual total of the sum, but counted 
what pertained to the symbol under consideration. One particular Stoic, called 
Cromas, whose renown has come down to us, argued that there are but four vowels. 
When my Aeneas asked the reason of this matter from him, he answered: “We all 
know that five are the letters called vowels, but our ancient fathers, in compliance 
with a very old custom, could not measure any number without a symbol; thus, since 
in Stoic calculation no fundamental symbol precedes the number five, they counted 
only four major vowels by subtracting the ‘u’.”68 
In what seems to be a search for ratio, Virgilius, again, points instead to the arbitrariness 
of the system.69 
Likewise, in Epist. I, discussing the plural form of vesper, he mixes up a plaidoyer of ratio 
and ordo with a very personal judgment on a colleague, Epist. I, 107-119: 
Cauendum est tamen, ne aut uesper aut uesperum aut uespera pluralem numerum 
habere putentur. Vnde miror, quomodo quidam procacissime ausus sit dicere 
 
 
67 Virgilius resorts to microcosmic-macrocosmic explanations, cfr. Stroumsa 2016, pp. 108-120 for further 
examples.  
68 The passage is indeed obscure. I followed Polara – Caruso 1979, p. 267 in translating typus as symbol, but this 
solution remains unsatisfactory. 
69 However, Virgilius does not dismiss systematic thinking as a whole. In so doing, he proves to be far less 
contradictory than many anti-systematic and, though, highly systematising contemporary thinkers. The critical 
power of Virgilius lies in his writing praxis more than in his thought – but the dichotomy writing/thought risks to 
sound here more simplistic and useless than ever. 
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‘uesperes’, et non solum pluralem numerum contra omnem ordinem rationemque 
confusibiliter adsumpsit, uerum etiam genus ipsum corrupit, pro neutrali 
masculinum ponens. Sed huius modo uiri nomen, quia noblis est et satis clarus et 
multis forte eius dipliceat infamia, manifeste prodere nolo, praesertim cum hoc 
confessus sit non solum audaciter, sed et temerarie se dixisse et faciem suam in 
sinum meum porrexerit. Sed de hoc uiro satis sit dictum. 
 
Don’t think that uesper, uesperum or uespera have a plural form. I don’t really know 
how a certain grammarian could dare to say uesperes, so that he not only used, in a 
very confusing way, a plural form that runs against any rational principle, but he also 
wrongly identified the gender of the word, turning a neutral noun into a masculine 
one. But I don’t want to make his name explicit, since he is noble, and well-known, 
and his shame would embarrass many people – moreover, he admitted to having 
made a bold and thoughtless statement and buried his face in my lap. But enough 
has been said of this man. 
The entanglement of ‘‘technical’’ (objective) and ‘‘private’’ (subjective) voice is, in general, 
one of Virgilius’ most recognizable features, but here, in particular, the digressive and 
autobiographical tone of the remark is placed in a sort of discursive friction with the 
glorification of order and rationality that underlies the whole passage.  70  At the end of the 
exposition of the theory, moreover, Virgilius likens the supposedly stable ratio to a wavy 
sea, Epit. IV, 309-311: 
[…] mare quoque undosum biluosumque in turbinossa cordis profunditate hominis et 
in ipsa ratione. 
 
[…] the wavy and savage sea in the depth of man’s heart, and in reason too.  
It is through passages like this that ambiguity permeates Virgilius’s text, even more than 
through those passages where multifariousness is explicitly thematised. The most obvious 
statement is possibly Epit. X, 81-83: 
Per uarias Latinitatum multifariasque deferentias quis currere poterit, cum tam 
multae sint, ut nequeant numerari? 
 
 
 
70 As to this point, Virgilius’ anomaly should be considered more quantitative than qualitative in nature. One can 
find a similar emergence of autobiographical elements in Jerome’s exegetical writings, most significantly in the 
memories related to his great teacher, the grammarian Aelius Donatus: in eccl. 9, 10: Vnde praeceptor meus 
Donatus, cum istum versiculum exponeret… (“Hence my teacher Donatus, while explaining this line…”). Cfr. Holtz 
1981, pp. 37-46. 
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Who could ever get through the different and multifarious forms of all the Latins, 
since they are so numerous that it is impossible to count them all? 
Small wonder, then, that Vivien Law could speak of the Epitomae as a “plea for plurality, 
for a multiplicity of roads to the same goal. The theme of difference, of variety, of parallel 
if not necessarily equal approaches, is as pervasive as that of wisdom.”71 And yet, 
multifariousness is designed to achieve a goal in such a reading, whereas a trademark of 
Virgilius’s textuality is a baffling estrangement-effect that the reader can perceive 
whenever actual, monodirectional, constructive argumentation is displayed. Virgilius’s 
pleas for a “positive” multifariousness, for the very fact of being a positive statement, 
resound with an implicit vertical echo, namely that of any didactic discourse: “I’ll carry you 
up to the truth” - this is the implicit message. By asserting the value of multifariousness, a 
form of axiological judgment is inevitably introduced – and axiology is the science of 
verticality, of hierarchizing objects according to a chosen scale. That we are wandering 
into an ostentatiously verticalized system, a system in which the plurality of directions 
inherent in the concept of multifariousness might even be perceived as dangerous and 
misleading, becomes more evident when plurality is justified and redeemed through 
didacticism, as in Epit. V, 370-375: 
Nosse itaque debemus, quod ea quae paulo rariora sunt ob hoc doctores possuerunt, 
non quo nocere uellint auditoribus suis, sed proficere, ut, cum haec in eorum 
uidauerimus operibus inscribta, tamquam trita et cognita in ussu habeamus 
 
Therefore, we must realize that erudite people decided to use unusual words not to 
scare their listeners, but, instead, to advantage them, in order for us to recognize 
those weird words as commonly used and known whenever we come across them 
Multifariousness seems to be accepted here just because it might help to enhance the 
interpreters’ self-confidence and tame their disconcertedness when faced with deviant 
forms. Multifariousness, therefore, can also be a way of ordering.   
These last remarks lead once again to an attempt to formulate a further general 
assessment of Virgilius’s text. Every and each time discursive consistency might emerge, 
another, opposed force initiates a process of discursive erosion: the text problematizes, 
inescapably, the discourse. This is true to such an extent that the phrasing I have just 
employed, “general assessment”, blatantly clashes with this kind of textuality. Virgilius’s 
writing is a major example of opacity, of a semiotic material which contrasts any 
 
 
71 Law 1995, p. 49. Cfr. the whole chapter The multifarious nature of wisdom, pp. 47-56. 
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hermeneutically generalizing approach by opposing to it the unicity of its non-signifying 
non-system.72  
Virgilius’s playful grammar turns out to be, in the end, a grammar of language as 
bruissement (rustling), itself an example of this very bruissement.73 To use a phrase of 
Roland Barthes, spoken words (parole) seem, on the one hand, to be doomed to a kind of 
“mumbling” (bredouillement), to be misunderstood or poorly deciphered by the receiver; 
written words (écriture), on the other hand, are subject to silence and a rigid 
differentiation of signs from each other – as a result, an excess of meaning remains in both 
cases, preventing language from “fulfil[ling] a delectation appropriate to its substance.” 
One can imagine moving beyond the clumsiness of a stammering language that fails to 
properly communicate (despite retaining communication as its intention), beyond the 
paralyzing rigidity of differentiated signs, to attain the utopian state of a music of meaning, 
“the rustle of language”. This doesn’t simply imply a triumph of suprasegmental elements 
(accent, intonation, vowel quantity, etc.) over semantic ones,74 but a subtler merging of 
the two; the phonic signifier is able to fully deploy itself without abruptly rejecting 
meaning, without castrating it.75 It is precisely here, in this place precariously balanced 
between sense and non-sense, that Virgilius’s grammar can play as grammar and stage its 
idiosyncratic mixture of normative jargon and disruptive calembours. Starting from this 
point of view one can easily understand why, among Virgilius’s putative fathers, critics 
 
 
72 The vertical systems mentioned here might be profitably compared to what Deleuze and Guattari call espace 
strié: “Il est strié par la chute des corps, les verticales de pesanteur, la distribution de la matière en tranches 
parallèles, l’écoulement lamellaire ou laminaire de ce qui est flux. Ce sont des verticales parallèles qui ont formé 
une dimension indépendante, capable de se communiquer partout, de formaliser toutes les autres dimensions, 
de strier tout l’espace, et par là le rendre homogène”, Deleuze-Guattari 1980, p. 458. To the espace strié they 
oppose the anti-hierarchical and inherently heterogeneous espace lisse. The opacity, unicity, and alterity I 
advocate for Virgilius’ text make it a suitable example of espace lisse. Cfr. discussion in Westphal 2007, pp. 65-
70; Lapoujade 2014, pp. 54-60. 
73 Barthes 1984 [1975], pp. 93-96.  
74 Indeed, this is not really an unusual phenomenon in ancient rhetoric. Philostratus tells us on at least two 
occasions in his Vitae sophistarum (I 8, 7; II 10, 8) that among those who listened to the sophists, some were 
incapable of understanding Greek but enjoyed their performances nonetheless. Cfr. Malaspina 1988, p. 47. 
75 Barthes 1984 [1975], pp. 94-95: “Et la langue, elle, peut-elle bruire? Parole, elle reste, semble-t-il, condamnée 
au bredouillement; écriture, au silence et à la distinction des signes: de toute manière, il reste toujours trop de 
sens pour que le langage accomplisse une jouissance qui serait proper à sa matière. Mais ce qui est impossible 
n’est pas inconceivable: le bruissement de la langue forme une utopie. Quelle utopie? Celle d’une musique du 
sens; j’entends par là que dans son état utopique la langue serait élargie, je dirais même dénaturée, jusq’à former 
un immense tissue sonore dans lequel l’appareil sémantique se trouverait irréalisé ; le signifiant phonique, 
métrique, vocal, se déploierait dans toute sa somptuosité, sans que jamais un signe s’en détache (vienne 
naturaliser cette pure nappe de jouissance), mais aussi – et c’est là le difficile – sans que le sens soit brutalement 
congédié, dogmatiquement forclos, bref châtré.” 
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have repeatedly pointed to Pompeius, a commentator of Donatus arguably active in Africa 
somewhere between 5th and 6th century.76 Pompeius’s commentum artis Donati (a genre 
to which the Epitomae might be at least formally ascribed) is characterized by 
overwhelming and repetitive exemplification, self-contradiction, and random 
argumentation. Ever since Louis Holtz’s insightful surveys, Pompeius’s commentary has 
been interpreted as a revised compilation of stenographic notes – orality is the most 
convenient way to account for what, in the work, does not “work”.77 Yet, no one would 
dare to argue that oral marks could be traced in Virgilius’ hypertrophic page. The 
difference between Pompeius’s commentum and Virgilius’s treatises is thus, in Barthes’s 
terms, the difference between a ‘‘mumbling’’ language and the rustle of language, 
between unsuccessful communication and an excess of language produced through 
textual praxis. 
By writing in this way, Virgilius poses a hermeneutical conundrum. Despite all the 
references to an epistemological dimension situated beyond the mind and beyond 
linguistic articulation, what emerges from the Epitomae and Epistolae does not 
immediately recall a poetics or epistemology of transcendence and ineffability, of the 
breaking down of language when confronted with something that goes beyond 
symbolization. 78 To put it better, this is precisely what such passages immediately recall, a 
fact that should automatically alert Virgilius’s reader. In his textual praxis, the opposition 
between res and verba has, finally, collapsed. This merging doesn’t proceed from 
concreteness to abstraction – it is not that res, in the traditional sense, can be read as 
signa, but, rather, that verba are dealt with as res: opaque, breakable, even silent.79  
 
 
76 Keil, V, pp. 95-312. Cfr.; Holtz 1971; Id. 1981, pp. 236-237; Kaster 1988 pp. 139-168; 343-346. 
77 Cfr. Kaster 1988, p. 156: “Pompeius is a man talking, not writing”. 
78 As we have seen, in Virgilius ratio transcends mens. Law 1995, pp. 72-76 connects this aspect to the imagery 
of fire and sun in the Epitomae and Epistolae: homo plasto et affla et quodam caelesti igne consistit (“man 
consists of body and soul and a sort of celestial fire”) Epit. II, 23-24; intellectum quodam modo ignitum 
flammosumque possidet (“to the intellect belongs somehow a blazing nature”) Epit. IV, 294-295; ignis is the 
sample word used to exemplify the twelve Latins in Epit. I. Spirit, which goes far beyond sheer mind, coincides 
with fire. Law takes this symbolic equation as a fundamental clue to the “esoteric” nature of Virgilius’ works and 
their possible affinity to a “tradition” which would run down to the Cathars, Rosicrucians, Jakob Boehme, and 
Rudolf Steiner, not to mention the Qabbalah, the Sufi, and Theosophy. For a literary approach to the theme of 
silence and ineffability in late antique aesthetics, see Hernández Lobato 2017, pp. 10-24. 
79 For an influential theory of res and signa, the unavoidable reference is the first three books of Augustine’s De 
doc. Chr. A useful sketch of the pagan and Christian hermeneutic background of the Augustinian treatise is 
provided by Pollmann 1996, pp. 147-196. Still worth consulting is Colish 1968, pp. 8-81. See also Markus 1996, 
pp. 71-104. For a discussion of De dialectica and De magistro and their links to stoic linguistics, see Stock 1996, 
pp. 138-162. 
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Take, for example, one of the best known passages from Virgilius’ Epitomae; the last 
section of Epit. I, De sapientia, in which the author gives a first account of his theory of the 
“twelve Latins”, 64-83: 
Latinitatis genera sunt XII, quorum unum usitatum fitur, quo scripturas Latini omnes 
atramentantur. Vt autem duumdecim generum experimentum habeas, unius licet 
nominis monstrabimus exemplo. In usitata enim Latinitate ignis I. habetur, qui sua 
omnia ignit natura. II. quoquihabin, qui sic declinatur: genitivo quoquihabis, dativo 
quoquihabi, accusativo –bin (ueru superpossito), uocativo –bin (breve), ablativo –bi; 
et pluraliter: quoquihabis (producte), genitivo quoquihabium , dativo –bibus, 
accusativo –bis, vocativo –bis, ablativo –bibus; quoquihabin dicimus, quod incocta 
coquendi habeat dicionem. III. ardon dicitur, quod ardeat. IIII. calax calacis ex calore. 
V. spiridon ex spiramine. VI. rusin de rubore. VII. fragon ex fragore flammae. VIII. 
fumaton de fumo. VIIII. ustrax ex urendo. X. uitius, qui pene mortua membra suo 
uigore uiuificat. XI. siluleus, eo quod de silice sileat, unde et ‘silex’ non recte dicitur 
nisi ex qua scintilla silet. XII. aeneon de Aenea deo, qui in eo habitat sive a quo 
elimentis flatus fertur.  
 
There are twelve different sorts of Latin, the first being the one usually used by the 
Latins to write. To give you an idea of these twelve Latins we will focus on one single 
word. In usual Latin, we find ignis I. which is called this way since it ignit (burns) 
everything by nature. II quoquihabis must be declined as follows: genitive 
quoquihabis, dative quoquihabi, accusative –bin (after the verb), vocative –bin 
(short), ablative –bi; and in the plural: quoquihabis (long), genitive quoquihabium, 
dative –bibus, accusative –bis, vocative –bis, ablative –bibus; quoquihabin is called 
this way since it can cook what is not cooked. III ardon is called this way since it burns 
(ardeat). IIII calax calacis because of its warmth. V. spiridon since it breathes (ex 
spiramine). VI. rusin since it is red-couloured (e rubore). VII. fragon because of the 
crashing (fragore) of flames. VIII fumaton because of the smoke (de fumo) VIIII. 
ustrax since it consumes (ex urendo). X. uitius since through its vigour it reinvigorates 
vigourless limbs. XI. siluleus since it stems from hard stones, so that it would be 
inexact to call stones that cannot produce fire ‘silex’. XII aeneon is derived from the 
god Aenaes, who inhabits fire and provides all elements with breath. 
Whether this is a ‘‘parody’’ of Donatian grammar or Isidorian etymologies, a manifesto 
against the normativity of the school, an example of cryptography, or all of these at once, 
I would like to our draw attention to the effects of semantic evacuation activated in this 
passage by strings of characters such as quoquihabin dicimus, quod incocta coquendi 
habeat dicionem, or siluleus, eo quod de silice sileat, unde et ‘silex’ non recte dicitur nisi ex 
qua scintilla silet. Virgilius seems to play with the reifying effects inherent in grammatical 
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discourse: in Virgilius’ works, grammar itself, taken in its totality, undergoes the same 
process of reification which was the common outcome of grammatical practices.   
A grammar celebrating the corporeality of any spiritual meaning and the literality 
(objectuality) of any allegorical reading: one deep-seated reason for Virgilius’s uncanny 
alterity might be seen in the quintessentially hybrid and shifting character of the semiotic 
processes triggered by his texts.80 His writing dwells (quite comfortably, indeed) in the split 
between signifier and signified – it revels in the fissure that enables semiosis and, at the 
same time, prevents its conclusion and solution. The Epitomae and Epistolae confront 
readers with the materiality of the signifier – words, objectified, point to the mystery of 
their (un)necessary arbitrariness, and grammar and etymology become the keys to 
explaining the world precisely because they can hardly explain anything. 
1.4 Epitome and Absence 
The literary and epistemological challenge launched by Virgilius’ treatises can be easily 
(although reductively) articulated in terms of a tension between fullness and emptiness: 
on one hand, the fullness of the signifier as an opaque object that reveals its own semiotic 
emptiness; on the other, the emptiness from which meaning derives and on which it is 
based.81 But a similar dialectic underpins Virgilius’ persona as well, a persona that was 
taken, over time, to be that of a madman as well as a serious scholar, a grownup with no 
books and the product of a bookish culture – someone for whom there was “too much to 
 
 
80 Virgilius’s writing thus recalls Benjamin’s conceptualization of baroque allegory more than the Pauline 
opposition between the letter and the spirit, which strongly influenced Christian hermeneutics through the 
dichotomy literal reading/allegorical reading. Cfr. one of Benjamin’s famous statements: “In the anagrams, the 
onomatopoeic phrases, and many other examples of linguistic virtuosity, word, syllable, and sound are 
emancipated from any context of traditional meaning and are flaunted as objects which can be exploited for 
allegorical purposes. The language of the baroque is constantly convulsed by rebellion on the part of the element 
which makes it up”, Benjamin 1998 [1928], p. 207. For a short overview of Benjamin’s theory of allegory, see 
Cowan 1981. On the Pauline dichotomy see, Ginzburg 2010.  
81 I should probably apologize for constantly falling back into binary oppositions while dealing with a series of 
texts that, I am arguing, constantly evade binaries. Though, in a way, to talk about tension without mentioning 
the opposite poles of which it is composed – or, in other words, to talk about interstitial spaces (another name 
for Virgilius’ textuality) without resorting to an idea of spatial limitation – seems to be impossible: indeed, such 
a contradiction is nothing but the re-enactment of the negativity posed by Virgilius’ texts itself. 
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know”82 or someone who suffered from such a penury of culture that he was obliged to 
make up his own imaginary library and raise his provincial colleagues to the status of 
classics: either the author of a charlatan text (Schwindelliteratur) or of a work that mirrors 
the very processes of cultural exhaustion. 
The naiveté and untenability of these polarised views are, in the end, less interesting 
than the fact that they would eventually surface in Virgilius’ reception history. They 
represent the most obvious effect of the textuality of the Epitomae and Epistolae, and 
both of them stem, albeit moving in opposite directions, from the sense of bottomless 
vertigo (Schwindel) these texts engender in the reader.  
The paradoxical, though inevitable, coexistence of fullness and emptiness that 
characterizes Virgilius’ work is one of the grounding components of what we can call the 
epitomatory dimension. In fact, the presence of Virgilius’ treatises is increased by the very 
fact that they constantly point to absent objects (the plethora of non-existing sources and 
grammarians, for example). The Epitomae and Epistolae gesture as traces, as semiotic 
sutures, hinting, as they do, at unknown/lost worlds while, at same time, preventing the 
reader from accessing them. As previously stated, the scinderatio fonorum (scrambling of 
words) might be taken as the realization, at the level of word, of the process of dissection 
performed by Virgilius at the more general level of the grammatical tradition in its 
entirety.83 Epitomae are condensed texts not so much in the sense that they summarise a 
given body of knowledge, but because they draw together many disparate discourses with 
no apparent concern for their reciprocal coherence.84 As a consequence, condensation in 
Virgilius’ writing cannot be reduced to a tendency to freeze meaning in a compact and 
easily digestible form; on the contrary, it ignites a process of textual motility which is 
hardly likely to satisfy any ‘‘frozen’’ readers. This is also why I started my discussion by 
advocating for the necessity of inhabiting Virgilius’s texts rather than commenting on it. 
Focusing on the dizzy feeling these treatises generate seems to be a productive way of 
approaching them, since it respects their implicit mandate: be literal and get lost among 
letters!85 By inhabiting I mean little more than attempting to uncover a hermeneutics that 
 
 
82 This is the incisive title chosen by Blair 2010 for her thorough and insightful monograph on reference books 
and compilation in the Early Modern Age. 
83 Cfr. supra p. 23. 
84 In this sense, my understanding of epitomatory condensation comes closer to Freudian Verdichtung – the 
process of condensation/compression of several association under one single image/ memory/ though that 
Freud saw as one of the basic mechanisms of dream work – than to the notion that it is “just” a tool for 
information management (cfr. Dubischar 2010).   
85 Hence the resistance of Virgilius to translation. All of the translations included here are nothing more than 
normalizations intended to make some conceptual aspects of the text accessible.  
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does not oppose any resistance to the motility of the text – that is, does not feel ashamed 
of becoming trapped within it.  
To end I shall return to our point of departure, Luciano Caruso’s preface. It is no surprise 
that Luigi Munzi launches a pretty open attack against Caruso’s Appendice in his 
meticulous review of Polara’s edition.86 The piece is accused of being nothing more than a 
skilful ‘‘game’’ seeking to imitate Virgilius’ manière and épater les bourgeois. Though 
Munzi fairly admits that Caruso’s pastiche shows a certain degree of witty cleverness, he 
also sees it as cool and intellectualistic, and, in the end, not really worth publishing along 
with a highly ‘scientific’ object such as a critical edition. Despite all of his good will, we do 
not need much esprit de finesse to realize that Munzi could have hardly produced an apter 
contribution to Caruso’s ‘‘game’’ – the reviewer ends up stressing the clash between the 
straightforwardness of his own “scientific thinking” and the provocative “uselessness” and 
self-referentiality of the Appendice. It is precisely this proliferating discursive clash that 
creates the space in which the effect I call indeterminacy can reverberate and transform 
Caruso’s text into an effort to inhabit Virgilius’. Burning the discourse brings the text to 
life. 
Ardon dicitur, quod ardeat 
(Epit. I,75)  
  
Dialecta est mordatrix omnium uerborum, quae 
legi, dici ac scribi ab omnibus solent, exiterans 
quodammodo atque effibrans uiscera sententiarum, 
medullas sensuum, uenas fonorum . 
(Epit. IV, 176-178) 
 
 
86 Cfr. Munzi 1983, p. 91. 
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Chapter  2  
The Paradox of Movement 
(Gaius Iulius Solinus) 
Le Guatémala, par exemple, n’existe  
pas. Je le sais, j’y ai vécu.  
G. Arnaud, Le salaire de la peur 
 
2.1 Of Apes and Encyclopaedias 
Both Caius Iulius Solinus and his work, the Collectanea rerum memorabilium, have 
undergone many transformations and at least one veritable metamorphosis throughout 
their history. Long before becoming, in the words of his most important modern editor, 
Theodor Mommsen, a “laughable little teacher” (ridiculus magistellus), Solinus had 
already had the rather unusual privilege of being transformed into an ape. “Pliny’s ape” 
(simia Plinii) was the depreciatory nickname late humanists began to use for Solinus, 
referencing the Collectanea’s (apparently) obvious dependence on Pliny’s Historia 
Naturalis. This mocking designation enjoyed quite a long-lasting success, being 
popularised by Vossius and employed well into the twentieth century.1 Though I am not 
 
 
1 The whole first section of Mommsen’s introduction, Auctor et auctoritates, is quite telling of the disdain with 
which Solinus was regarded by 19th century philology, a dismissive view that dated back to the late Humanists 
and was provoked by the derivative nature of the Collectanea, cfr. Mommsen 1958 [1895], p. VIII: Iam Plinii 
naturae historia cum extet integra, epitomen hanc docti viri hodie fere contemnunt, nec sine causa. nam sane 
perparvum interest scire quibus artibus seculii tertii scholasticus Plinium quasi scriptorem iusto simpliciorem loqui 
docuerit tumide et perplexe et insipide, cuius si placet exemplum luculentum considerare, expende quid effecerit 
ille c. 24, 3-6 ex Plinianis 5,3. nec magis persequendi sunt ridiculi magistelli errores…(“Since Pliny’s Natural History 
still exists entirely, scholars nowadays generally despise this epitome, and rightly so. It is actually useless to know 
with what techniques a schoolteacher from the 3rd c. taught Plinius (an author whose style is, in a manner of 
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as ready as Kai Brodersen to argue that Richard Burton, in his English translation of the 
1001 Nights, mistook Simia Plinii for a real alternative to Solinus’ name, I would like to 
believe it.2 For it does not seem inappropriate that a writer who had the chance of being 
regarded as one of the most quoted authorities in Western geography only to end up being 
despised as an idiotic compilator, should push another aspect of his persona to its limits: 
that Solinus, the great collector of marvellous tales, the source of monsters for many 
centuries to come, should himself incorporate a quantum of such animality and transform 
into a miraculum, an emblem of hybridity in his own right.3  
Hybridity permeates the literary quandary posed by the Collectanea. To put it plainly, 
Solinus’ book may be described as a geographical compendium drawing mostly on Pliny’s 
books 3-6 and Pomponius Mela’s Chorographia, with a specific interest in lesser known 
 
 
speaking, more trivial than it should be) to speak in a bombastic, twisted, and ultimately disinteresting way; a 
telling example of which is provided by the fate of Plinius 5,3 in Collectanea 24, 3-6. The mistakes of this laughable 
little teacher do not deserve further attention…”). Vossius’s judgment (“tam multa ex Plinio exscribit, ut etiam 
Pliniana simia dici meruerit”, De historicis latinis libri III 1651 [1627], p. 720) was based on a communis opinio, 
attested in as early as the late 15th century by an emblem sketched in the margin of a 1480 edition of the 
Polyhistor, bearing the words Simia Plinii Maioris. This volume (Firestone Library, Princeton University, ExKa 
1480: Solinus 1480) belonged to the Neapolitan humanist Julio Pomponio Leto (1428-1498), but we cannot 
determine who drew the emblem. For Solinus’ humanist reception, see Dover 2013, Id. 2014. Although most 
scholars still reiterate Mommsenian percentages when documenting Solinus’ dependence on Plinius (Dover 
2013, p. 2013 assures that “nearly four-fifths of Solinus’ text is directly or indirectly taken from Pliny’s work”), 
some recent surveys have started to question such assumptions. Hillard concludes his analysis of prosopography 
in Pliny and Solinus with a bold statement: “I consider it beyond doubt that he [Solinus] was not dependent on 
what could be gleaned from Pliny and/or Mela. This is far from saying with confidence that he? it? was 
independent of Pliny, but it does mean, I would aver, that when he produces an item that differs from a parallel 
item in Pliny, that datum should be treated as having been derived from an earlier source […]”, Hillard 2014, p. 
74. For the controversy on Solinus’ sources, see Hillard 2014, pp. 59-61. 
2 Brodersen 2011, p. 70 notes that “indeed, a 19th century translator of the ‘Tales from 1001 Nights’ regarded 
Plinii Simia as Solinus’ alternative name!.” The translator is Sir R. F. Burton, the book his pathbreaking The book 
of the thousand nights and a night in 10 vols. In the edition I could consult (sine loco, sine data, Burton Club), the 
referenced passage appears in Vol. VI, p. 6 n.1: “These fish-islands are common in the Classics, e.g. the Pristis of 
Pliny (xvii. 4), which Olaus Magnus transfers to the Baltic (xxi . 6) and makes timid as the whales of Nearchus. C. 
J. Solinus (Plinii Simia) says, “Indica maria balænas habent ultra spatial quatuor iugerum”.” It is evident that no 
explicit statement is made here on Solinus’ possible names; moreover, Brodersen omits in his quotation the italic 
that differentiates Plinii Simia from the tria nomina, a graphic distinction which makes it hard to put the five 
words on the same level and regard the locution as Solinus’ “alternative name”. 
3 Solinus appears as a key figure in many histories of the “monstrous” and the “marvellous” in Western culture. 
One should mention, at least, Rudolf Wittkower’s essay on the “marvels of the East”, Wittkower 1942. The 
Collectanea played a central role in the tradition which finally led to medieval bestiaria like the so-called Liber 
monstrorum, cfr. Bologna 1977, p. 199: “la compilazione soliniana rappresentò in sostanza la mediazione dalle 
teratologie classiche alle compilazioni medievali”; see also Bianchi 1981, pp. 241-247.  
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anecdotes and marvellous details.4 The inadequacy of such a definition, however, 
becomes clear as soon as one begins to read the text.5 It is very telling that David Paniagua, 
as late as 2008, still felt it necessary to stress that the Collectanea can be more profitably 
read within the encyclopaedic tradition than in merely geographical terms.6 Nonetheless, 
one of the most influential contributions to Solinian studies in recent years has focused 
primarily on Solinus’ achievements as a geographer.7 Resorting to a reasonable 
compromise, Paniagua suggests that the Collectanea should be considered an 
encyclopaedic compilation whose material is ordered according to geographical criteria. 
In more abstract terms, we could say that geography functions here as the centripetal 
principle of a composition formed by centrifugal forces, the forces of a curious compilatory 
method. By centripetal force I mean any cohesive and structuring principle that 
contributes to organizing a text along a given set of lines, centralizing it and stabilizing its 
meaning. The centrifugal force, meanwhile, is a disruptive factor that interferes with the 
centralizing process – it could take the form of an abrupt transition in subject or of a 
loosening in the logical concatenation of the elements which build up a semantic or 
syntactic unit. This is only one of the many implications of the Collectanea’s hybrid 
configuration. The main goal of the following pages is to analyse the ways in which such 
aberrant conditions are reflected in the text. We will start by looking at the paradoxical 
nature of Solinus’s prefaces (2), move on to examining the specificity of Solinus’ epitomic 
 
 
4 A tradition of writings on mirabilia had already developed in the Hellenistic age and was conspicuously present 
also in Pliny’s work, see Beagon 1992, pp. 8-11, 144-147. For a short history of teratology in the Greco-Roman 
world, see Schepens-Delcroix 1996.  
5 Reading a text is here to be considered as opposed to using a text (be it as reference book, as a source for lost 
auctores, as a tool to emend other texts etc.). Doody 2010, p. 92 effectively points to the paradox inherent in 
encyclopaedic texts that “having gone to the immense effort of gathering together information covering all the 
branches of human knowledge, it expects its readers not to read at all.” This opposition is to be meant in a 
broader way, of course, than opposing episodic to linear reading.   
6 See Paniagua 2008, p. 109. Paniagua perhaps seems to be far too confident in speaking of the “encyclopaedic 
project” (“proyecto enciclopédico”, p. 107) or “encyclopaedic goal” (“objetivo enciclopédico”, p. 109) in a pre-
modern context. See in general König-Woolf 2013 and more specifically Doody 2010 pp. 41 ff. On the relationship 
between genre and technical writings, see Taub 2017, pp. 4-17. Johnson 2016, pp. 29 ff. stresses the 
entanglement of encyclopaedic and geographical thinking in Late Antiquity, both considered as expressions of 
an overarching archival thinking. 
7 Brodersen 2011 aims to present Solinus as an innovator in the field of descriptive geography (for the distinction 
between “descriptive” and “mathematical” geography – the one, for instance, of Ptolomy – see the overview by 
Dueck 2012). Next to some small but broadly influential lexical innovations (i.e. adjective mediterraneus instead 
of Pliny’s interior), the scholar draws attention to the changing of the mode of description from the linear 
approach of peripli and itineraria to a new areal mode, based on the concept of plaga. This would witness Solinus’ 
use of maps in rearranging the material he found in his sources (Brodersen compares only with Pliny and 
Pomponius Mela). On the opposition of areal and linear geographical description, see Janni 1984; for a critique 
of such a polarized view, see Talbert 2009; Id. 2016.       
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gesture (3), and conclude by exploring the issues of paradoxicality, polarity and hybridity 
and their effects on the ways in which Solinus’ text deals “epitomically” with the problems 
of truth and referentiality (4). 
2.2 Prefaces and Tensions 
Solinus’ two introductory paratexts have received a good deal of scholarly attention. The 
reason for this lies both in their programmatic content and in the philological issues with 
which they engage.8 Ever since Mommsen’s edition, the Collectanea and their textual 
transmission have been regarded as a possible example of an authorial double edition, 
although Mommsen rejected this possibility. The German scholar sorted the extant 
manuscripts into three families, the third presenting a version of the text which, despite 
being attested in exemplars that are extensively contaminated with manuscripts from the 
first two families, can be easily recognized as a different version, marked by many textual 
divergences and expansions.  
Most significantly, the manuscripts belonging to the third family are introduced by a 
second “short preface” that tells an interesting story: its author, talking as Solinus in the 
first person, maintains that previous, still unpolished versions of the book had once 
circulated and should now be substituted by the present version. A new title is proposed, 
Polyhistor, and the former title, Collectanea rerum memorabilium, is explicitly deleted (II 
Pref.: erit igitur operi isti titulus Polyhistor: nam quem in exordio designaveram, scilicet 
Collectanea rerum memorabilium, cum his quae improbavimus placuit oblitterari, “the 
present work will be entitled Polyhistor, since I decided to eliminate the previous title 
Collectanea rerum memorabilium along with other things I could no longer accept”).9  
On the basis of this textual evidence, rivers of ink have been spilled. Mommsen thought 
the Polyhistor-version was an apocryphal reworking of the original 3rd c. edition by an early 
medieval redactor (hypothetically, an Irish monk from the 7th c. CE) – an interpretation 
 
 
8 For the philological aspect, see Mommsen 1958 [1895] pp. LXXXVIII ff.; Walter 1969, pp. 15-33; Sallmann 1971, 
pp. 164-165; Schmidt 1995, pp. 26-35. For a literary discussion, see Santini 1998; von Martels 2014, pp. 181-21; 
Pavlock 2014; Apps 2014, pp. 32-35; Schlapbach 2014. 
9 In the manuscripts of the first two families both the “first” prefatory letter and the actual treatise are preceded 
by an index of the capitula (or rubricae). The manuscripts of the Polyhistor-version open instead with the 
“second” letter and show the sequence: “second” letter + index + “first” letter + treatise. See Schmidt 1995, pp. 
26-27. All translations from Solinus are my own. 
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that was quickly discarded for lacking evidence. Hermann Walter, reviving the Solinian 
question in the 1960s, resolutely tried to support the existence of two original Solinian 
versions; nowadays this seems to be the most accepted theory, although uncertainty 
remains as to how and why the two versions were published.10  
It is not my purpose to enter the thorny and highly conjectural field of Solinus’ 
manuscript tradition and its various redactions. Suffice to recall that two of the most 
relevant articles in the last decades, Schmidt 1995 and Brodersen 2011, diverge as to the 
author’s chronology, situating him in the 4th and in the 3rd century CE respectively, with 
not irrelevant consequences: Brodersen’s re-evaluation of Solinus as a geographical 
innovator is consistently based on the premise that Solinus was writing in the 3rd c. CE – 
for a 4th c. author one could hardly speak of innovation. This same hermeneutical paradox 
led Hyskell, in his study on the language of the Collectanea, to praise Solinus for his lexical 
audacity, since most of Solinus’ words became fairly common in the 4th c., though the 
scholar maintained Mommsen’s 3rd century chronology.11 Once the dismissive attitude of 
19th c. philology faded away, critics risked falling into an apologetic tone and obsessing 
over attempts to prove Solinus’ qualities by replacing one evaluative system with another, 
allegedly newer one.12  
Let us jump to a consideration of the prefaces as exemplifications of some peculiar 
aspects of Solinian textuality. The very existence of two contradictory prefaces, or better 
said, their preservation in a substantial part of the manuscript tradition, may be regarded 
as an eloquent index of two of the Collectanea’s main features, namely accumulative 
excess (two prefaces) and paradox/polarity (two contradictory prefaces). The first, “long” 
preface could be read as a list of such polarities and, in a way, it is not completely surprising 
that a work meant to collect memorable materials should set out by exhibiting an 
 
 
10 Walter 1969 takes the “second” prefatory letter to be true. Schwindt follows him but goes further, arguing 
that the first version of the work was dedicated to the Emperor Constantius II on the occasion of his visit to Rome 
in 357 CE. The lectio Constantio is actually attested as a variant for Advento as the dedicatee of the “first” 
prefatory letter in some 12th century manuscripts. See Schwindt 1995, pp. 33-35. 
11 See Hyskell 1924. Most of the arguments proposed to date the Collectanea are ultimately inconclusive. Cfr. 
Schwindt 1995, pp. 31-33 and bibliography, who nonetheless, as we have seen, strongly supports a 4th century 
date. On the contrary, Brodersen 2011, p. 66 sums up internal non-linguistic evidence for the 3rd century in the 
following points: Solinus (50.3) remarks that men are wearing silk robes, which might be seen as a hint to an 
innovation introduced by Elagabalus; Solinus’ interest in the calendar may parallel Censorinus’ De die natali (238 
CE); Antioch and Byzantium are hardly mentioned, and the latter never as Constantinople. His remark that “while 
none of these features individually can be used to date Solinus’ work, the cumulative evidence may point to the 
later 3rd century for at least the first version” sounds, indeed, quite optimistic.  
12 It is small wonder, then, that almost all of the essays collected in Kai Brodersen’s volume Solinus. New Studies 
(Brodersen 2014a) start with an apology for the author, and that the very first article (von Martels 2014) is entitled 
“Turning the Table on Solinus’ Critics.” 
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inclination to building up polarities – memory itself existing only in a polarised space, being 
a form of re-collecting.13  
Solinus presents his work from the outset as a compendium and, as such, as a sort of 
compromise between two contending tendencies: overwhelming loquacity and 
unsatisfactory brevity, Pr. I, 2:14 
Liber est ad compendium praeparatus, quantumque ratio passa est ita moderate 
repressus, ut nec prodiga sit in eo copia nec damnosa concinnitas. 
 
This book has been conceived as a summary and has been condensed as much as is 
reasonably acceptable, so that it contains neither an overwhelming loquacity nor an 
unsatisfactory brevity.15 
The conception of the book is explicitly linked to the notion of measure, a rationale closely 
connected to an idea of balance. Santini, in his thorough analysis of Solinus’ prefaces, has 
laid convincing emphasis on the importance of the monetary metaphor that runs through the 
text.16 Both prodigalitas and damnum clearly belong to economical jargon, a jargon that 
also permeates the following sentence, Pr. I, 2: 
 
 
13 More than to the opposition past/present I am referring to the couple absence/presence (cfr. supra pp. 53-54), 
or, in other terms, to the “fort/da” game expounded by Freud in Beyond the Pleasure Principle – to memory as 
an exercise in mastering absence through symbolical tools (cfr. Lacan 1978, p. 375: “C’est ici [in the “fort/da” 
game] que nous débouchons sur l’ordre symbolique, (…) il tend au-delà du principe de plaisir, hors des limites de 
la vie et c’est pourquoi Freud l’identifie à l’instinct de mort. Et l’instinct de mort n’est que le masque de l’ordre 
symbolique en tant – Freud l’écrit – qu’il est muet (…)”). For classic perspectives on memory as a cultural and 
literary organizational device, see  Assmann 1999 and Lachmann 1990.  
14 Both motifs are traditional. The stress on brevity (Kürzeformel) is listed by Opelt 1962, col. 959 among the 
features common to many epitome-prologues. Despite all the modesty affected by the epitomiser 
(Bescheidenheitsformel, another feature well represented in Solinus’ preface), it could be that what is here called 
prodiga copia was pointed to as a flaw of the “original” works, thus making explicit the agonistic implication of 
the epitomic discourse. See also Santini 1998, pp. 39-40 and Apps 2014, p. 33. 
15 Apps 2014, p. 33 translates damnosa concinnitas as “detrimental beauty of style”. This rendition seems to be 
more in line with the common rhetorical usage of concinnitas as meaning harmony or aptness (cfr. Cicero Orat. 
44. 149: Collocabuntur igitur verba, aut ut inter se quam aptissime cohaereant extrema cum primis; aut ut forma 
ipsa concinnitasque verborum conficiat orbem suum), but the Solinus passage is reported in Th. l. L. s.v. a 50,1 
precisely as evidence for the meaning of  dicendi brevitas. In spite of the circularity of the argument, I chose to 
make explicit the reference to brevity (evoked by the adjective damnosa) in order to strengthen its antithesis to 
copia. 
16 Beside the examples here discussed, it should be remembered that the term compendium originally had 
economic connotations (cfr. Forcellini s.v. 1, est quidquid lucramur rem nostrum Servando). Fermentum 
(fermentum cognitionis) could also bear financial nuances (Petron. 76,7 hoc fuit peculii mei fermentum). See 
Santini 1998, pp. 39-42. 
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Cui si animum propius intenderis, velut fermentum cognitionis magis ei inesse quam 
bratteas eloquentiae deprehendes. 
 
Upon closer inspection, you will see in it more food for thought than a lavish patina 
of eloquence. 
This statement, opposing content and form, usefulness and real knowledge to rhetorical 
embellishment, is quite canonical; what Solinus is proposing is an economy of literary 
communication.17  
A principle of economic exchange can also be detected in Pr. I, 3: 
Exquisitis enim aliquot voluminibus studuisse me inpendio fateor, ut et a notioribus 
referrem pedem et remotis largius inmorarer. 
 
I confess I have sedulously read several selected books, in order to be able to move 
away from common topics and spend more time on unusual ones. 
Solinus is now drawing on another topos, suggesting that thanks to his effort (studium) his 
readers will be able to save their energies.18 By remarking that he will not linger on well-
known matters, instead devoting time to things likely to be unknown, he introduces some 
new elements to the picture. This is the first time that space explicitly enters Solinus’ 
discourse, through a metaphor in which the writer is compared to a traveller, an image 
that returns throughout the Collectanea and cooperates in making Solinus’ work a peculiar 
textual space, even before a text about space.19 An attentive reader may already foresee 
that the centre of the book will dwell in the remota – that the centre of the Collectanea 
 
 
17 The brattea metaphor can be found, with a similar moralising twist (surface vs. substance) in Seneca, Epist. 
115, 9 omnium istorum, quod incedere altos vides, bratteata felicitas est. See Santini 1998, p. 40; Apps 2014, pp. 
33-34. 
18 Cfr. Opelt 1962, coll. 9589 ff. for prefatory topoi in epitomes. In praising his own service to the reader, the 
compendiator could take up an agonistic attitude towards the epitomised auctor. See, for example, what 
Ianuarius Nepotianus writes in his preface to the epitome of Valerius Maximus’ Factorum ac dictorum 
memorabilium libri, Praef. 7-12: igitur de Valerio Maximo mecum sentis opera eius utilia esse, si sint brevia: digna 
enim cognitione componit, sed colligenda producit, dum se ostentat sententiis, locis iactat, fundit excessibus, et 
eo fortasse si paucioribus notus, quod legentium aviditati mora ipsa fastidio est (“Therefore, talking about 
Valerius Maximus, you will agree with me that his works are useful if they are brief: he certainly writes things 
that are worth reading, but he lengthens what should be shortened while showing off witticisms, boasting figures 
speech, indulging in digressions, and, maybe, this is the reason why he is not that popular among readers – eager 
readers are annoyed by constant dawdling”). 
19 The very common journey-metaphor was already present in Pliny’s dedicatory preface, Praef. 14: Praeterea 
iter est non trita auctoribus via nec qua peregrinari animus expetat. See Pavlock 2014, p. 26. For a more literary 
theoretical discussion of this topos see Montalbetti 1997, pp. 99-120.  
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will always remain displaced, re-motus, i.e. in a way, de-centred.20 It would be easy to 
judge such a penchant for de-centring as a form of escapism, an effect of Solinus’ 
superficial curiosity. To the utilitarian as well as humanitarian ideal underlying the previous 
lines – where the writer is presented as a sedulous medium between the reading public 
and knowledge – a new, more hedonistic nuance is added, which will be fully voiced 
shortly thereafter, Pr. I, 4:21 
inseruimus et pleraque differenter congruentia, ut si nihil aliud, saltem varietas ipsa 
legentium fastidio mederetur. 
 
We have also inserted many disparately compatible things, so that, if nothing else, 
the variety of the matter will counter effect the reader’s boredom.  
Most remarkably, it is the addition of differenter congruentia that makes varietas possible. 
It is tempting to take this oxymoron as an emblem of the whole Collectanea, but the 
mention of varietas comes right after the main focus of the book has been made explicit, 
Pr. I, 3: 
Locorum commemoratio plurimum tenet, in quam partem ferme inclinatior est 
universa materies. Quorum commeminisse ita visum est, ut inclitos terrarum situs et 
insignes tractus maris, servata orbis distinctione, suo quaeque ordine redderemus. 
 
For the greatest part, the book is a recollection of places, a topic on which much of 
the content converges. It seemed appropriate to recall the best known spots from 
both land and sea according to the different areas in the world and their order. 
A short list of “secondary” topics, the differenter congruentia, follows, Pr. I, 4: 
Inter haec hominum et aliorum animalium naturas expressimus. Addita pauca de 
arboribus exoticis, de extimarum gentium formis, de ritu dissono abditarum 
nationum, nonnulla etiam digna memoratu. 
 
Among these things with which we have dealt are also the natures of men and other 
animals. Moreover, we have added some information on exotic trees, on people 
 
 
20 Cfr. Gellius’ scarce confidence in the very possibility of finding something remotum, Praef. 15: Nam ecquid tam 
remotum in litteris est quin id tamen complusculi sciant? Et satis hoc blandum est, non esse haec neque in scholis 
decantata neque in commentariis protrita (“Is there any in literature so recondite as not to be known to a goodish 
many? In fact, I am sufficiently flattered if these subjects have not been repeated over and over again in the 
schools and become the common stock of commentaries” trad. by J. C. Rolfe).  
21 Both utilitarianism and humanitarianism already constituted essential features of Pliny’s cultural project, see 
Beagon 1992, pp. 55-75. 
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living far away, on the unfamiliar customs of hidden countries, and other things 
worthy of being recalled.  
Already in this short overview a tension is detectable between centrifugal and centripetal 
forces. Solinus distinguishes between a main theme and additamenta (addita), between 
cursus and ex-cursus. Moreover, geography is here clearly linked to the idea of measuring 
the world (ordo, distinctio), of organizing space, of striping it, in Deleuzian terms.22 And 
yet, ironically enough, treatises which would conform to such an ordered view are 
implicitly accused of being boring.23 In order to please the reader, nothing curiosum can 
be left out, (Pr. I, 5: quae praetermittere incuriosum videbatur, “to omit such thing would 
be a form of negligence”).  
The very gesture of reading seems to be presented as propelled by varietas and 
curiositas. Along and beyond the utilitarian economy of order, a new economy comes to 
light – an economy of pleasure based on concepts such as movement, difference, and 
distance from the centre. To dismiss this as a regressive kind of escapism would prevent 
us from appreciating the inherent mobility of Solinus’ text; for it is true, in a way, the 
Collectanea are constantly escaping.24 If we had to take on Paniagua’s commonsensical 
invitation to regard the Collectanea as an encyclopaedic compendium, we would be 
obliged to acknowledge that the conceptual and generic core of the work does not lie in 
its geographical section, but in the additamenta, ergo in the ex-cursus. 
The paradox of such formulations (centre-in-the-remota; core-in-the-excursus) is 
produced by the attempt made in the preface to articulate the hybridity of the text by 
resorting to binary oppositions, that is, to polarised structures. Indeed, antithesis (a most 
polarised structure) abounds in the few lines of the long-preface, as well at the thematic 
level already analysed on the smaller scale of some callidae iuncturae.25 To the 
 
 
22 Cfr. supra p. 49 n. 72. 
23 Intellectual dryness and literary platitude are very usual charges for the remnants of Latin late antique 
geographical writing, even in favourable critical accounts, cfr. Molè 1985, p. 703. The judgment seems to be 
unfair if one considers the mainly pedagogical function of some late antique texts (see for instance the ones 
included in Riese’s Geographi Latini Minores, Iulius Honorius and Vibius Sequester). On geography in the late 
antique educational system, see Dalché 2014; on Christian and pagan geography in Late Antiquity, see Zecchini 
1993 and Humpries 2007; on mapping and “cartographical thinking” in late antiquity, see Johnson 2016. 
24 As a classic example of such dismissal we could take the words of Sallmann 1971, p. 160: [if one reads Solinus 
in comparison with Pliny] “dann liegt der gewaltige Sturz der römischen Bildungsidee bis hinab zu einer 
Modeliteratur vor Augen, der Bildung nur Unterhaltung bedeutet, Belehrung als rhetorische Attitüde dient und 
die jedes wissenschaftlichen Geistes und Wertes enträt”. 
25 I have already quoted (supra p. 57 n. 1) Mommsen’s judgment on Solinus’ style, whose writing is defined as 
tumidum, perplexum and insipidum. Santini 1998, p. 37-38 points to the ‘‘ostentato manierismo’’ of the prefatory 
letter and analyses its rhetorical sophistication. Humanists pillaged Solinus in search of technical terms and, 
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aforementioned differenter congruentia, we could add the subtly evocative de ritu 
dissono, and even the central locorum commemoratio, in which time (memoria) and space 
(locum) almost inadvertently merge.26 
In paragraphs 5 to 8, this tension – the result, I repeat, of an effort to transcribe 
hybridity into polarised patterns – runs the risk of undermining the whole 
geographical/encyclopaedic project. Solinus apologises for his curiositas by leaning on the 
auctoritas of his forerunners, Pr. I, 5: 
quae [addita pauca] praetermittere incuriosum videbatur quorumque auctoritas, 
quod cum primis industriae tuae insinuatum velim, de scriptoribus manat 
receptissimis. 
 
To omit such things would be a form of negligence, all the more so since their 
relevance is guaranteed by trustworthy authors, a fact I would like you to be one of 
the first to appreciate.   
But the pivotal argument is that, in the end, curious things aside, very little remains for 
Solinus to tell, Pr. I, 5: 
quid enim proprium nostrum esse possit, cum nihil omiserit antiquitatis diligentia, 
quod intactum ad hoc usque aevi permaneret? 
 
What could actually be ours, given that the diligence of the ancient writers has left 
nothing untouched in our own age? 
Stuck in between two economies – ordo and utilitarianism on one hand, varietas and 
pleasure on the other –, Solinus’ text may never come to light: why should anyone indulge 
in telling stories, if all relevant tales have already been told? Is curiositas really enough to 
account for the presence of the Collectanea? What comes to the fore is a poetics of 
exhaustion, the flip-side of the underlying poetics of curiositas/marvel. Since the diligentia 
antiquitatis has left little room for novelty or actual discovery, Solinus is to be judged for 
his skills in selecting and reshaping materials that already been discussed, Pr. I, 5: 
 
 
sometimes, did not hide stylistic appraisal, see Dover 2013; von Martels 2014. Beroaldus (1500, quoted by Dover 
2013, p. 433) wrote that Solinus: Plinianam maiestatem nec minus brevitatem foeliciter effinxit; fecitque ex 
plinianis racemis racemationem haud dubie florulentam.    
26 Commemoratio stands here for commentatio, descriptio, cfr. Th. l. L. 1829, 3, and retuns as such at several 
turning points in the treatise, cfr. II, 1 ad locorum commemorationem stilus dirigendus; LVI, 6 gentium vel 
insularum commemoratione. The theme of memory was essential to compilations such as Gellius’ Noctes Atticae 
(Praef. 2) or Ampelius’ Liber memorialis. See Santini 1998, pp. 40-41.   
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quapropter quaeso, ne de praesenti tempore editionis huius fidem libres, quoniam 
quidem vestigia monetae veteris persecuti opiniones universas eligere maluimus 
potius quam innovare. 
 
Therefore, I beg you, do not ponder the authenticity of this work by resorting to 
current criteria, since, adopting the mould of old coins, we have preferred to pick up 
common opinions rather than to look for new ones. 
This is a well-known prefatory topos for compilators,27 yet here it gains in importance as it 
marks the opening of a textual movement typical of Solinus, one that could be dubbed the 
poetics of praeteritio.28 As we shall later see in more detail, Solinus speeds up his narrative 
pace when confronted with “very important” subject matter (for example Augustus), 
ostentatiously avoiding dealing with it in an extensive way. In light of this, what is said in 
the closing section of the preface becomes all the more meaningful, functioning as both 
an overview of the overall structure of the Collectanea and an introduction to the first 
section of the treatise, Pr. I, 7-8: 
sicut ergo qui corporum formas aemulantur, postpositis quae reliqua sunt, ante 
omnia effigiant modum capitis, nec prius destinant in membra alia, quam ab ipsa ut 
ita dixerim figurarum arce auspicium faciant inchoandi, nos quoque a capite orbis, 
id est ab urbe Roma principium capessemus, quamvis nihil super ea doctissimi 
auctores reliquerint, quod in novum praeconium possit suscitari, ac supervacuum 
paene sit relegere tramitem decursum tot annalibus. Ne tamen prorsus dissimulata 
sit, originem eius quanta valemus persequemur fide. 
 
Like painters, when they set out to draw the human body, having postponed all the 
other parts, start from the head and do not proceed to the other members until they 
have taken a good omen from, so to say, the acropolis of the whole body, we too 
shall start from the head of the world, that is the city of Rome, even though the most 
erudite writers have hardly left something new to say, and it might seem pointless 
to walk again and again down a path already known from so many historical books. 
Nonetheless, we will deal with the origin of Rome as reliably as we can, so that this 
topic may not appear to be totally dismissed. 
The fact of choosing Rome as a starting point is presented as ineluctable and useless at 
the same time. The organic metaphor through which the ordering principle of the book is 
 
 
27 See Opelt 1962, coll. 959 ff.; Paniagua 2008, pp. 107-108. The comparison between ancient authors and old 
coin may be paralleled by Fronto, De orationibus 13 [ = 159, v.d.H.] monetam veterem sectator, but the image of 
the scale seems to be a Solinian invention. See Santini 1998, p. 42.  
28 On the “apophatic aesthetics” in late antique literature, see Hernández Lobato 2012, p. 401-449 and Id. 2017. 
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justified, moving from the head to the limbs, reveals itself as contradictory:29 important 
subjects should be tackled precisely because they are important, but, if they are really 
important, then they are likely to be widely known, and thus do not really need to be 
tackled.30  
Even before actually setting off, Solinus’ collection of marvellous stories and anecdotes 
has to face the threat of silence. And yet, it is precisely such a lack of things which should 
be told that fuels a longing for narrative. To continue telling stories might be seen as the 
consequence of a mindset haunted by a sense of exhaustion, whose only reasonable path 
is the silence to which it cannot bring itself to surrender. 
Shortly before, Solinus asks his addressee for understanding, Pr. I, 6: 
ita si qua ex istis secus quam opto in animum tuum venerint, des velim infantiae 
meae veniam: constantia veritatis penes eos est quos secuti sumus.   
 
Thus, if you do not receive from what I have written the same impression I intended 
to produce, forgive, please, my inability to speak: the reliability of my writing is 
guaranteed by the authors I have followed. 
Far from being unusual, this professio modestiae recalls a similar topos in technical 
writing;31 nonetheless, the stress is here placed not so much on the style (infantia as the 
opposite of eloquentia)32 as on the inventio, on the quality of the matter collected and 
proposed to the readers. We shall return to the relationship between Solinus and his 
 
 
29 The equivalence head/arx was quite traditional. A later epitomizer, Cassius Felix (mid 5th century), testifies to 
its popularity in medical literature, De medicina, Praef. et ideo a principio passionis capitis inchoantes scripsimus, 
quoniam summa civitas corporis a ueteribus dicitur caput, cfr. Ps. Gal. XIV, 313 K. See Fraisse 2002, p. 4 n. 4.  
30 The relatively thorough treatment that Italy receives in the Collectanea (the second chapter, devoted to Italy, 
is one of the longest of the whole work) might suggest we should consider it as an expression of Rome’s declining 
relevance in the 3rd-4th centuries, to the advantage of the Italic “periphery” (and, to an even greater extent, of 
other “peripheries”). But I am not sure that we can use Solinus to this purpose. In his text, both Rome and, as we 
shall see below, Italy, appear under the sign of praeteritio. On the essential interaction between Rome and Italy 
in Roman self-fashioning, see at least Dench 2005, pp. 153-221. 
31 Cfr. Opelt 1962, col. 959 on the so-called Bescheidenheitsformel. Formisano 2001 provides a thorough 
discussion of the specific rhetorical and literary tools employed in late antique technical writing,  “testimonianza 
della progressiva autonomia che la letteratura tecnico-scientifica ricerca dal sistema dell’eloquentia, della 
volontà di tale letteratura di trovare un proprio spazio e una propria identità” (“testimony to the progressive 
autonomy from the system of eloquentia that technical writing was trying to gain, as well to its willingness to 
establish its own literary space and identity”), p. 105. 
32 Infantia can traditionally stand for imperitia fandi, cfr. Cic. De orat. 3, 342, infantiam eius, qui rem norit, sed 
eam explicare dicendo non queat; Front. De eloquentia 2,8 [= 139,12 v.d.H.] tum si eligendum sit, longe longeque 
eloquentiam infantiae praeferas. See Santini 1998, p. 43. Walter 1969 p. 30 takes it literally, but quite 
unconvincingly, as a hint at Solinus’ young age. 
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auctores and to the ways in which auctoritas is exploited as a guarantee for referentiality 
(in other terms, for the reliability of the information provided in the Collectanea). Here it 
is worth noting that Solinus’ infantia is more radical. The tension is not so much between 
bad and good words, or good content and bad words, as between speaking and not 
speaking at all. The contrast of prodiga copia and damnosa concinnitas turns out to be 
somewhat deeper than it at first appeared. What seemed to be an economic principle of 
balance reveals itself as the instantiation of the tension that grounds, permeates and 
informs the whole cultural project of the Collectanea, providing them with a peculiar 
textual physiognomy which we will now try to conceptualize. 
2.3 Epitomic Nomadism 
I have not yet discussed perhaps the most blatant discrepancy between the ‘‘first’’ and 
‘‘second’’ prefaces, namely the shift of the (pretended) title from Collectanea to 
Polyhistor. Apart from philological disputes, these two titles welcome reflection on the 
twofold nature of the epitomic gesture. Both terms convey an idea of multiplicity, but if 
Polyhistor represents the fundamental meaning of plurality (poly-), Collectanea stresses 
the act of gathering and assembling scattered pieces of information (colligere). Just like 
compendium (originally opposed, in its basic meaning of ‘‘saving’’, to the centrifugal 
dispendium, ‘‘expense’’), collectanea reminds us that the movement with which epitomes 
are traditionally identified is a centripetal one. An epitoma rei tractatae is made of material 
drawn from several books and organised around one single topic – many bits of 
information are made to converge in a single point. The semantic evolution of the word 
epitome in English clearly shows the importance of the unifying moment in the 
epitomisation process: ‘‘epitome’’ currently stands for the quintessential, the most typical 
manifestation of a given phenomenon, and, therefore, is strictly connected to a form of 
essentialist thinking.33  
Solinus’ text, however, is characterized by discontinuity and divergence. For all the 
centripetal force exerted by geography as an ordering principle for the many stories 
 
 
33 This is no place, of course, to engage with a necessarily cursory discussion of the philosophical tenets here at 
stake nor to draw even a sketchy history of the opposition between essentialist and non-essentialist approaches. 
By essentialism I simply refer to “The doctrine that it is correct to distinguish between those properties of a thing, 
or kind of thing, that are essential to it, and those that are merely accidental. Essential properties are ones that 
it cannot lose without ceasing to exist.” (The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 2016, s.v.). 
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assembled together, an impression of an inextinguishable mobility emerges from the text, 
of a work, as I said before, that constantly runs away. And this from the very beginning of 
the work. 
The Collectanea open with what we could call an archeology of Rome: in a text that 
should mostly deal with space, time turns out to be the first protagonist to enter the scene. 
The treatise opens with a survey of the different theories concerning the name Rome (I, 1-
5), followed immediately by a description of the most ancient Roman cults and cult places 
(I, 6-16), a discussion of the city’s foundation, and a list of the seven kings and their 
traditional living places (I, 16-30). The debate on foundational date of Rome (I, 27-30) 
leads, via a very condensed scheme of Roman history (I, 31-33), to a discussion of 
calendars and calendar reformation (I, 34-47). Augustus, as a remarkable calendar 
reformer, brings to an end the first half of the first chapter (I, 47-52). The second half (I, 
53-127) is entirely devoted to the human being and provides a sort of marvellous 
anthropology.  
Only in chapter two does the treatise return to its original premise and talk about 
places, as Solinus himself does not omit to point out, II, 1: 
De homine satis dictum habeo. Nunc, ut ad destinatum revertamur, ad locorum 
commemorationem stilus dirigendus est atque adeo principaliter in Italiam, cuius 
decus iam in urbe contigimus. 
 
I have written enough about man. To return to our initial purpose, let us move our 
stylus towards the recollection of different places, and of Italy in particular, whose 
glory we have already shown by dealing with Rome. 
Solinus’ intervention seems to confirm a feeling that may have already crept into the 
readers – that they have been submitted to a rather long ex-cursus. The first chapter is 
arguably the most heterogeneous and, for exactly this reason, it anticipates some typical 
textual moves that return again and again in the Collectanea.  
First of all, a sense of deferral. By frustrating the reader’s expectations, Solinus 
introduces space into the narrative; the expected topic is displaced and a kind of dynamism 
is injected into the text. Space is no longer a matter of content as a formal principle, the 
slippery (dynamic) base of the whole Collectanea – a perturbing principle more than a 
constructive one. Gaps, holes, and abrupt transitions seem to be the complementary side 
of the cumulative tendency typical of miscellaneous writings, since lists and juxtapositions 
(here taken as the basic form of any miscellany) are lists and juxtapositions precisely due 
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to the white spaces inserted between their component parts.34 Scholars have radically 
diverged in their attempts to pin down Solinus’ “art of transition”. While Fernández Nieto 
and Paniagua stare in admiration at his mastery in systematising such a disparate material, 
Schlapbach speaks of an elegant “meandering from one topic to another.”35 This very 
contrast between logical articulation and analogical continuity captures the hybridity at 
the heart of Solinus’ writing. If it is true that specific thematic threads emerge more or less 
regularly throughout the work (and not only the ones listed in the preface – unfamiliar 
animals, plants, and habits – but also minerals and commercial goods),36 the variety of 
strategies employed to jump from one topic to another one is no less remarkable. 
At II, 25 we read about the river Po, Padus, a logical subject within the framework of 
the topographical outline of the Italian peninsula that Solinus has been sketching since II, 
19. But at II, 26 an abrupt transitional sentence leads to an entirely new topic: 
Memorabilibus inclutum et insigniter per omnium vulgatum ora, quod perpaucae 
familiae sunt in agro Faliscorum quos Hirpos vocant. 
 
Among other memorable, famous and broadly known facts is that in the territory of 
the Falisci there are a few groups of people called Hirpi. 
Having moved away from topography, we are now plunged into ethnographic and cultic 
considerations regarding the Hirpi, a brotherhood whose members used to jump on 
burning pyres, II, 26: 
hi sacrificium annuum ad Soractis montem Apollini faciunt: id operantes 
gesticulationibus religiosis impune insultant ardentibus lignorum struibus, in 
honorem divinae rei flammis parentibus. 
 
These people celebrate a sacrifice for Apollo every year on the Mount Soracte: 
during the ceremony, among other rituals, they jump on burning pyres without 
getting wounded, since the flames prove to be obedient in honour of the deity. 
 
 
34 On “cumulative aesthetics”, a key concept in late antique studies, see at least Elsner 2006 (criticised by Liverani 
2011); see the discussion infra pp. 95-96. For a theoretical discussion of “lists” as a literary-aesthetic tool, see 
Eco 2009 and Milcent-Lawson et al. 2013. 
35 Cfr. Schlapbach 2014, p. 142 and n.3. 
36 A stress on commercial goods is not very common in Latin late antique geographical writings, with the 
conspicuous exception of the Expositio totius mundi et gentium, on which see Rougé 1960; Molè 1985; 
Humphries 2007.  
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It is probably this idea of portentous physical resistance that allows the subsequent 
transition to the Marsi, people immune to snake venom. Such peculiarity is then justified 
through a short ex-cursus which binds the Marsi to Circe and Medea, II, 27-30: 
Gentem Marsorum serpentibus inlaesam esse nihil mirum: a Circae filio genus ducunt 
et de avita potentia deberi sibi sciunt servitium venenorum: ideo contemnunt 
venena. C. Coelius Aeetae tres filias dicit Angitiam Medeam Circen: Circen Circeios 
insedisse montes, carminum maleficiis varias imaginum facies mentientem: 
Angitiam vicina Fucino occupavisse ibique salubri scientia adversus morbos 
resistentem, cum dedisset homines vivere, deam habitam: Medeam ab Iasone 
Buthroti sepultam filiumque eius Marsis imperasse. 
 
It is no surprise that the Marsi are immune to snake venom: they say they are 
descendants of Circe’s son and they know that, thanks to their ancestral power, they 
can’t be hurt by venom; that is why they have little regard for venom. C. Coelius tells 
us that Aeeta had three daughters, Angitia, Medea, and Circe: Circe lived in the area 
of the Circei mountains and used her magical arts to imitate the different corporeal 
forms; Angitia, located close to the Fucinus, knew how to heal people, and since she 
was able to make people go on living, she was regarded as a goddess; Medea was 
buried by Jason in Buthrotus, and her son reigned over the Marsi.    
Another fast transitional phrase (II, 31, 9-10: Sed quamvis Italia habeat hoc praesidium 
familiare, a serpentibus non penitus libera est, ‘‘but, despite this domestic defence, Italy is 
not completely free of snakes’’) brings the narrative back to snakes and to Italian fauna, 
flora and mineral resources more generally (II, 32-50). A specific textual mouvence is 
bestowed to the Collectanea by the way in which Solinus fills the two major geographical 
blocks, topographical (II, 19-25) and naturalistic (II, 32-50), passing from the Padus to the 
Marsi via Circe and Medea. At times, progressions such as these are sped up by the 
effacement of any transitional jointures, attaining an effect of congeries. 
In the following passage from the long anthropological section in chapter one, sharp-
sightedness is in the spotlight, I, 99-101: 
Visu deinde plurimum potuit Strabo nomine, quem superspexisse per centum triginta 
quinque milia passuum Varro significat, solitumque exeunte a Carthagine classe 
Punica numerum navium manifestissime ex Lilybitana specula notare. Cicero tradit 
Iliadam omnem ita subtiliter in membranis scriptam, ut testa nucis clauderetur. 
Callicrates formicas ex ebore sic scalpsit, ut portio earum a ceteris cerni nequiverit. 
Apollonides perhibet in Scythia feminas nasci, quae bitiae vocantur: has in oculis 
pupillas geminas habere et perimere visu si forte quem iratae aspexerint. 
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A man called Strabo was extraordinarily sharp-sighted, to the extent that, according 
to Varro, he could see up to a distance of 135,000 paces and was able to count from 
the Lilybaeum promontory the number of ships of the Punic fleet sailing off from 
Carthage. Cicero tells us that the entire Iliad was written on so tiny a piece of 
parchment that it could be enclosed by a nut-shell. Callicrates sculpted ivory ants 
whose proportions could be hardly appreciated by other people. Apollonides 
recounts that in Scythia women called bitiae are born: they have double pupils in 
each eye and, when they are angry, they can kill whoever they might be looking at 
through the very power of their sight. 
The passage is entirely built on the juxtaposition of anecdotes, leaving it unclear as to why 
one nugget of information should follow another. The idea of sharp-sightedness tends to 
fade into the background, becoming nothing more than a slight thematic denominator. 
Cicero’s Iliad “in a nutshell” and Callicrates’ ivory ants are, first of all, minuscule objects, 
“therefore” very difficult to see.37 The double pupillae of the Scythian bitiae have a totally 
new kind of visual capacity – that of killing. The congeries never ceases to be a congeries, 
but, on a closer scrutiny, exhibits a tight network of analogical interconnections.38 As a 
result, the dialectics centre-periphery and centripetal forces-centrifugal forces are 
reiterated at the level of each thematic sub-unit, being the major thematic thread 
relentlessly intersected by other divergent lines.  
It is sometimes hard to avoid the temptation to read something more than an analogical 
embroidery into Solinus’ montage of stories. For example, juxtaposition can achieve the 
effects of irony. Let us look again at a passage from the long ‘‘anthropological’’ section of 
chapter I in which Solinus discusses a series of curious facts variously related to childbirth. 
As it is well-known, he maintains, the first sound produced by new-born babies is a cry, 
since they are not able to express joy before their fourth day. Yet, an exception is provided 
by Zoroaster, who is said to have started smiling on his very first day of life (I, 72). On the 
contrary – and here we have a typically analogical swerve –, Crassus, the triumvir, was said 
to have never laughed in all his life, hence his nickname Agelastus (I, 73). This mention of 
Crassus conjures up the following micro-section, centrifugal in respect to the thematic 
thread of childbirth, I, 73-74: 
 
 
37 On the tabulae iliacae (small tablets representing episodes of the Iliad in miniaturized size) and for an insightful 
discussion of the aesthetics of miniaturization, see Squire 2011.  
38 De-contextualisation, isolation, and accumulation of phenomena were textual strategies often employed in 
paradoxography, cfr. Schepens-Delcroix 1996, p. 393: “Whereas in these works [Aristotelian treatises etc.] 
observations are set in some context and inserted in a narrative or explanatory frame, the paradoxographer 
tends to isolate, to set apart and, through these very procedures, to stir amazement at the uniqueness and the 
eccentricity of a phenomenon.” 
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inter alia Socratis magna praeclarum illud est, quod in eodem vultus tenore etiam 
adversis interpellantibus perstitit. Heraclitus et Diogenes cynicus nihil umquam de 
rigore animi remiserunt, calacatisque turbinibus fortuitorum omnem dolorem vel 
misericordiam uniformi duravere proposito. Pomponium poetam consularem virum 
numquam ructuasse habetur inter exempla: Antoniam Drusi non spuisse percelebre 
est. 
 
Among other examples of Socrates’ greatness, it is well-known that he never 
changed his attitude and appearance whatever his opponents said. Heraclitus and 
Diogenes the Cynic never abandoned their spiritual firmness, and even when 
confronted with the diverse vicissitudes of fate, they equally endured pain and joy. 
Among other examples, the consul and poet Pomponius is said to have never 
belched; and we all know that Antonia, Drusus’ wife, never spat. 
This anecdotical sequence is composed of four units devoted, respectively, to Socrates, 
Heraclitus/Diogenes, the poet Pomponius, and Antonia, Drusus’ wife: two Greek units plus 
two Roman ones. The unexpected swerve coincides with the transition from the Greek to 
the Roman world; having recalled the philosopher’s impressive self-control adversus 
omnem dolorem vel misericordiam, Solinus moves on to Pomponius’ and Antonia’s 
rougher forms of self-control with no evident shift in tone – and yet, this is a veritable fall 
from tragedy to comedy, a contrast made all the more ironic by the homogenizing 
influence of the congeries, a form-without-form that allows the antithetical to be 
juxtaposed without the need for the contradiction to be solved.39 Considered in this way, 
it would be misleading to think of the chaotic homogeneity of the congeries as a flattening 
force (in accordance with the principle: since there is no order, no real chaos can exist; 
since no doxa is given, no actual paradox can emerge), or to conceive it of as a synthesis 
of dialectical contraries. The movement of the congeries is not a dialectical one, as no 
Aufhebung is foreseen, no solution is required. Given a thematic unit that we will take as 
our thesis or positive moment, and given another subsequent, unrelated unit which, due 
to its being disjointed from what precedes it, we will consider as antithesis or negative 
moment, the result of their juxtaposition will not be a synthesis of the two: the second unit 
will not sublate (aufheben), rewrite or erase the first, but they will coexist together in a 
single place: a textual place more than a logical one. The loosening or breaking down of 
any causal/implicational linkage (that is, of what should constitute the ground for logical 
articulation) creates an apparently static condition: to abolish the logical movement of 
cause/effect/implication may seem close to abolishing any movement whatsoever. Even 
 
 
39 This is a paradox that congeries share with another “formal” device, the list. This is no place to tackle the topic 
more in detail, but see, at least, Eco 2009 and Milcent Lawson et al. 2013. 
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so, what I am arguing is that far from arresting movement(s), the congeries succeeds in 
speeding it up beyond the threshold usually accepted by a (“modern”) reader. If the 
passages we have been reading may appear as static heaps of scattered bits of 
information, it is just because of the difficulty we as readers have in catching up with their 
counterintuitive and relentless thematic shifting.  
In such a proteiform textual environment the very notion of compositional balance 
seems to be discarded. Solinus’ proclivity for varietas and remoteness impacts 
conspicuously on the way the different topics are distributed and, even more, on the 
quantity of space given to each topic. Augustus (I, 48-49) is referenced in 15 lines in 
Mommsen’s edition, whereas no less than 31 lines are devoted to the diomedeae aves and 
their habits (II, 45-50): these allegedly interesting birds receive twice as long a treatment 
as the founder of the Empire.40 The whole life of the first princeps is, moreover, reduced 
to nothing more than a list of misfortunes, in an attempt to answer the rhetorical question 
of whether or not the emperor’s existence had been richer in dangers than in happiness 
(I, 48: tanta et tot in vita eius adversa inveniuntur adversa, ut non sit facile discernere, 
calamitosior an beatior fuerit). Here we once more encounter Solinus’ tendency to provide 
cursory treatment of matter that he wants his readers to understand as relevant.  
This practice is overtly thematised, in a way, at the beginning of chapter II. The incipit 
of the geographical treatise deserves full-length quotation, II, 2-5: 
sed Italia tanta cura ab omnibus dicta, praecipue M. Catone, ut iam inveniri non sit, 
quod non veterum auctorem praesumpserit diligentia, largiter in laudem excellentis 
terrae materia suppetente, dum scriptores praestantissimi reputant locorum 
salubritatem, caeli temperiem, ubertatem soli, aprica collium, opaca nemorum, 
innoxios saltus, vitium olearumque proventus, nobilia pecuaria, tot amnes, lacus 
tantos, bifera violaria: inter haec Vesubium flagrantis animae spiritu vaporatum, 
 
 
40 Solinus’ passage actually offers an amplificatio of Pliny. Compare, for example, how Plinius and Solinus describe 
the “ritual” celebrated by these birds on Diomede’s altar: aedemque eam cotidie pleno gutture madentibus pinnis 
perluunt atque purificant, unde origo fabulae Diomedis socios in earum effigies mutatos , “and every day they 
wash and purify the temple mentioned by filling their throats with water and wetting their wings, which is the 
source of the legend that the comrades of Diomede were transformed into the likeness of these birds”, Plinius, 
N.H. 10, 127; aedem sacram omni die celebrant studio eiusmodi: aquis inbuunt plumas alisque inpendio 
madefactis confluunt rorulentae: ita aedem excusso umore purificant: tunc pinnulis superplaudunt: inde 
disceditur quasi peracta religione, “every day they sedulously honour the sacred temple as follows: they imbue 
their feathers with water and, once their wings are totally wet as if soaked with dew, they fly together over the 
temple: by shaking their wings, they release the water, thus purifying the temple: it is as if they were applauding 
with their soft feathers; then, they fly away, as though they had accomplished a ritual”, Solinus, II, 49. In Solinus’ 
version the scene is expanded, or, better, the action is captured in slow-motion (the birds inbuunt, cofluunt, 
purificant, superplaudunt, discedunt) with lexical exactness (note the adjective rorulentae, and the verb 
superplaudunt). 
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tepentes fontibus Baias, colonias tam frequentes, tam assiduam novarum urbium 
gratiam, tam clarum decus veterum oppidorum, quae primum Aborigines Aurunci 
Pelasgi Arcades Siculi, totius postremo Graeciae advenae et in summa victores 
Romani condiderunt: ad haec laterum portuosa, orasque patentibus gremiis 
commercio orbis accommodatas. verum ne prorsus intacta videatur, in ea quae 
minus trita sunt animum intendere haud absurdum videtur et parcius depasta levibus 
vestigiis inviare. nam quis ignorat vel dicta vel facta a Iano Ianiculum, a Saturno 
Latium atque Saturniam, a Danae Ardeam, a comitibus Herculis Polyclen, ab ipso in 
Campania Pompeios, qua victor ex Hispania pompam boum duxerat? 
 
But all ancient authors (M. Cato especially) have already described Italy so carefully 
that it is no longer possible to find a topic left untouched by their zeal, there being 
plenty of reasons for this extraordinary land to be praised, to the extent that most 
eminent writers continue to commend the healthiness of its regions, the mildness 
of the climate, the fertility of the soil, the sunlit hills, the shadowy woods, the gentle 
mountain passes, the abundance of vineyards and olive groves, the excellent cattle, 
the many rivers, lakes, and the beds of violets blossoming twice a year; and again, 
Vesuvius, smoking because of its inflamed soul, Baiae, warmed up by its hot water 
springs, the many colonies, the enduring beauty of the recent cities, the prestigious 
eminence of the older towns founded by the Aborigines, the Aurunci, the Pelasgi, 
the Arcades, the Siculi, and, in the end, by foreigners from all Greece and by the 
ultimate winners, the Romans; to all this, one should add the coasts fit for 
harbouring and, thanks to their vast gulfs, for trade relationship with all the world. 
But in order not to give the impression that we have been neglecting Italy, it does 
not seem unreasonable to dwell on lesser known aspects and to deal cursorily with 
scarcely frequented themes. For, who does not know that the Janiculum was named 
after Janus or that it was founded by him, as well as Latium and Saturnia by Saturnus, 
Ardea by Danae, Polycle by Hercules’ comrades, Pompei in Campania by Hercules 
himself while he was victoriously leading his cow herd from Spain? 
 This passage re-enacts on a larger scale some of the phenomena we have already 
observed. It probably represents the most explicit statement of Solinus’ poetics of 
praeteritio which we saw foreshadowed in the preface.41 The motif of an all-too-well-
 
 
41 Cfr. supra p. 64 and also: II, 36: sciens de lupis praetereo multa: spectatissimum illud est (“I will omit lot of 
information on wolves, although I know many things on this subject: but it is a very hackneyed one”); III, 3: sed 
haec facessant (“but enough with this topic”); IV, 1: Sardinia quoque, quam apud Timaeum Sandaliotin legimus, 
Ichnusam apud Crispum, in quo mari sita sit, quos incolarum auctores habeat, satis celebre est (“It also quite 
known in which sea Sardinia (which Timaeus called Sandaliotis, Crispo Ichnusa) is located, and from where its 
inhabitants come”); VIII, 3: ac ne in montes notos eamus, Pindum et Othryn agitent qui Lapitharum originem 
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known Italy was far from new, as testified by a parallel locus in Pomponius Mela, II,58: De 
Italia magis quia ordo exigit quam quia monstrari eget pauca dicentura: nota sunt omnia. 
And yet, the form this motive assumes is revealing: a veritable praeteritio amplificata, a 
paratactical, long and virtually self-effacing list of things-which-do-not-need-to-be-said-
but-are-nevertheless-being-said, reminiscent of other, similar late antique specimens.42 
This initial praeteritio constitutes the conceptual matrix of the whole second chapter. It is 
among the longest and most detailed sections of the Collectanea, but, nonetheless, is 
intrinsically destabilized, constantly on the brink of not being written at all. The same could 
be said of the first chapter, where the “necessity” of speaking of Rome culminated in the 
relegation of the spatial theme in favour of embracing the temporal one (namely the 
problem of Roman origins, calendar reformation, and human birth and development):43 
the Collectanea’s chatty exhaustion proceeds not only by means of an accumulation of 
positive data, but also by means of omissions, gaps, and sudden leaps backwards and 
forwards. 
It should be noted that the discontinuity of such a textual surface can only be fully 
appreciated through a full-length and continuous reading. Hence, my entire argument 
might be dismissed by the claim that the impression of nomadism and centrifugal 
movement which we have been analysing is based on a misconception – on an attempt to 
sequentially enjoy a text originally meant to be read discontinuously, in bits: as if we were 
trying to read a reference book from cover to cover. Interestingly enough, though, Solinus’ 
popularity is somehow bound up with this duplicity and tension. 
On the one hand, ever since its earliest beginnings, Solinus’ text has been regarded as 
a repertoire, an archive from which to pluck random curiosities. The apparatus of rubricae 
that accompany the treatise in manuscripts, allegedly from a very early stage, seem to 
testify to such fragmentary fruition.44 This detailed systems of headlines, almost one for 
 
 
persequentur, Ossam quos Centaurorum stabulis immorari iuvat (“We will not discuss the famous mountains - 
the Pindus and the Othryn are proper subject for those who search the origins of the Lapites, the Ossa for those 
who like lingering on the stables of the Centaurs”) ; IX, 3: verum ut sileam aut Rhodopen Mygdonum montem aut 
Athon (“I will pass over in silence the Rhodope, mountain of the Mygdones, and the Athos) ; XLV, 1: multae in 
Cappadocia urbes inclitae: verum ut ab aliis referamus pedem, coloniam Archelaidem (“in Cappadocia there are 
many celebrated towns, but, to pass over the others, the colony Archelais…”). 
42 Cfr. most famously Sidonius Apollinaris’ carmen 9, a recusatio 346 lines long. See Hernández Lobato 2012, pp. 
413-419 and  Id. 2017, pp. 284-287.  
43 As is well known, the calendarial dispute was central to the Roman cultural system, see Wallace-Hadrill 2008, 
pp. 239-248; Moatti 2015 [1997], pp. 136-143.  
44 The rubricae can be consulted in Mommsen 1958 [1895], pp. 223-232. Since they predate the bifurcation of 
the manuscript tradition, Walter thought that they were “original”, cfr. Walter 1969, p. 23: “Beide Arme der 
Überlieferung enthalten mit Unterschieden, wie nicht verwunderlich, die Rubriken. Diese wurden mithin vor der 
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each paragraph, is obviously meant to facilitate the retrieval of information and is 
somewhat comparable to the modern articulation of chapters and sub-chapters.  
Fig. 1, taken from Kai Brodersen’s German translation of the Collectanea, shows to the 
extent to which the text can be visually reshaped to conform to a reader’s need for well-
ordered data. 
 
 
[Fig.1] Kai Brodersen 2014b, pp. 58-59 
It has also been noted that one of the advantages of Solinus’ Collectanea, which probably 
guaranteed its success over the centuries, is that it is possible to read it from cover to 
cover, unlike Plinius’ imposing Historia or other multivolume works.45 The phenomena of 
discontinuity that we have been detecting are more noticeable during such continuous 
cover-to-cover reading. 
The Collectanea exemplify what we may refer to as an encyclopaedic paradox: by 
aiming to condense multiple strands of knowledge into a single book, the author produces 
 
 
Spaltung der Handschriftenfamilien, d. h. vor der Überarbeitung, ja vor der Handschriftenunterschlagung 
abgefaßt, sind also authentisch.” An insightful study of the importance of such paratextual tools in understanding 
how books were supposed to be read is provided by Doody’s analysis of Pliny’s summaria (short lists of book 
contents) throughout the centuries, cfr. Doody 2010, p. 93: “The summarium is our clearest textual hint for a 
methodology of reading that pinpoints the necessary fact at the expense of reading a narrative.” As for Solinus’ 
rubricae, Pliny’s summaria can be traced back very early in the manuscript tradition. The Codex Moneus (M), 
shows that summaria were common by the 5th century and, most likely, already present in the 2nd century codex 
from which the Moneus was probably derived. The practice may have originated at the time of the papyrus rolls, 
when each book was contained in a single roll. See Doody 2010, p. 99-100. For a thorough analysis of the uses of 
capita with reference to Cicero’s corpus see Butler 2014. 
45 See Dover 2013, pp. 435-436.  
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a work that does not really function as a single book.46 Truly epitomic, Solinus’ collection 
of memorable things is at once scattered and unified: it enacts its own genesis – the 
founding gesture of fragmenting texts in order to originate a new one – in its own textual 
movement, and constantly reiterates it.47   
Given such a background, a further complication arises when one progresses to 
wondering about what kind of relationship links the text to its purported ‘‘content’’: the 
world, its organization and its marvels. 
2.4 Veritably Fantastic Beasts 
We have already seen how the theme of reliability was central and tightly bound to the 
concept of authority in the preface – the constantia veritatis rests on the auctoritas of 
Solinus’ forerunners.48 As is often noted, Solinus’ concern for truth appears to be all the 
more relevant if one considers the marvellous contents of his book: the more a story is 
incredible, the more it needs the support of authoritative sources, though it would 
probably be reductive to consider this strategy as a mere rhetoric of authentication.49 A 
substantial part of Solinus’ argument consists in the avowal that the information he 
provides might turn out to be, at closer inspection, obsolete or even false: quapropter 
quaeso, ne de praesenti tempore editionis huius fidem libres, quoniam quidem vestigia 
monetae veteris persecuti opiniones universas eligere maluimus potius quam innovare 
(“therefore, I beg you, do not ponder the authenticity of this work by resorting to current 
criteria, since, adopting the mould of old coins, we have preferred to pick up common 
opinions rather than to look for new ones,” cfr. supra p. 66). This statement at once 
confirms and discards the authoritative principle. All we can say is to be found in the words 
 
 
46 Cfr. Doody 2010, p. 92: “The key paradox of the encyclopaedic text is that, having gone to the immense effort 
of gathering together information covering all the branches of human knowledge, it expects its readers not to 
read at all. The tension between the unifying discourse of complete knowledge and its practical segmentation 
into digestible chunks requires a certain amount of conceptual shimmying on the part of the reader.” 
Interestingly enough, Doody is here writing about Pliny, whose work Solinus is supposed to have made readable. 
47 The bibliography on the very concept of the “fragment” is endless. Lucien Dällenbach’s research, after more 
than 30 years, remains useful and stimulating. See his edited volume Dällenbach 1984 and, more recently, 
Dällenbach 2001.  
48 On the phrase constantia veritatis, see von Martels 2003. 
49 See von Martels 2003, p. 71; Apps 2014, p. 42. Not surprisingly, the naming of sources was an essential principle 
of paradoxography, see Schepens-Delcroix 1996, pp. 383-386. 
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of our auctores, but it is not always true that they represent the world truthfully. Can 
Solinus really ask his readers to believe his wor(l)ds? And what does this mean? Arwen 
Apps is quite confident in arguing that: “Within certain limitations, he [Solinus] wanted 
above all else to construct an account which was “correct”. Even with the educational (or 
“edu-training”?) aim he seems to have had in mind in selecting lesser-known topics, 
nothing can have been further from his intentions than misleading posterity.” But, shortly 
thereafter, she is nevertheless obliged to admit that: “Solinus was of course prey to the 
kinds of difficulties confronting all other ancient researchers: conflicting, scarce 
information and tyrannies of time and distance […] But for whatever reason, physical 
autopsy seems not have interested him in the slightest; it played no part in his compilatory 
methodology.”50  
This last statement recalls the topos according to which Late Antiquity is considered an 
intrinsically ‘‘bookish’’ era, an age that witnessed a step back on the path towards 
‘‘modern’’ epistemological standards. This is no place to argue against the problematic 
teleology of such a view; suffice it to note that Solinus’ position is ambiguous enough to 
encourage caution.51 The fact that his sources are outdated (monetae veteris) is hardly 
disputable. It has been calculated that only three out of the sixty-two auctores he 
mentions date from the Common Era: the natural historian Fabianus (Tiberian age), the 
chronographer Bocchus (Claudian age), and the historian Granius Licinianus (2nd c. C.E.).52 
If one takes into account that Solinus is mostly borrowing from Pliny and Pomponius Mela, 
as well as intermediary sources, the phenomenon appears to be far from surprising. Pliny 
himself has notoriously been rebuked by modern critics for his indiscriminate trust of 
unverified sources, to the extent that he is even accused of having slowed down the 
progress of Western science.53 Predictably, but still remarkably, a high concentration of 
references to the auctores can be found in Solinus’ discussions of controversial subjects, 
that is to say, where several rival explanations are at his disposal. The longest lists of 
 
 
50 See Apps 2014, pp. 34-35. 
51 Apps 2014, p. 35 quotes an old article by William H. Stahl, a piece very telling of how a prominent mid-20th 
century scholar of ancient science could look down on late antique outputs. Stahl 1959 was ruthlessly 
unambiguous in stating that “as geographical works, Solinus’ and Capella’s treatises are worthless” (p. 111); “the 
encyclopaedists [i.e. Solinus, Martianus Capella, Isidore etc.] are wholly bookish in their instincts. They may have 
been quite familiar with the geography of a country through having spent a lifetime there, yet they prefer to 
preserve the scanty or faulty information about that country found in some handbook” (p. 124). For the changed 
perspective on late antique science and scientific writing, see Formisano 2001; Id. 2017a; Id. 2018. 
52 Cfr. Apps 2014, p. 41. She draws from Mommsen’s index auctorum a Solino laudatorum, Mommsen 1958 
[1895], p. 237. 
53 See Doody 2010, pp. 14-23 and Schepens-Delcroix 1996, pp. 435-437.  
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auctores thus often coincide with clashes in authority, each voice contrasted and limited 
by the others.54  
This way of piling up auctores acquires further significance when somewhat thorny 
topics, such as the origins of Rome, lie at the centre of the debate. If it is undeniable that 
Solinus, in accordance with what he declares in the preface, starts his book from the caput 
mundi, it is also worth noting that in his version the name of the Urbs turns out to have an 
elusive history; Solinus’ treatment of the centre of the Roman world sets off with a series 
of conflicting hypothesises I, 1-5: 
Sunt qui videri velint Romae vocabulum ab Evandro primum datum, cum oppidum 
ibi offendisset, quod extructum antea Valentiam dixerant iuventus Latina, 
servataque significatione inpositi prius nominis, Romam Graece Valentiam 
nominatam […] Heraclidi placet Troia capta quosdam ex Achivis in ea loca ubi nunc 
Roma est devenisse per Tiberim, deinde suadente Rome nobilissima captivarum quae 
his comes erat, incensis navibus posuisse sedes, struxisse moenia et oppidum ab ea 
Romen vocavisse. Agathocles scribit Romen non captivam fuisse, ut supra dictum, 
sed Ascanio natam Aeneae neptem. traditur etiam proprium nomen Romae, verum 
tamen vetitum publicari…   
 
According to some people, the name Rome was first given by Evander when he ran 
across a small fortified town, founded some time before, which the Latin youth used 
to call Valentia and, while preserving its original meaning, he translated this 
denomination into the Greek word Rome […] Heraclides argued that after the fall of 
Troy a bunch of Achives had reached, through the Tiber, the place where now Rome 
[the city] rises, then, persuaded by Rome, the most noble among their captives, they 
burnt their ships, built the foundations, erected the walls and called the town after 
that captive. Agathocles writes that this Rome, unlike what was previously said, was 
no captive, but Ascanius’s daughter and Aeneas’ granddaughter. Rome [the city] is 
also said to have a true proper name that cannot be publicly revealed… 
A feeling of exhaustive accuracy goes hand-in-hand here with a destabilizing effect. A 
similar uncertainty lurks in the discussion of the founding date of Rome, I, 27: 
 
 
54 Apps 2014, pp. 36-37 identifies some basilar and predictable patterns in Solinus’ dealing with auctores: the 
quoting of rival opinions when no opinio universa is available is the most common (cfr. the different versions of 
the name Palatine, I, 15; on the origins of Tibur and Praeneste, II, 7 – II, 9; on the name of Crete XI, 5 etc.); sources 
are involved when technical information is provided (cfr. I, 17, where Lucius Tarruntius is quoted to describe the 
arrangement of the heavenly bodies at Rome’s foundation); sometimes Solinus conjures up eye-witnesses (cfr. 
XXX, 17-17, Sotacus is said “to have seen” the dracontia stone); finally, auctores are cited in support of  traditions 
that deviate from mainstream versions (cfr. I, 18 where the annalist Gnaeus Gellius is cited for his rationalization 
of the myth of Cacus).   
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Cincio Romam duodecima olympiade placet conditam: Pictori octava: Nepoti et 
Lutatio opiniones Eratosthenis at Apollodori comprobantibus olympiadis septimae 
anno secondo: Pomponio Attico et M. Tullio olympiadis sextae anno tertio… 
 
Cincius argues that Rome was founded during the twelfth Olympiad; Pictor, during 
the Eighth; Nepos and Lutatius, accepting the date proposed by Eratosthenes and 
Apollodoros, propose the second year of the seventh Olympiad; Pomponius Atticus 
and Marcus Tullius the third year of the sixth Olympiad… 
An ostentatiously detailed series of calculations follows, leading to the conclusion that: 
quapropter cum octingesimo primo anno urbis conditae ducentesima septima 
olympias conputetur, par est Romam septimae olympiadis anno primo credi 
conditam  
 
therefore, since the 801st year after the foundation of Rome coincides with the 207th 
Olympiad, it is correct to state the Rome was founded in the first year of the seventh 
Olympiad  
As Solinus’ overview reminds us, the founding date of Rome had famously been a debated 
issue among historians and antiquarians, a dispute which has ideological implications that 
can hardly be underestimated.55 Although the only polemical urgency here is that of an 
‘‘inoffensive’’ erudite controversy, this catalogue of alternative datings ends up 
dismantling the ground upon which the Urbs was supposed to have been founded: its 
temporal pedestal. While reading such a list, one should bear in mind Solinus’ attitude 
towards temporality and authority as it was expressed in the prefatory request discussed 
above. The antiquity of the auctores makes them trustful, but it also inevitably endangers 
the up-to-dateness of the information they provide.  
Reality, truth, and time are set in a counter-intuitive if not contradictory constellation, 
at least at first sight: Solinus seems to be ready to admit, very candidly, that the material 
he is drawing on might be false – or, in other terms, that what is supposed to be an entirely 
referential text might instead be read as partially, if unintentionally, fictional. Solinus’ 
remark is too general to allow for any precise estimate of the amount of ‘‘truth’’ he 
attributed to his own work, but it is, nonetheless, indicative of the expectations he was 
raising in his readers. The author and the reader whom he conjures up seem to share a 
 
 
55 The debate continues today, see for instance Carandini 2014. On the role of the foundational myth in Roman 
self-fashioning and the importance of antiquarian practices, especially in the late Republican age, see at least 
Wallace-Hadrill 2008, pp. 231-248; Moatti 2015, pp. 143-163, 272-307; most recently, on the Varronian cultural 
project, see Leonardis 2019. 
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certain trust in the authoritativeness of (possibly) outdated auctores, as well as a degree 
of indulgence towards the infiltration of unverified news.  
A concern for truth and correct information had been a major, even structuring 
principle of historical/geographical writing since at least the time of Herodotus; imposing 
enterprises such as Polybius’ Historiai and Strabo’s Geographica drew heavily upon it to 
construct their own authority.56 In particular, a passage in which the latter dismisses a 
series of authors specialised in the Indika, “Indian matters”, has become common 
reference for scholars studying the negotiations between ‘‘scientific’’ geography and 
‘‘popular’’ teratology, Strab. 2.1.9: 
Ἅπαντες μὲν τοίνυν οἱ περὶ τῆς Ἰνδικῆς γράψαντες ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ψευδολόγοι 
γεγόνασι, καθ᾿ ὑπερβολὴν δὲ Δηίμαχος· τὰ δὲ δεύτερα λέγει Μεγασθένης· 
Ὀνησίκριτος δὲ καὶ Νέαρχος καὶ ἄλλοι τοιοῦτοι παραψελλίζοντες ἤδη· καὶ ἡμῖν δ᾿ 
ὑπῆρξεν ἐπὶ πλέον κατιδεῖν ταῦτα, ὑπομνηματιζομένοις τὰς Ἀλεξάνδρου πράξεις· 
διαφερόντως δ᾿ ἀπιστεῖν ἄξιον Δηιμάχῳ τε καὶ Μεγασθένει. οὗτοι γάρ εἰσιν οἱ τοὺς 
Ἐνωτοκοίτας καὶ τοὺς Ἀστόμους καὶ Ἄρρινας ἱστοροῦντες, Μονοφθάλμους τε καὶ 
Μακροσκελεῖς καὶ Ὀπισθοδακτύλους· ἀνεκαίνισαν δὲ καὶ τὴν Ὁμηρικὴν τῶν 
Πυγμαίων γερανομαχίαν, τρισπιθάμους εἰπόντες. οὗτοι δὲ καὶ τοὺς χρυσωρύχους 
μύρμηκας καὶ Πᾶνας σφηνοκεφάλους ὄφεις τε καὶ βοῦς καὶ ἐλάφους σὺν κέρασι 
καταπίνοντας· περὶ ὧν ἕτερος τὸν ἕτερον ἐλέγχει, ὅπερ καὶ Ἐρατοσθένης φησίν. 
ἐπέμφθησαν μὲν γὰρ εἰς τὰ Παλίμβοθρα, ὁ μὲν Μεγασθένης πρὸς Σανδρόκοττον, ὁ 
δὲ Δηίμαχος πρὸς Ἀλλιτροχάδην τὸν ἐκείνου υἱόν, κατὰ πρεσβείαν· ὑπομνήματα δὲ 
τῆς ἀποδημίας κατέλιπον τοιαῦτα, ὑφ᾿ ἧς δή ποτε αἰτίας προαχθέντες. Πατροκλῆς 
δὲ ἥκιστα τοιοῦτος· καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δὲ μάρτυρες οὐκ ἀπίθανοι, οἷς κέχρηται ὁ 
Ἐρατοσθένης. 
 
However, all who have written about India have proved themselves, for the most 
part, liars, but pre-eminently so, Deimachus; the next in order is Megasthenes; and 
then, Onesicritus, and Nearchus, and other such writers, who begin to speak the 
truth, though with faltering voice. I, too, had the privilege of noting this fact 
extensively when I was writing the “Deeds of Alexander”. But Deimachus and 
Megasthenes especially deserve to be distrusted. For they are the persons who tell 
us about the “men that sleep in their ears,”, and the “men without mouths,” and 
“men without noses”; and about “men with one eye,” “men with long legs,” “men 
with fingers turned backwards”; and they revived, also, the Homeric story of the 
battle between the cranes and the “pygmies,” who, they said, were three spans tall. 
These men also tell about the ants that mine gold and Pans with wedge-shaped 
heads; and about sallow oxen and stags, horns and all; and in these matters the one 
 
 
56 See the quick overview by Dueck 2012, pp. 41-44.  
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refutes the other, as is also stated by Eratosthenes. For although they were sent on 
an ambassadorial mission to Palimbothra (Megasthenes to Sandrocottus, 
Daimachus to Allitrochades the son of Sandrocottus), still, as memoirs of their stays 
abroad, they have left behind such writings as these, being prompted to do so by – 
I know not what cause! Patrocles, however, is by no means that sort of man. And 
what is more the other witnesses that Eratosthenes has used are not lacking in 
credibility.57 
In a seminal overview of the origins of the Western iconography of monsters, Rudolf 
Wittkower (Wittkower 1942) connected Strabo’s passage with an anecdote told by Aulus 
Gellius, in which the Roman erudite describes how, strolling in the harbour of Brundisium, 
his attention was drawn to some books on sale, N.A. 9.4, 3-4: 
Erant autem isti omnes libri Graeci miraculorum fabularumque pleni, res inauditae, 
incredulae, scriptores veteres non parvae auctoritatis: Aristeas Proconnesius et 
Isogonus Nicaeensis et Ctesias et Onesicritus et Philostephanus et Hegesias; ipsa 
autem volumina ex diutino situ squalebant et habitu aspectuque taetro erant. 
 
All those books were in Greek, filled with marvellous tales, things unheard of, 
incredible; but the writers were ancient and of no mean authority: Aristea of 
Proconnesus, Isogonus of Nicaea, Ctesias and Onesicritos, Philostephanus and 
Hegesias. The volumes themselves, however, were filthy from long neglect, in bad 
condition and unsightly. 
He goes on reporting the marvels he excerpted from these fascinatingly taetra volumina, 
providing a sort of extended version of Strabo’s list; however, despite the non parva 
auctoritas of the auctores, he concludes by stating that, N.A. 9.4, 12: 
Haec atque alia istiusmodi plura legimus, sed cum ea scriberemus, tenuit nos non 
idoneae scripturae taedium nihil ad ornandum iuvandumque usum vitae pertinentis. 
 
This and many other stories of the kind I read; but when writing them down, I was 
seized with disgust for such worthless writings, which contribute nothing to the 
enrichment or profit of life. 
Wittkower coupled Strabo and Gellius’ accounts in a section entitled An Enlightened 
Interlude, stressing the rationalistic and mistrustful attitude they embody. Scholars are 
now more cautious in judging ancient authorial postures and declarations, but it is true 
 
 
57 Transl. by H. L. Jones 1917. See Wittkower 1942, pp. 165-166; Romm 1992, pp. 96-104. 
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that voicing a feeling of mistrust towards one’s sources was (and remains) a good strategy 
for increasing one’s own credibility.58  
Through Pomponius Mela and Pliny the Elder,59 the “marvels of the East” were granted 
a long-lasting presence in Latin geographical writing, and Solinus might well be regarded 
as the fundamental gate-keeper of this tradition: thanks to the extensive re-use of the 
Collectanea by Martianus Capella and Isidore of Seville, Solinus’ work entered the Middle 
Ages as a standard stock of monstrous creatures. The India of Ctesias and Megasthenes 
turned, in Western literary consciousness, into the India of Solinus.60  
In this light, the way India is introduced in chapter 52 of the Collectanea seems all the 
more significant, especially when compared with Pliny’s parallel locus N.H. 6, 57-59. Pliny, 
after reporting Posidionius’ theory that India lies opposite Gaul,61 identifies the eastern 
country as a land of exuberant alterity and summarises part of the tradition we have 
already encountered: 
Alia illi caeli facies, alii siderum ortus; binae aestates in anno, binae messes, media 
inter illas hieme etesiarum flatus, nostra vero bruma lenes ibi aurae, mare 
navigabile. Gentes ei urbesque innumerae, si quis omnes persequi velit. Etenim 
patefacta est non modo Alexandri Magni armis regumque qui successere ei, 
circumvectis etiam in Hyrcanium mare et Caspium Seleuco et Antiocho praefectoque 
classis eorum Patrocle, verum et aliis auctoribus Graecis, qui cum regibus Indicis 
morati, sicut Megasthenes et Dionysius a Philadelpho missus, ex ea causa vires 
quoque gentium prodidere. Non tamen est diligentiae locus: adeo diversa et 
incredibilia traduntur. 
 
In that country the aspect of the heavens and the rising of the stars are different, 
and there are two summers and two harvests yearly, separated by a winter 
 
 
58 It has been observed, for example, that Strabo’s attitude itself seems to be inconsistent with regards to India, 
see Romm 1992, p. 103: “Strabo’s attempt at revisionist Indography, with its glowing faith in the advances 
wrought by Alexander and Augustus, turns out to be only marginally more restrictive than the efforts of earlier 
writers […] Strabo seems to surrender his judgment when faced with large collections of wonders and to be 
carried along by the catalogue, allowing its spare style and rapid momentum to carry him past all questions of 
credibility.” 
59 It is no wonder that Gellius (9.4.7), a few lines after the passage quoted above, mentions Pliny book 7, a book 
devoted to “man”, rich in teratological material on which Solinus’ excursus on the same topic is also based (I, 53-
127). See the commentary by Beagon 2005. 
60 On the story of the “monstrous races” see Wittkower 1942 and Friedmann 1981. 
61 For all its awkwardness from a modern geographical perspective this theory is explicable on the grounds of the 
Ocean river theory (according to which the oikoumene was surrounded by a huge, unique river) and on the 
minimization of the real proportions of northern Eurasia. On this, and on the strange case reported by Pomponius 
Mela (3. 44-45) and Pliny (N.H. 2.170) of “Indians” found ashore in Germany, see Podossinov 2014. 
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accompanied by Etesian winds, while at our midwinter it enjoys soft breezes and the 
sea is navigable. Its races and cities are beyond counting, if one wished to enumerate 
them all. For it has been brought to light not only by the armed forces of Alexander 
the Great and the kings who succeeded him, Seleucus and Antiochus, and their 
admiral of the fleet, Patrocles, having sailed round even into the Hyrcanian and 
Caspian Sea, but also by other Greek authors who have stayed as guests with the 
Indian kings, for instance Megasthenes, and Dionysius sent by Philadelphus for that 
purpose, who have also reported on the strength of these nations. Nevertheless 
there is no possibility of being exact in this matter, so discrepant and difficult to 
believe are the accounts given.62 
In this last remark, non tamen est diligentiae locus, we can hear an echo, although 
weakened, of Strabo’s polemics. For his part, Solinus takes over some of Pliny’s material 
only to radically alter its implications:63 
Hanc [Indiam] Posidonius adversam Galliae statuit. sane nec quicquam ex ea 
dubium: nam Alexandri Magni armis comperta et aliorum postmodum regum 
diligentia peragrata penitus cognitioni nostrae addicta est. Megasthenes sane apud 
Indicos reges aliquantisper moratus res Indicas scripsit, ut fidem, quam oculis 
subiecerat, memoriae daret. Dionysius quoque, qui et ipse a Philadelpho rege 
spectator missus est, gratia periclitandae veritatis paria prodidit. 
 
Posidonius placed India opposite Gaul. No aspect of this country is mysterious: 
Alexander the Great’s military conquest and the commitment of his successors have 
provided us with a thorough knowledge of India. After a sojourn at the courts of 
some Indian kings, Megasthenes wrote his treatise On Indian things in order to 
entrust to memory what he had seen in person. Dionysius, who had been sent to 
India as an observer by king Ptolemy, also wrote similar things in support of truth 
Megasthenes and Dionysius are presented as reliable autoptic witnesses, without any 
mention of the polemics surrounding their writings. For a “guardian of memory” 
(Paniagua) this is quite a remarkable move. But some irregularities in the passage merit 
closer inspection. The final sentence, in particular, seems problematic. The complemental 
structure gratia + genitive is rarer than the opposite genitive + gratia; moreover, 
Mommsen’s punctuation somehow separates gratia periclitandae veritatis from the 
participle missus through the insertion of a comma. In my translation I take gratia 
periclitandae veritatis as the goal of Dionysius’ mission, consequently making it directly 
 
 
62 Text and translation are taken from Rackham 1942. 
63 The question of whether Solinus drew directly from Pliny, from an intermediary source or from a common 
source is here irrelevant. 
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dependant on missus.64 Fernández Nieto, in his commented Spanish edition, follows 
Mommen’s punctuation closely, but, as a result, his translation sounds somewhat 
ambiguous: “Asimismo Dionisio, que fue enviado por el rey Filadelfo, también como 
observador, nos ha legado un relato parecido al objeto de averiguar la realidad” 
(Fernández Nieto 2001, p. 524, my emphasis). Was Dionisius sent in order to ascertain the 
truth or did he write a report similar to Megasthenes’ in order to fabricate a shared truth? 
Deciding between these two possible readings does not produce a neutral resolution, 
since if we accept the former Solinus would really be stating a contrary opinion to Pliny 
while stressing over and over that he is drawing on dependable sources.65  
As is very often the case, such textual difficulties conceal more radical hermeneutical 
doubts: is Solinus deliberately manipulating his sources in order to mislead his reader? 
Such an interpretation may sound unacceptably rough, but it has been proposed and has 
the advantage of acknowledging a certain degree of personal initiative on the part of 
Solinus.66 A less “personalistic” way of conceptualizing this problem might be to rephrase 
it in terms of genre expectations: Solinus, by de-problematizing the material he finds in his 
auctores, is implementing a strategy quite common among teratologists, whose 
compositional technique mostly consists of excerpting extraordinary information from 
contexts in which it would usually be normalized.67 The relief given to the marvellous in 
the Collectanea (and not only to the Indian marvellous) makes the reconfiguration of the 
‘‘deontological’’ principles outlined in the preface understandable. A new form of 
negotiation, a different writer-reader pact is here implied. In line with what we designated 
as an economy of pleasure, if, on the one hand, the reader’s enjoyment of the mirabilia 
significantly depended on the assumption that the marvellous information was true, on 
the other one, there would have been no pleasure at all if the information had been sifted 
too rigorously. When stating this we must avoid falling into a simplistic characterization of 
late antique readers as too unsophisticated for “real” science and of Solinus as their 
complaisant servant. 
 
 
64 Cf. Brodersen 2014b, p. 291. 
65 Even the apparently clear-cut introductory utterance sane nec quicquam ex ea dubium (“no aspect of this 
country is mysterious”) is not completely free of philological uncertainties: Mommsen’s apparatus shows that G, 
a manuscript already collated by Gustav Parthey and at that time in possession of Mommsen himself (Mommsen 
1958 [1895], p. LII) deletes the nec, thus providing a reading of the passage that would be closer to the 
traditionally distrustful attitude: sane quicquam ex ea dubium. 
66 See Apps 2014, p. 34 n. 2. Typically enough, in his Dawn of Modern Geography (Beazley 1897, p. 247), Beazly 
argued that, notwithstanding Solinus’ derivativeness, “it would be wrong to refuse him a place in the history of 
Christian geography, for no one influenced it more profoundly or more mischievously.” (My emphasis). 
67 Cfr. supra p. 72 n. 38. 
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The result of Solinus’ contradictory gestures (flaunting reliable auctores while admitting 
that they could be wrong; purporting a rigorous obedience to his sources while radically 
sifting their material etc.) is a hybridization of worlds, a dimension in which the exact 
meaning and the extent of the term ‘‘referentiality’’ is blurred. Indeed, by defining 
referentiality as the correspondence between a set of elements constituting the “real 
world” and those constituting any given ‘‘book world’’, we run the risk of adopting a grid 
that is too rigid.  
Most of the models proposed to describe the status of geographical objects in literary 
works rely on a tripartite scheme: at the extremities we find objects that belong exclusively 
to either the ‘‘real world’’ or the ‘‘book world’’, in the middle are objects that share 
features from both realms. For example, Parsons relies on three different but similar 
categories: immigrant objects (taken from the ‘‘real world’’ and transplanted into the 
‘‘book world’’), narrative  objects (existing only in the ‘‘book world’’) and, in between, 
surrogate objects.68 Davis calls the entities belonging to the ‘‘real world’’ actual, while the 
ones that belong exclusively to the ‘‘book-world’’ are fictitious, and renamed objects are 
things like real cities disguised in the narrative under a fictitious name.69 A very similar 
structure underpins Westphal’s distinction of three different types of referential system: 
consensus homotopique (when a geographical entity in the ‘‘book world’’ is meant to 
correspond univocally to an entity in the ‘‘real world’’), excursus utopique (referring to 
places that exist only in the ‘‘book world’’), and brouillage hétérotopique (under which 
label Westphal places any overlapping of the two domains, through juxtaposition, 
interpolation, etc.).70 All of these paradigms, even when one considers their intermediate 
categories (renamed, surrogate and heterotopic objects), rest on a systemic opposition 
between Reality and the Book, non-fiction and fiction. They do not ascribe priority to 
either of the two domains – both Reality and the Book are equally treated as discursive 
constructs – but their very individuation fails to fit the case of Solinus’ work. Indeed, the 
distinction that they draw, if not ontologically embodied by the ‘‘object’’, definitely points 
to a posture of the ‘‘subject’’, a speaking/writing subject that operates in lucid awareness 
of what is fiction and what is not.  
Parsons, Davis and Westphal provide their tripartitions as tools for analysing fictional 
texts, but these tools are scarcely helpful when dealing with non-fictional works, and even 
less so when approaching the old problem posed by the reciprocal porousness of ‘‘actual’’ 
 
 
68 On Parsons’ categories, which he fully developed in Nonexistent objects, see Pavel 1986, pp. 27-31. 
69 Davis 1987, p. 55. Davis’ main focus, though, is not so much the “ontology” of literary places as their ideological 
implications (cfr. the whole chapter Known unknown locations: the ideology of place, Davis 1987, pp. 52-101). 
70 Westphal 2007, pp. 169-172. For an overview of these and other tripartite schemes, see Piatti 2009, pp. 131-
147. 
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and ‘‘fictional’’ worlds. Thomas G. Pavel focused on this paradox in his classic monograph, 
at the end of which he offers a sketchy outline of what he labels an economy of the 
imaginary.71 At a given point in space and time the world view of a given community may 
consist of several contrasting ontological landscapes, that is, of different sets of beliefs 
that establish the boundaries for what can exist or what cannot, what can happen or not 
happen. For example, a Christian ontological landscape open to miracles has been 
coexisting for three centuries at least with a scientific landscape that resolutely rejects 
them; rejection is but one of the possible configurations of the relationship between two 
ontological landscapes, whose negotiations are more often subtle, complex and unstable. 
We could say that ‘‘fiction’’ arises when an ontological landscape is discarded and 
employed for secondary uses and the ontological level of its objects is downgraded (think 
of the destiny of ‘‘mythology’’). 
Now, what kind of speaking/writing subject is Solinus? What is his India? An immigrant 
object? If so, we could be so bold as to argue that Solinus did actually believe in the 
referential quality of all his information. If this is the case, how can we account for the 
shifts in the form and style of his teratological treatise? One could pick up any passage in 
chapter 52 and immediately recognize the catalogic abundance and unashamed 
decontextualization of the mirabilia collected there, their paroxysmal caricature of 
encyclopaedic exhaustiveness.72 Is India a narrative object? This would run against the 
genre affiliation claimed in the preface. And how could we choose one of the middle-
categories, if the conditions for their possible existence are erased and collapsed? Clearly, 
the most conspicuous consequence of Solinus’ weak epistemology is the impossibility of 
outlining the ontological landscape of the Collectanea in a clear-cut way. As a gate keeper 
of tradition, in the end, Solinus is relatively ambiguous. His work, shuttling between 
centrifugal and centripetal forces, never settles in a stable middle point, never rests in a 
centre of stillness: its being “in between” – genres, levels of referentiality, ontological 
landscapes – is a kinetic condition, its epitomic condensation generates movement instead 
of stasis. 
Given this scenario, when and where could such a text come to an end? This question 
might be rightly asked of any work with encyclopaedic ambitions (when and where should 
we stop cataloguing the world?), but it is all the more interesting in the case of a book 
whose potential openness has to come to terms with its being ad compendium 
praeparatus. The memorabile and the mirabile, although serving as selection criteria and 
therefore as semantic stabilizers, nonetheless allow for diversity and permanent 
 
 
71 Pavel 1986, pp. 136-148. 
72 See, most famously, the long list of Indian monsters and mirabilia at LII, 27-45.  
 92 
deviation, to the extent that at any new chapter (or, better, at any swerve into a new topic) 
it seems difficult to foresee how long it will take for the theme to be consumed. 
The Collectanea end, just like Pliny’s properly descriptive geographical books (N.H. 3-6, 
the last part of book 6 being devoted to calculating the dimensions of seas, rivers, 
continents etc.), at the Western extremity of the known oikoumene, at the so-called 
Insulae Fortunatae (Isles of Blessed) – but this ending conceals something more than an 
external, physical boundary.73  
The final section (LVI, 14-19) sets out with a disclaimer: Solinus warns the readers that 
the archipelago falls short of the expectations its name might raise, LVI, 15: 
De harum nominibus expectari magnum < non > miror, sed infra famam vocabuli est. 
 
I would not be surprised if one had great expectations, on the basis of their names, 
but they do not live up to their reputation.  
Interestingly enough, there is no sense of this dismissive tone in Pliny N.H. 202-205, the 
passage on which Solinus is probably drawing. Furthermore, as we have seen on other 
occasions (cfr. supra the digression on the diomedeae aves), Solinus systematically 
amplifies Pliny’s phrasing in the ensuing description, with the clear purpose of painting a 
gloomy picture of the Insulae. The neutral Plinian observation that there are no buildings 
on the island called Ombrion/Embrion (N.H. 6, 203: primam vocari Ombrion, nullis 
aedificiorum vestigiis) is reformulated by Solinus to encompass more explicitly both past 
and present (LVI, 15: in prima earum, cui nomen est Embrion, aedificia nec sunt nec 
fuerunt); the juice of some black canes growing there is said to be amarum by Pliny, 
amarissimum by Solinus; talking about another island, Iunonia, Pliny recalls that it 
harbours a small temple made only of stone (N.H. 6, 204: in ea aediculam esse tantum 
lapide exstructam), a temple Solinus presents in harsher terms by stressing its smallness 
and the inadequacy of its “roof” (LVI, 16: in qua pauxilla aedes ignobiliter ad culmen 
fastigata).74 But the most incisive intervention is to be found in the very last sentence. 
 
 
73 Solinus identifies the Insulae Fortunatae with the modern Canaries, thus following Pliny, whose main sources 
were the Latin geographer Statius Sebosus and the Numidian king and polymath Juba.  On the different ancient 
and modern identifications, see Amiotti 1988; Santana Santana – Arcos Pereira 2006. For an overview of imperial 
and medieval testimonies on the Insulae Fortunatae, see Cristini 2017. 
74 It is difficult to decide whether ad culmen fastigata should be read as a precise architectonical notation or not. 
Manfredi 1996, pp. 124; 141 ff. (quoted in Fernández Nieto 2001, p. 568 n. 1463) quotes Solinus’ description to 
argue that the building was not an actual temple, but a small votive chapel of Phoenician foundation. This reading 
is interesting not so much for the (I think indemonstrable) material evidence, but because it would imply that 
Solinus is here adding some new, i.e. non-Plinian, information. Can the discrepancies between the two texts be 
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Pliny’s cursory remarks on the presence of rotting carcasses (N.H. 6, 205: infestari eas 
beluis, quae expellantur adsidue, putrescentibus) is transposed by Solinus as follows, LVI, 
19: 
Perhibent etiam expui in eam undoso mari beluas; deinde cum monstra illa putredine 
tabefacta sunt, omnia illic infici taetro odore; ideoque non penitus ad 
nuncupationem sui congruere insularum qualitatem. 
 
The rough sea, they say, casts ashore wild creatures; then, as these see-monsters 
rot in putrefaction, everything stinks with their foul stench; that’s why the actual 
quality of the islands does not match their name. 
The closing scene of Solinus’ textual travel is set in a nightmarish landscape. Against a 
backdrop of stormy waves, rotting carcases exhale an overwhelming miasma. Far from 
weakening the presence of the monstra that, as readers, we have met throughout the 
work, this final dissolution makes the monsters even more haunting – the savage 
materiality of this vision is striking, as persistent as the taeter odor of decomposing 
remains. This explosion of material evidentia is accompanied by the acknowledgement 
that signified and signifier can be irreversibly split, that res and verba do not always match 
in a consequent way. This is the ultimate clash staged here, and it is this very clash that 
makes the Collectanea possible. The pedantic indignation of the last sentence (ideoque 
non penitus ad noncupationem sui congruere insularum qualitatem) can hardly make us 
forget that it is only through an imperfect transposition of res into verba that a catalogue 
of the world ad compendium praeparatus is feasible. The Solinian congeries is, first and 
foremost, a congeries of words – in this sense, its ‘‘bookishness’’ should be connected to 
more fundamental processes than those implied by uncritical erudition. At the end of his 
journey, Solinus leaves the reader brooding on how real monstra can be, wondering 
whether the truth lies in their excessive existence or in the haunting stench of their rotten 
bodies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
explained through Solinus’ direct access to Pliny’s auctores (Juba? Cfr. Cristini 2017, p. 157) or/and to an 
intermediate source? I do not think that the answer is really relevant to the present discussion.   
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Chapter  3  
Thorns, Marrow, and Meaning 
(Fabius Planciades Fulgentius) 
 
 
Col passo avaro, indocile, acre, rompo 
all’aldilà che in falde e felci sfrangia 
sul botro; oltre le serpi e i pruni zompo. 
 
E nell’alto aldilà, nei fondi teneri 
do di tacco, do a sacco, sfregio veneri, 
falsifico simbiosi: ora si mangia. 
 
A. Zanzotto, Il galateo in bosco, Ipersonetto V  
 
 
«Tutto arbitrario, tutto documentato» 
 
G. Manganelli, Pinocchio: un libro parallelo 
 
 
3.1 Mysticum cerebrum 
3.1.1 Labyrinthus in vacuo (a pre-analysis) 
Tandem inter sentosa nemorum fructeta, quae agrestis olim deseruerat manus – 
nam, intercapedinante pavoris prolixitate tam larga, fumo lurida parietibus aratra 
pendebant et laborifera boum colla iugales in vaccinam mollitiem deduxerant callos 
– squalebat viduus sulcis ager et herbidis sentibus olivifero vertici minabatur; ita 
enim nexili de syrmate meandrico gramini labrusca coibant, quo saepta herbosis 
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radicibus tellus Triptolemicum contumax abnueret dentem – ergo dum huiuscemodi 
paliurea prata incedenti premerem planta et roscidos florulenti velleris colles 
spatianti meterem passu, defectum voluntas peperit et egredientis studio sedulitas 
ex labore successit. Devertor arborei beneficium umbraculis praesumens, quo me 
errant foliorum intextu Phoebis torridis defensaret obtuitibus et circumfluo ramorum 
recurrentium nexu umbram quam propriis radicibus praeberet mihi etiam 
concederet esse communem.  
 
And so, among the thorny briers of the glades, once kept in order by the hand of the 
countryman (because the stoppage and long neglect caused by that fear, the 
ploughs, a sorry sight and thick with soot, were hung up on the walls; and the necks 
of the oxen, once fit for hard toil, had now reduced the tough skin of their yoking to 
a cow-like softness), the neglected land stood with its furrows overgrown and 
threatened to choke the tops of the olive trees with its thick briers. The wild vine 
was collecting with its binding, winding, and trailing growth, as if the earth held 
down by its matted roots would stubbornly refuse the tooth of Triptolemus. As in 
this fashion I forced my steps across the fields through the advancing thorn and 
paced through the mounds with their bright and spreading tufts, my enthusiasm for 
walking began to falter, and eagerness gave place to toil. I turned aside, anticipating 
the benefit of the shady tree with its interwoven leaves to protect the wanderer 
from the fiery glances of Phoebus, and in the entwining of its bending branches I 
gained the shady spot which at its vey roots is provided and let me share.1 
The eye glides slowly across a desert of devastated fields, a post-apocalyptic horizon 
littered with the remnants of long forgotten human activities, the anthropic landscape 
now reduced to a tabula rasa where infesting weeds can freely sprawl. Then, all of sudden, 
a shift in tone, defectum voluntas peperit (“my enthusiasm began to falter”), devertor (“I 
turn aside”) – and the vision begins to transform, from abandoned glades we are 
transported, thanks to emergence of the first person voice, to a place where the mild 
shadow cast by some trees offers a comfortable shelter away from the burning sun, a locus 
amoenus at the heart of desolation. 
 
 
1 All translations are taken from Whitbread 1971 with some modifications. It should be noted that Whitbread’s 
translation, still the only extant English full-length translation of Fulgentius’ works, is far from being flawless, as 
already pointed out by Bruère 1973 and Relihan 1986, p. 540 n. 11. The Latin text reproduces Venuti 2018 for 
the Prologue and Helm 1898 for the three books of fabulae. Pages and lines references  are based on Helm 1898.   
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This excerpt is taken from the Prologue of Fabius Planciades Fulgentius’s Mythologiae 
(Prol. 6,4 – 6, 20).2 The first person, as it will be confirmed shortly thereafter, is Fulgentius 
himself: we are ushered into the hermeneutical world of the Mythologiae (three books of 
fabulae, “myths”, and interpretations) through an ostentatiously autobiographical voice. 
And yet, what kind of voice is this? What kind of bios? Before delving into a closer reading 
of the Prologue (see section 2. ‘‘The Allegorical Satire of the Prologus’’) I would like to 
linger a little longer on this vision of grimness and subsequent, unexpected peacefulness 
by making it resound in a vacuum, as if it were an excerptum rescued from an irretrievable 
totality: a way of reading that, as we shall see, shows some affinities with Fulgentius’ own 
interpretative strategy and bestows an epitomic character to his work. 
By offering a content-centered paraphrase of the passage, I have substantially obscured 
its most striking feature: the blatant panache of the prose.3 In this sequence of 
descriptions all nouns and adjectives, sedulously displaced, seem to be loaded with 
something more than mimetic accuracy; everything is a topos overflowing with figurative 
abundance (note the redundancy of nexili de syrmate meandrico gramini); everything is 
detailed, but all details sound generic.4  
A similar kind of discrepancy, between topicality and excess, coherence and 
arbitrariness, might be spotted in the spatial configuration of the scene: plundered fields 
and blossoming mounds belong to two totally different worlds – a fact which, apparently, 
does not prevent them from being staged as contiguous. If it is hard to draw a map of the 
land here described, it is because such a landscape is too topical to fit into a naturalistic 
topography – an abstract topology is all we can attain. But what may appear as a 
traditionally climactic ascension from darkness to light – in three acts: devastated 
country/blossoming mounds/amoenus lonely tree – is blurred by a factor that subtly 
connects the starting and the final point of the climax: the labyrinthine texture of the 
vegetation. The tangle of briers choking the ground (ita enim nexili de syrmate meandrico 
gramini labrusca coibant, quo saepta herbosis radicibus tellus Triptolemicum contumax 
abnueret dentem) is mirrored in the interwoven foliage and branches of the tree, a visual 
echo that breaks the pure linearity of the ascending movement from death to life, from 
 
 
2 On Fulgentius’ three names and on the vexata quaestio of whether the author of the Mythologiae should be 
identified with the well-documented bishop of Ruspe (468-533 CE), see the thorough treatment by Hays 2003. 
Despite Hays’ resolution in denying the identification, there is still no agreement among scholars. Cfr. Venuti 
2018, pp. 11-21.  
3 For an assessment of Fulgentius’ notorious prose, see Venuti 2018, pp. 30-34; Wolff–Dain 2013, pp. 25-29; 
Manca 2003, pp. 58-63, on the De aetatibus mundi et hominis. 
4 The overwhelmingly rich intertextuality of the Prologue will not be at the centre of the present discussion; it 
has been already intensively investigated by Venuti 2018. 
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squalor to dewy hills, and impresses on it the mark of circularity. Both the fields and the 
tree share a common feature: they are, as it were, saturated environments, spaces replete 
with an exceeding element; or again, as I suggested before, tabulae rasae on which we 
can recognize a meandrous pattern – they are inscribed surfaces. And the shape of such 
inscriptions is analogous to Fulgentius’ own divergent writing, characterized as it is by 
displacements in the expected ordo verborum, metaplasms, hapax legomena.5 The 
thickness of the thorns on which the first person narrator has to step while walking 
through the fields (dum huiuscemodi paliurea prata incedenti premerem planta) is 
reminiscent of the thickness that readers find in the excess and saturation on Fulgentius’ 
page.  
Slowed down in the very process of interpreting the text, a reader of the Prologue has 
to struggle against its opacity, which is accompanied by a feeling that everything, on this 
page, is meaningful. Its overstuffed signifiers trigger questions about their relationship to 
the signified: the glades, the mounds, the tree, but also the first-person wanderer, the 
bending branches, the vines, the olive tree, every component of the scenery might not 
simply be what it seems. Their accumulation and juxtaposition on Fulgentius’ over-
inscribed page invites the reader to look for supplemental readings, or just to read the 
objects. The Prologue is a maze of opaque signs whose intricacy reveals itself to be, at the 
same time, the cause and the final result of their excess of meaning. 
However, it is also worth noting that accumulation and loosely coherent juxtaposition 
may contribute to making the single objects stand out against the blurred (entwined) 
background, providing them with the evidence of isolation. In such saturated 
environments, objects, instead of interconnecting in a stable network, or building up an 
easily decipherable relationship, emerge as unrelated monades, as characters of a broken 
alphabet: we see the lurida aratra, we see the meandering scribbling of the weeds, we 
even see the hammering alliteration of paliurea prata incedenti premerem planta, or the 
twisted syntax of quo saepta herbosis radicibus tellus Triptolemicum contumax abnueret 
dentem – what is hard to see is the system that would account for their meaning and make 
it not only perceivable, but also utterable. 
 
 
5 On the linguistic features of Fulgentius’ inclination to hapax legomena, see Manca 2003, p. 63; Hays 2002, pp. 
249-252; Wolff – Dain 2013, pp. 26-27. 
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3.1.2 Frames and Meanders 
Thus far, the discussion has been deliberately presented in the form of a pre-analysis, that 
is, in a way which many will judge as not analytical at all. Instead of trying to disentangle 
the several aspects of the text, I have let them collapse in on each other. For example, the 
meander has been taken ‘‘literally’’ at the level of the narrative (meandrico gramine) and 
used subsequently as a formal pattern, standing for any kind of intricacy (leaves and 
branches). Reduced to the status formal of pattern, it has been applied to stylistic features 
as well as to more general semiotic considerations. A similar ambiguous inconsistency 
could be ascribed to the use of the phrase tabula rasa, the verb devertor and the term 
topos, as well as to the treatment of space. This was no analytical argumentation because 
it was based upon abrupt shifts from one signifying system to another, from the fictional 
world within the text to the linguistic code underlying the text itself, and from the code to 
its rules. Moreover, it might also be pointed out that the reader here evoked resembles 
an abstract function more than a historically and phenomenologically anchored subject. 
This implies that the present observations are nothing but undemonstrated and 
indemonstrable generalizations relying upon the (mis-)conceptions of one single reader – 
“me”. We shall see how the merging of disparate semiotic codes and the “arbitrariness” 
of the analysis are exactly what usually baffle post-renaissance students when they 
approach Fulgentius’s Mythologiae.6  
Even so, while rambling in thrall of the text and its meanders, we touched upon an 
actual problem which lies at the heart of any epitomic practice: the conundrum of meaning 
and of its delimitation. Reflecting on accumulation and juxtaposition, or, to resume some 
phrasing from the pre-analysis, reflecting on opacity, requires us to grapple with the issue 
of de-contextualization.7 By shifting from one signifying system to another, what we are 
doing is, basically, transplanting units from one context to a new one – I take the meanders 
drawn by the grass and transpose them at the level of textual analysis, never forgetting, 
though, their irreducible origin. One might say that I am just metaphorizing. When staring 
at an object, it is difficult to perceive it as an integrated wholeness once we are aware of 
 
 
6 The Mythologiae were very popular in the Middle Ages, not only as a source of myths. Carolingian authors seem 
to have admired Fulgentius’ style and to have adopted some Fulgentian phrases, cfr. Laistner 1957 [1928]. 
Fulgentius’ repertoire of myths remained authoritative at least until Giovanni Boccaccio’s Genealogiae deorum 
gentilium and Coluccio Salutati’s De laboribus Herculis. See Hays 2013, esp. pp. 319-333, who concludes that: 
“The dismissal of Fulgentius as an eccentric and minor author – ‘pretentious, yet essentially trivial’ – as Laistner 
called him – is a comparatively recent phenomenon, and one driven primarily by trends in modern classical 
scholarship”, p. 332. 
7 My use of the term opacity does not entirely overlap with the aesthetical use popularized by Edouard Glissant 
(cfr. Glissant 1990), on which see Mbom 2000. 
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the disparate provenience of its elements. While reading of a luxuriant tree growing a few 
steps away from a plundered field, we are likely to glimpse the disjointedness of the image, 
all the more so if we find it described in terms that immediately recall the locus amoenus 
topos: we will be inevitably led to make sense of the presence of the tree through the 
topos, that is, by connecting the tree to another signifying context. But what would happen 
if we did not know anything about loci amoeni et similia? What if, in other words, the only 
available context were the one at hand, this unaccustomed juxtaposition of devastation 
and luxury, and we were not able to hear in the tree the echo of a topos? Would we still 
perceive the disjointedness of the image? Or is this rather a product of our disjointing 
gaze?  
For all their triviality, such questions play no secondary role when it comes to studying 
a set of phenomena which, for brevity’s sake, I will subsume under the label of cumulative 
aesthetics. This term has often been utilized for late antique artistic products, with 
reference to both visual and literary output;8 it points to a crisis in the ideal of organic 
totality which became more and more conspicuous in late antiquity: a pre-eminence of 
details over the whole, an inclination towards the heaping of “ornaments”, a 
fragmentation of the object (sculpture, poem etc.) into un-related units are all 
characteristics widely attested in art from the 3rd-7th c. CE.9 In addition to such formal 
disruption, the identity (understood as uniqueness) of the work of art came to be 
menaced, at least from a modern point of view, by the continuous ostentation of the 
derivativeness of the work itself, by its repeated insistence on being a patchwork made of 
scraps taken from previous cultural experiences. Jaś Elsner has argued that the spolia-
aesthetics observable in much late antique architecture and statuary can be interpreted 
as a correlative to typically late antique textual works like centos, quotation-stuffed poems 
and, of course, epitomes: the Arch of Constantine would be comparable to Homeric and 
Virgilian centos, which pillaged canonical literary texts to create new entities out of their 
words.10 It is here that our ‘‘trivial questions’’ become most relevant. Paolo Liverani has 
repeatedly warned against drawing hurried parallels between spolia and intertextual 
practices.11 In his opinion, spolia and citations cannot be made to overlap since the latter 
is not an invasive technique, while the former derives from a previously destroyed context; 
 
 
8 See Elsner 2006; Elsner-Hernández Lobato 2017, pp. 6-9; Johnson 2016, p. 29 speaks of an “aesthetic of 
accumulation.” 
9 Cfr. Elsner 2006; Patricia Cox Miller speaks of an aesthetics of fragments based on “distant echoing”, Cox Miller 
2009, pp. 43ff.. This concept is similar to the “aesthetic of discontinuity” famously analysed by Michael Roberts 
in his monograph on late antique “jewelled style” (Roberts 1989). See in general Lobato 2012, pp. 257-317.  
10 Elsner 2006, pp. 279-280. 
11 Liverani 2009; Id. 2011. 
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quotations demand, as it were, to be read against an original background, they function 
as bridges between two (con)texts, whereas spolia often entail the material effacement of 
this very (con)text. Did the Arch of Constantine need its observers to be aware of the 
origins of its medallions and columns? Liverani denies this possibility by arguing that the 
spolia appearing in the arch performed a phatic/metalinguistic function, that is, they 
reinforced and explained the monument’s own mode of communication: “In the most 
elementary fashion, the reused columns and the profusion of marbles that Constantine 
and his successors employed in the imperially sponsored church basilicas were saying 
something similar: ‘this is a building of imperial status, worthy of the emperor’s 
benefaction’.”12 In other terms, in the eyes of Roman viewers the disparateness of the 
columns and reliefs dissolved into the majestic totality of the political message. The 
pressure exerted by imperial ideology functioned as a semantic homogenizer, obliterating 
any potential internal discrepancies. What would have been easy to deconstruct as an 
accumulation of fragments was actually perceived as a coherent totality. 
At the intersection between cumulative aesthetics and delimitation of meaning we find 
the problem of framing.13 In the case of the Arch of Constantine, the broad frame 
superimposed by imperial ideology supersedes the minor frames of columns, narrative 
panels, and freezes. The constitution of meaning always depends on the number of 
interconnections we are willing to admit among the elements of a given set: to choose a 
frame means to accept some connections, to bring them to the foreground, while 
discarding others, relegating them to the background – it is a process of marking, of 
creating a path. In an over-inscribed environment (as in its opposite, an empty 
environment) one might be tempted to indulge in the most characteristic feature of 
frames: their unrestrainable capacity for producing meaning. Once framed, even a void 
becomes significant; when too many objects are eligible to be framed, the temptation is 
to frame everything, be it by setting the focus closer on the object or further away from 
it, by reveling in close-ups or exceeding in long-shots. Over-inscribed environments help 
us to realize that, in the end, it is the very act of framing that ignites the process of semiosis 
– to realize that the confusion elicited by where to put the frame (a crisis of legibility) is a 
confusion that should always be there, even if there are no objects to frame.  
Fulgentius’ textuality embodies this apparent paradox – the overabundant significance 
of the void, the emptiness of an over-significant space – both from the perspective of the 
object being-read and of the reading subject (thus destabilizing any neat distinction 
 
 
12 Liverani 2011, p. 37. 
13 It will become clear in the following pages that I deliberately take the term frame and its derivatives in quite 
broad a sense. For some theoretical considerations on frames and their disruption, see at least Kovács 2016. For 
a cultural history of frames in the ancient visual and textual domains, see Platt – Squire 2017. 
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between the two): the meandering signifiers of the Prologue, so hard to disentangle, 
anticipate Fulgentius’ own entangled reading of the myths, its incessant shifting of frames. 
As we shall later see, Fulgentius’ hermeneutics insists on the signifier only to smash its 
boundaries and shuttle freely between verba and res, breaking down words, tales and 
images, so that sepulto mendacis Graeciae fabuloso commento quid mysticum in his sapere 
debeat cerebrum agnoscamus (“once the fictional invention of lying Greeks has been 
disposed of, we may infer what allegorical significance one should understand in such 
matters”, Prol. 11, 17-18). This mysticum cerebrum, a variation on what Macrobius had 
called cogitationes latentes, the hidden meaning of words,14 is attained at costs that have 
often proved hardly acceptable for modern scholars. In order to find some very harsh 
judgments of Fulgentius’ interpretative technique one does not necessarily need to go 
back to the baffled, dismissively positivistic condemnation expressed by Domenico 
Comparetti who, in his widely influential monograph on the reception of Vergil in the 
Middle Ages, lamented that “the [allegorical] process of Fulgentius is so violent and 
incoherent, it disregards every law of common sense in such a patent and well-nigh brutal 
manner, that it is hard to conceive how any sane man can seriously have undertaken such 
a work, and harder still to believe that other sane men should have accepted it as an object 
for serious consideration.”15 Indeed, as late as 1971, Leslie G. Withbread observed that 
“[Fulgentius’] purposes and methods [are] muddleheaded and dubious, and [his] displays 
of learning second hand and suspect”;16 and in 1986 J. C. Relihan began an article noting 
ironically that “Fulgentius the Mythographer suffers from an academic contempt that 
seems to be completely justified.”17 
If we decide to define Fulgentius’s controversial hermeneutics as ‘‘allegorical’’, then it 
seems to be appropriate to look at it as a form of “radical interpretation”, as Gerald L. 
Bruns phrases it, that is to say, as a way to radically subvert the apparent meaning of a 
given sign (either textual or visual). An important disclaimer should not here be omitted: 
allegory as “radical interpretation” has always been, in Bruns’ opinion, a typically Western 
 
 
14 Sat. 1.17.5. Cf. Amsler 1989, p. 126. Venuti 2018, pp. 211-212 lists other passages from the Mythologiae: 12,3 
secretis mysticisque rebus vivaciter pertractandis; 12,12 mysticae artes; 15,1-2 mysticis […] rationibus […] de his 
expectas effectus; 54,9 sed haec fabula mystici saporem cerebri consipit; 74, 8-9 nunc ergo huius mysticae fabulae 
interiorem cerebrum inquiramus; 78, 18-20 vocis pulchritudo […] interna artis secreta virtutem etiam mysticam 
verborum attingit.   
15 Comparetti 1997 [1872], p. 112. 
16 Whitbread 1971, p. IX. 
17 Relihan 1986, p. 535. 
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hermeneutical tool, an instrument of power, control and cultural appropriation.18 Before 
assigning such an attitude to Fulgentius and making him a sort of intellectual conqueror, 
it is worth taking a closer look at this peculiar use of the concept of allegory. 
3.1.3 Allegory and Satire 
In Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern (1992) Gerald L. Bruns defines allegory as the 
hermeneutical practice of transposing an object into a code understandable by (or 
compatible with) the reader and her/his community. In this sense, allegory, although 
based on the multifariousness of the sign, might be regarded as a semantic stabilizer: it 
exploits the instability of the text to make it say what the reader yearns to hear (the figural 
interpretation of the Old Testament would be a classical example of such a procedure).19 
Unlike the Benjaminian allegorical reader, fascinated by textual ruptures, deviations, and 
unfathomable juxtapositions of scattered fragments, a truly demolishing reader, Bruns’ 
allegorist is first of all a powerful centralizer of meaning, someone able to make everything 
converge on a single point, since in “radical interpretation what matters is not meaning 
but truth; that is, the question is not, What does this sentence mean? but How would this 
sentence have to be construed so as to be held true in our language?”20 Allegory, then, 
seems to be here the very structure of ideology, almost a factory of master signifiers that 
leaves scarce or no room for an actual, dialogical encounter between texts and readers: 
allegory – that is, radical interpretation – turns out to be a reader’s monologue, or even a 
soliloquy, in which the text, precisely because of its opaqueness, is utilized as if it were a 
mirror.21 
At the opposite pole, Bruns locates satire: “Satire is the discourse of the Other against 
the Same: counterallegory. Satire explodes the conceptual schemes or mechanical 
operations of the spirit by which we try to objectify and control things, including all that 
comes down to us from the past.” Resuming the terminology I adopted speaking of 
 
 
18 See Bruns 1992, p. 83: “‘Radical interpretation’ means the redescription, in one’s own language, of sentences 
from an alien system of concepts and beliefs […] In this context making sense does not mean recovering or 
preserving an original message, or at least not just that; rather, it means integrating a text (and its meanings) 
into a radically new cultural environment.” As Bruns himself points out shortly thereafter, he borrows the term 
‘‘radical interpretation’’ from David Davidson’s Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, which, in turn, 
reinterpreted and modified Willard Van Orman Quine’s concept of “radical translation”.  
19 Bruns 1992, pp. 88 ff. focuses on Philo of Alexandria. 
20 Bruns 1992, p. 83.  
21 In order to oppose such a solipsistic attitude, Bruns suggests we go back to Gadamer’s notion of the “fusion of 
horizons”, Bruns 1992, pp. 209 ff. For a subtler and somehow less pessimistic account of the relationship between 
ideology and allegory, see most recently Jameson 2019, pp. ix-xxi.   
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Solinus, if allegory is a centripetal hermeneutical strategy, satire is a centrifugal one, 
“unconvertible, uncontainable, uncontrollable; it rages at the gates for all the world like 
the voice of a madwoman.”22 And where allegory can only be monological, satire is 
inherently dialogical. Bruns considers both these strategies as ways of confronting 
“tradition” or “the past”. Tradition is, indeed, often conceptualized as an allegorical 
process, as a subsumptive thinking that canonizes objects and makes them acceptable by 
stabilizing their meaning in accordance with a fixed set of values; the traditionalist cannot 
but silently welcome the things this enormous machine of meaning-production hands 
down to him/her. On the contrary, the satirist chooses to play an interlocutory role and to 
deal with tradition not so much as with an archive of consolidated values as with an 
agonistic space, a place where “[one] exposes one’s self-image to alternative descriptions, 
producing an irrepressible satirical desire”23; for the satirist, tradition is a place to lose the 
self through contamination.24  
I think that the Bachtinian echoes of Bruns’ theory are here sufficiently evident: the 
monological ratio of allegory is to be seen as a coercive (although highly productive) force, 
whereas the polyphonic dialogism of satire would act as a disruptive, liberating gesture. 
Like many other dichotomies, this opposition, while providing a handy hermeneutical tool, 
convincingly captures some phenomena while remaining blind to others. The tension that 
Bruns recognizes between allegory and satire could actually be said to be operative within 
allegory itself. In an influential overview of allegorical practices in Antiquity and the Middle 
Ages, Jon Whitman, analyzing the exemplary case of Bernardus Silvestris’ Cosmographia,25 
draws attention to the double dynamics that allegory can generate: on the one hand, 
allegorical objects or characters (i.e., for instance, Nature) are made to converge around 
a core of truth, that is, are interpreted as functions of the master signifier (once we know 
that a specific character  represents nature, we will be inclined to read all of its elements 
as representing a particular aspect of nature) – this is usually called allegoresis, or allegory 
as interpretative practice. On the other hand, compositional allegory, that is, allegory as 
the creation of allegorical objects, can really proliferate indefinitely, to the extent that 
these objects can become so numerous that it is almost impossible to derive a coherent 
 
 
22 Both quotations from Bruns 1992, p. 204. 
23 Bruns 1992, p. 204. 
24 Interestingly and perhaps unexpectedly, Bruns 1992, p. 199, chooses Petrarch as an example of dialogical 
appropriation of tradition, assuming that: “The lesson of Petrarch would be that tradition is not an empire of the 
dead whose ruins litter the contemporary landscape; not the bricoleur’s debris. It is not something that requires 
to be disinterred and reinstituted in a museum or a throne. It is not vergangen, or gone for good. […Petrarch] 
gives us the model of the hermeneutical concept of tradition as an ongoing conversation from which modernity 
(by definition) excludes itself”.   
25 Whitman 1987, pp. 218-260. 
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master signifier: “On the one hand, the correspondences of compositional allegory begin 
to expand as the characters diverge from themselves. On the other hand, the divergences 
of interpretative allegory begin to coalesce as the characters correspond with each other, 
and in so doing, converge on an underlying truth.”26 Such a movement dramatically 
complicates the polarized scheme outlined by Bruns: there is an element of satirical 
indeterminacy in every attempt at allegory/allegoresis, so that allegory reveals itself as an 
inevitable factor of instability (a tempered version, it could be argued, of the notion of 
allegory as a disruptive force presented by Paul de Man and other deconstructionists).27 
To our present purpose, though, Bruns’ schematic view offers an interesting point of 
departure, since Fulgentius’ Mythologiae seem to subsume both tendencies, the 
allegorical and the satirical, in quite a straightforward way: the Prologue has been long 
since described as belonging to the ancient genre of satira menippea;28 the three books of 
allegorical explanations to that of Graeco-Roman fabulae constituted as popular models 
down to Boccaccio.29 Yet, more interestingly, Fulgentius’ work also contradicts the 
polarized structure of Bruns’ theory, polarizing, in its turn, critical interpretations. The next 
two sections will try to examine this mechanism in more depth. 
3.2 The Allegorical Satire of the Prologus 
3.2.1 Shifting Frames 
A first, easy way to tackle the problems of allegory, satire, and, again, framing in the 
Prologue of the Mythologiae is to interrogate its architecture and the role it plays in the 
compositional economy of the whole work. In Helm’s edition, the 13 page long Prologue 
is directly attached to the first book, since no actual cutting is discernible between the 
closing section of the Prologue and the beginning of the mythological discussion. 
 
 
26 Whitman 1987, p. 243. 
27 I am referring, of course, to de Man’s essays collected in Blindness and Insight (1971) and Allegories of Reading 
(1979). For a general (and polemical) assessment of de Man’s allegory, see Kablitz 2016, pp. 27-44. Against any 
interpretation of allegory as a “structure of meaning”, see Machowsky 2013, pp. 1-63. 
28 Cfr. Relihan 1993, pp. 152-163. Venuti 2018, pp. 30-34, is more cautious in assigning the Prologue to any 
definite genre, and she confesses that she does not think it “possibile, e nemmeno utile, attribuire un’etichetta 
esclusiva di genere a questo prologo”, p. 33. For a quick overview of the genre from antiquity to modern times, 
see Weinbrot 2005. 
29 See supra p. 95 n. 6. 
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Nonetheless, this very seamless juncture distinguishes the Prologue from the two other 
short introductions to the second and the third book, which are remarkably shorter and 
self-contained.30 The first prologue is, moreover, by far the most rhetorically refined 
section of the Mythologiae, which would not be peculiar at all, were it not for the fact that 
‘‘rhetorical  refinement’’ for Fulgentius generally involves a display of his taste for hapax 
legomena, syntactical difficulties, and unexpected iuncturae: the immediate connection to 
the first book is thus counterbalanced by a conspicuous linguistic specificity which 
contributes to the separateness of the opening section of the Mythologiae. This effect of 
discontinuity and interruption constitutes, I would argue, a constant of the Prologue and 
one of its distinctively satirical features.31  
On a macrostructural level, the most striking form of discontinuity is represented by the 
insertion of two poems, which has led scholars to speak of satira menippea when trying to 
define the genre of Fulgentius’ work. The presence of these two poems suggests a 
subdivision of the Prologue into three major sections, whose articulation is only partially 
self-evident. In order to better grasp the dynamics of continuity and discontinuity active 
here and to understand why one should avoid any hasty partition of the text, it might be 
useful to draw a sketchy outline of the content of the Prologue. 
The Mythologiae begin with an acknowledgement of the cultural squalor of their time, 
an age in which one has to struggle to stay alive, let alone to cultivate literary glory 
(famae…poeticae 3,6); even so, the author hopes that the dedicatee, referred to as a 
dominus,32 will generously accept the result of his efforts, namely, the explanation of 
myths through philosophy (3-4,7). What has so far been a pretty topical dedication now 
takes on a more autobiographical nuance, significantly introduced by the first person 
pronoun (Me interim discedentem a te, domine,…. 4,7). Fabius Fulgentius (the two names 
are explicitly mentioned in the Prologue, at 10,11 and 12, 22 respectively) tells the story 
of how, having escaped from the stressful life of the city, he looked for some quiet in the 
countryside, only to be followed by a horde of tax collectors (tributaria conventio, 5,1) and 
end up stuck at home by the reiterated military attacks of some mysterious enemy (bellici 
 
 
30 For a comparative reading of all Fulgentian prologues, see Manca 2002. 
31 Needless to point out that here my usage of the term “satire” refers to the traditional Latin genre only lato 
sensu. Still, the discontinuous, juxtapositional character of satire emerges in the well-known ancient etymology 
of satura, connected as it was to an idea of variety and, obviously, saturation. Cfr. the famous passage from 
Diomedes, GL I, 485. See Freudenburg 2005, pp. 2-3 and the overview of different 19th-20th century theories in 
Knoche 1957, pp. 8-13. 
32 It is impossible to identify Fulgentius’ dedicatee. In some manuscripts, inscriptiones and subscriptiones present 
the work as dedicated to a certain Catus/Cantia presbyterus Carthaginis. In any case, Venuti 2015 is right when 
trying to prove that drawing historical information from such stylized a text as the Mythologiae is 
methodologically problematic, to say the least. 
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frequenter incursus, 5,8). The advent of a dominus rex (5.14) has now rescued the country 
from the ingressores and set the writer free from his seclusion. Leaving home, Fulgentius 
enters a world of ruin and devastation, but wandering through plundered fields he reaches 
a solitary locus amoenus (5,17-6,22); once there, he sings in praise of the Muses. This 
invocation in trochaic meter marks the beginning of the second part of the Prologue: 
attracted by Fulgentius’ carmen, three Muses really do show up, led by Calliope, who 
engages Flugentius himself in conversation; at the end of their dialogue, Calliope promises 
that she will send Urania, Philosophia and Satira, whose praise concludes Calliope’s speech 
(8-13,5), as helpers to Fulgentius in his philosophical project. The third section is then 
rather abruptly introduced by a hexametric patchwork of astro-mythological indications 
of the incipient night. We soon realize that the poem has served to dramatically shift the 
narrative in time and space; it is night, and from the locus amoenus have we moved to an 
interior, Fulgentius’ own house, perhaps. The writer is sleeping, noisily snoring, when all 
of a sudden he is startled by the arrival of Calliope, gloriously circumfused with light and 
accompanied by the promised tutrices Urania, Philosophia and Satira: thanks to their 
support, Fulgentius is finally ready to start his interpretation of Graeco-Roman myths 
(13,17-15,19). 
This rough summary might already suffice to provide a hint of the striking degree of 
textual variety in the Prologue, which switches not only from prose to poetry, but also 
from densely descriptive passages to anecdotes, from plain narration to dramatic 
dialogue. If this fragmentary unfolding seems to fit into a general idea of cumulative 
aesthetics, the juncture linking the fragments and panels to the extremities of what has 
been defined as an “allegorical play in three acts”33 deserves some scrutiny.  
The exordium couples topical material with idiosyncratic Fulgentian language:34 the first 
sentence runs over no less than twenty lines in the editio teubneriana, quite a problematic 
textual limen, both repulsive and captivating. We will not indulge in a close analysis, but 
the passage is worth reading in its entirety – in its torrential self-deployment (3,1-3,20): 
Quamvis inefficax petat studium res quae caret effectum et ubi emolumentum deest 
negotii causa cessat inquiri – hoc videlicet pacto, quia nostri temporis aerumnosa 
miseria non dicendi petat studium, sed vivendi fleat ergastulum nec famae 
adsistendum poeticae, sed fami sit consulendum domesticae – cito itaque nunc aut 
quod amiseris fleas aut quod edas inquiras quam quod dicas invenias; vacatque hoc 
 
 
33 Venturi 2018, p. 26. 
34 Among the topoi one might recognize the servitium theme (with terms such as dominus, imperare, auscultare); 
the description of the qualitas temporum; the opposition between silence and sound etc. Cf. Manca 2002 and 
Venuti 2018’s commentary ad loc. 
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temporis potentibus opprimere, prioribus rapere, privatis perdere, miseris flere – 
quia soles, domine, meas cachinnantes saepius nenias lepore satirico litas libentius 
adfectari, dum ludicro Thalia ventilans epigrammate comoedica solita est vernulitate 
mulcere, additur quia et mihi nuper imperasse dinosceris ut affatim feriatas tuarum 
aurium sedes libido quolibet susurro permulceam: parumper ergo ausculta dum tibi 
rugosam sulcis anilibus ordior fabulam, quam nuper Attica saporante salsura, 
nocturna praesule lucerna commentus sum, ita somniali figmento delusam, quo non 
poetam furente aspicias, sed onirocriten soporis nugas hariolantem advertas. 
 
Although a subject which lacks immediate purpose may produce little real 
enthusiasm and, where there is no material advantage, may well cease to be 
pursued for practical reasons (on the ground, that is, that the calamitously wretched 
state of our times invites no enthusiasm for putting such a subject into words, and 
has only pity for a drudgery which cannot be justified in poetic fame but serves only 
for personal edification), I now take up a subject the loss of which you may regret, 
the statement of which you may need or discover to be necessary, and one which in 
this age of ours it is pointless for those in power to suppress, or our leaders to 
commandeer, or private individuals to destroy, or the oppressed to bewail. For you, 
Master, are accustomed to treating with indulgence those sad dirges of mine so 
often ridiculed with the kind of satirical pleasantry that Thalia, the Muse of comedy, 
flourishing her humor with theatrical epigram, is in the habit of pertly rapping out. 
Moreover, you will remember, you recently commissioned me to try to soothe your 
moments of leisure with some agreeable murmuring. For a short space, then, listen 
while I unfold for you a tale, wrinkled like the furrows of an old woman, which, 
performing by night lamp and mocking the pretense of sleep, I have just concocted 
with a salty Attic flavor. In this you will not see a poet seized with frenzy, but you 
may be diverted by dreamlike nonsense expounding trifles suited to sleep. 
The verbosity of this first sentence, as well as Prologue as a whole, stands in a sharp 
contrast with the condition of forced silence and cultural depression denounced in the 
narrative;35 the reader will soon discover that this work is the effect of a gloomy secessus 
to the country, a dark parody of the traditional philosophical negotium – a text that 
declares from the outset a certain inability to exist.  
Significantly enough, a recusatio immediately follows, a negative statement in which 
the author insists on his rejection of myth-telling in favor of myth-explanation – the 
negation, the void, with a movement we have already learnt to observe in Virgilius and 
Solinus, is expanded in the form of a catalogue (4,1-4,6): 
 
 
35 Cf. Lobato 2017, pp. 293-304 for an acute analysis of the theme of silence in the Mythologiae.  
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Neque enim illas Heroidarum arbitreris lucernas meis praesules libris, quibus aut 
Sulpicillae procacitas aut Psyches curiositas declarata est, neque illam quae aut 
maritum Fedrium in tumulum ducit aut Leandricos natatos intercepit, sed quae 
nostrum academicum rhetorem ita usque ad vitalem circulum tulit, quo paene 
dormientem Scipionem caeli civem effecerit. 
 
In these books of mine you will see neither those lamp-light performances of Ovid’s 
Heroides, in which either the shamelessness of someone like Sulpicia or the exotic 
feelings of Psyche are revealed, nor what forcibly led Theseus, the husband of 
Phaedra [Phaedrus?]36 into the underground cave or carried off Leander as he swam. 
It will be such things as those of which our Academic orator Cicero has given a lively 
account, almost making the sleeping Scipio into a Citizen of heaven. 
However, for all its relentless syntactic outrance and thematic negativity, the exordium 
nonetheless achieves a kind of homogeneity. The first real swerve occurs with the 
irruption of the first person pronoun me: it opens up a new generic system 
(autobiographical narration), or, at least, exploits it in a more overt way than the 
commonly topical references to the relationship between the author and dedicatee of the 
exordium. 
This seemingly minor transition in the generic system is particularly relevant as it 
represents a first change of frame, a sliding in the hermeneutical strategy the reader is 
supposed to employ. It anticipates the successive, explicit breaking points I have already 
highlighted, those that correspond to the insertion of the poetical invocation of the Muses 
and description of night; in both cases, though, the abruptness of the shift invites the 
reader to look for traces of continuity: the dispersal of the material (the fading of the 
seemingly autobiographical focus) triggers the search for unifying elements. One might 
thus notice, for example, that the noun melos crops up shortly before both of the poems. 
In the first occurrence, it is part and parcel of a paragraph that actually functions as a 
juncture, a bridge towards the new, poetic dimension (6,22-7,4): 
Nam me avium quaedam vernulitas, quae fragili quadam dulcedine crispantes sibilos 
corneis edunt organulis, ad hoc opus allexerat et laboris tam subita requies melos 
quoddam carminis exspectabat. 
 
Whereupon a certain liveliness of the birds, as with a kind of delicate softness they 
produced their rapid whistlings through their horny beaks, lured me back to this 
 
 
36 For the philological debate surrounding the adjective Fedrium and the subsequent interpretation of the 
passage, see the thorough treatment of the passage by Venuti 2018, pp. 144-147, who suggests to see here a 
reference to a fabula by Phaedrus (Phaedr. 3,10). 
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present task of mine, and the unexpected respite from toil inspired a kind of 
melodious verse. 
The poeticization of the singing of the birds (as well as the ‘‘naturalization’’ – the becoming 
natural – of the poet’s singing) preludes the reification of the Muse-topos, its 
materialization:37 once the poem has been ‘‘sung’’, the Muses evoked turn out to be 
materially present; the verb adstiterant, on whose possible Boethian echo much ink has 
been spilled,38 conveys the well-nigh ‘‘staged’’ evidence of the Muses: 
Adstiterant itaque syrmate nebuloso tralucidae ternae viragines… 
 
The maidens had been standing in group of three, shimmering in their long, 
gossamerlike robes… 
In Fulgentius’ self-proclaimed post-pagan and post-mythological world, the anomaly of a 
‘‘pagan’’ literary investiture, contrary to what we might expect, is not only accepted, but 
even plastically enacted by inserting speaking characters in to what seemed to be an 
autobiographical account: not unlike Hesiod and his followers. The melos carminis, the 
poetic moment, becomes a point of conflation of frames (Greek and Latin, pagan and 
Christian, prose and poetry), preserving textual continuity by, at the same time, 
sanctioning conceptual disruption.     
No less ambiguous is the context of the second occurrence of the noun melos at 13,4, 
melos cantandi. Calliope is here concluding her speech by praising Satira’s power to silence 
the garrulous Sempronia even in the presence of Catilina: Hac etenim alludente […] 
Sallustianaeque Semproniae quamvis praesens sit Catilina melos cantandi raucescit (“For 
with her [Satira’s] jesting the wordiness of the Sempronia mentioned by Sallust is wrecked 
and, although Catilina is there, the song becomes coarse”, 13,3-13,5).39 Remarkably, just 
after the phrasing melos cantandi raucescit, the nocturnal poem begins: the effect is that 
of an ironical montage, of a conceitful interplay between a fading melos and an incipient 
 
 
37 Cfr. Fredric Jameson’s reflections on the unifying/objectifying effects of alienation and allegory: “something 
withdrawn from me becomes in other words a kind of unity in its own right; it unifies what was hitherto disparate 
for lack of a general name, and only after it is thus unified can it be treated as a kind of object […] Such 
objectification/reification is also to be considered an allegorical process, the alienation of an objectifying name 
and its transformation into an object of exchange”, Jameson 2019, pp. 40-41.  
38 The apparition of the Muses has been contrasted with the apparition of Philosophia in Boethius De 
consolatione philosophiae (1.1.1.: astitisse mihi supra verticem visa est mulier reverendi admodum vultus…), a 
possible parallel that, if confirmed, would play an important role in the debate around Fulgentius’ chronological 
collocation. See the discussion in Hays 2003, pp. 169-173 (Hays tends to dismiss the problem since, in his opinion, 
“the similarities are not, by and large, coincidences of phrasing but rather of motifs”, p. 171).  
39 I here modify Whitbread’s translation to follow Venuti’s interpretation, cf. Venuti 2018, p. 127; 223. 
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carmen (a poem, it should be noted, that thematizes night/silence). But it is at the end of 
the poem that Fulgentius’ satirical sabotage of his own text emerges most distinctly: the 
brief summary or prose paraphrase that follows the hexameters (and that had similarly 
followed the invocation to the Muses, 8, 6-8) plays with dry irony on the gap between the 
ornamental rhetoric of poetry and the straightforwardness of ‘‘standard’’ language, 
mocking the pretentiousness of the former, but also implicitly bringing to the fore the 
violence intrinsic to any commentarial enterprise – to any explanatio.40 We need to look 
at the entire passage to grasp the contrast in all its poignancy, 13, 6-16: 
Solverat ignivomos mundi regione peracta 
quadrupedes gelidumque rotis tepefecerat orbem 
rector et auratis colla spoliabat habenis. 
Iam Phoebus disiungit equos, iam Cynthia iungit; 
quasque soror linquit, frater pede temperat undas. 
Tum nox stellate mundum circumlita peplo 
caerula rorigeris pigrescere iusserat alis 
astrigeroque nitens diademate Luna bicornis 
bullatum biiugis conscenderat aethera tauris. 
Iam simulacra modis mentes fallentia plastis 
mollia falsidicis replebant stramina signis 
 
et, ut in verba paucissima conferam, nox erat.  
 
 Earth’s territory crossed, and the chilly world 
Warmed by the chariot-wheels, the charioteer 
Loosed his fire-breathing horses, from their necks 
Removed the golden reins. Phoebus unyokes 
His steeds, as Cynthia prepares her team. 
The brother tests the waters with his foot 
Up whence his sister rose. With starry cloak 
Binding the earth, night bids the sky to rest 
On dewy wings, while all agleam the moon, 
lts two-pronged diadem adorned with stars, 
The twin bulls yoked together, mounted up 
The fresh-laid sky, and mind-deceiving shapes, 
 
 
40 Moreover, Fulgentius’ textual strategy is perhaps even more layered if we take nox erat as an intertextual 
reference to Vergil’s most famous nocturnal scene in Aen. 4, 522 ff., Nox erat et placidum carpebant fessa 
soporem/ corpora. In this sense, Fulgentius may be opposing ‘‘good’’ Virgilian poetry to his ‘‘bad’’ patchwork. I 
owe this suggestion to Prof. Wim Verbaal. 
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Phantoms in formless guise, soft pallets fill 
With lying images— 
 
And, as I can state in very few words, it was night. 
The last two verses add further (self-)destabilizing material to the discourse: the poem 
ends with a stress on the delusional effects of dreaming, no casual ending if what we find 
shortly thereafter, at the opening of the final section, is a self-portrait of Fulgentius as an 
insanus vates (“frenzied bard”). Given such a background, what interpretation of the 
ensuing scene are we supposed to arrive at, as Calliope and the promised helpers finally 
arrive and wake up the snoring vates? 13, 17-14,1: 
Cuius noctis nomen iamdudum oblitus ut insanus vates versibus delirabam, dum 
subito agrestis illa, quam dudum videram hospita, oborto impetu cubicularias 
impulsu fores inrupit inopinanterque me iacentem repperiens marcentia languore 
somni lepido lumina rapido atque admodum splendifice intermicanti quodam sui 
vultus coruscamine perpulit; erit enim ultra solitum eminens mortalitatis aspectum. 
Denique pigrae adhuc quietis indicium rotatis naribus eructuantem repentina ostii 
crepitatione turbavit.  
 
Having long since forgotten the word night, I was revelling in these lines like a 
frenzied bard when the lady I had seen before as a guest, making her appearance 
with a sudden rush, burst roughly into my bedchamber and, to her surprise finding 
me lying down with my eyes drooping in a gentle sleep, drove in upon me, her face 
gleaming with a kind of darting and quite magnificent glow—for she was tall beyond 
the average look of mortal man. Then, her nostrils flaring, she interrupted this 
display of peaceful rest, and by her violent rattling of the door threw the snorer into 
confusion. 
Is the Prologue’s last section meant to be a drunkard’s vision or, on the contrary, an 
awakening from the fallacy of mythology to the truth of philosophy? Are we asked to 
allegorize Fulgentius’s own dreams? Scholars have provided different answers. 
3.2.2 Meaning and its Discontents 
As I mentioned briefly above, Fulgentius’ Prologue, being satirically (as well as allegorically) 
polymorphous, has prompted quite polarized readings, a fact understandable in the light 
of the text’s morphology: marked by discontinuity and perpetual frame-shifting it is hardly 
surprising that this text displays disparate configurations depending on the vantage point 
the observer decides to choose.  
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A telling attempt to superimpose a systematic reading-grid onto Fulgentius’ text has 
been made by J.C. Relihan.41 To bring order to the Prologue’s heterogeneous material, 
Relihan adopts as a fundamental thesis (that is, as a major analytical frame) an opposition 
between pagan mythology and Christian interpretation, according to which Fulgentius is 
first and foremost a Christian thinker totally absorbed in the effort of demystifying Graeco-
Roman mythology. The extent of the ideological implications of such an assumption can 
be measured by looking at Relihan’s resoluteness in cutting short the long-lasting 
prosopographic debate on the possible identification of the author of the Mythologiae 
with the better known Fulgentius Bishop of Ruspe (ca. 460-533 CE): “I take it as certain 
that both authors are the same man, as does Courcelle […]. The latest full discussion of the 
problem reaches the same conclusion: P. Langlois […].” References to Courcelle 1948 and 
Langlois 1964, even in the late ‘80s, were not enough, of course, to speak of “certainty”, 
as the overturning of the scholars’ communis opinio was to prove in the following three 
decades;42 Relihan simply needed to anchor his reading strategy historically (or, maybe 
better, contextually), as a way of justifying his often radical treatment of the literal surface 
of the text. I am consciously using the adjective “radical” to point to the allegorical nature 
of Relihan’s interpretation, an interpretation which, not surprisingly, has been met with 
some bafflement by Fulgentius’ scholars.43  
In fact, the apparently straightforward opposition pagan vs. Christian, when applied to 
this text, activates an interesting series of subversions that, even if problematic and rarely 
acceptable, are nonetheless emblematic of the interpretative clash surrounding Fulgentius 
and can prove useful in grasping the extent of his work’s ambiguity.  
Relihan sees an overt rejection of Ovid’s Metamorphoses in the Prologue and reads 
Fulgentius as an anti-Ovid.44 That the Ovidian poem might constitute a major intertextual 
reference seems to be, indeed, hardly disputable; the recusatio Fulgentius opposes to 
Calliope is undeniably not only a gallery of myths, but also an anthology of Ovidian stories, 
10, 19-11,12: 
Index te libelli fefellit, generosa Loquacitas; non mihi cornutus adulter arripitur nec 
imbre mendaci lusa [Danae] virgo cantatur, dum suo iudicio deus sibi pecudem 
praetulit et hanc auro decepit quam potestate nequivit; non suillo canimus morsu 
depastum amantis iuvenis femur nec in meis libellulis sub falsa alite puerilis pependit 
lascivia; non olorinis reptantem adulterum plumis, ova pulligera virginibus 
 
 
41 See Relihan 1984; Id. 1986; Id. 1993. 
42 See a quick overview of the debate in Venuti 2018, pp. 14-18 and, for a long argument against the identification, 
Hays 2003. 
43 Cfr., for example, Mattiacci 2002, p. 254 n. 9: “assai stravagante risulta tutta la sua [di Relihan] tesi”. 
44 See Relihan 1984, p.88. 
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inculcantem quam semina puerigena visceribus infundentem, nec lychnides puellas 
inquirimus, Hero atque Psychen, poeticas garrulantes ineptias, dum haec lumen 
queritur extinctum, illa deflet incensum, ut Psyche videndo perderet et Hero non 
videndo perisset; nec referam virginali figmento nonacrinam lusam viraginem, dum 
quaereret Iuppiter quod magis esset volle quam fuerat. 
 
The title of my little work has misled you, noble declaimer. Not through me will the 
horned adulterer be seized, or the maiden Danaë, deceived by a false shower, be 
celebrated in verse, as by his own choice the god Jove showed her wealth and tricked 
with gold one he had been unable to trick by force. I do not write about the thigh of 
a young lover fed to the teeth of swine, nor in my little work has youthful 
wantonness been described under a false guise. I am not concerned with him who 
creeps about as an adulterer in the plumage of a swan, foisting his eggs on maidens 
as he pours child-bearing seed into their bodies, or with those lamp-carrying 
maidens, Hero and Psyche, as one wishing to ramble on about such follies of the 
poets, as, for instance, that the first of these lamented a light that failed and the 
second one that was burning, Psyche perishing for seeing and Hero for not seeing. 
Nor do I tell of the maiden from Arcadia, deceived by a pretense of virginity when 
Jove sought her, wishing to be greater than in fact he was. 
If it is true that it would be quite difficult to draw a list of mythical exempla without 
intersecting one of Ovid’s works and if, therefore, Fulgentius’ list does not have to be 
considered necessarily Ovidian, the final claim – i.e. an explicitly programmatic 
formulation of the goal of the Mythologiae – does obviously sound like anti-Ovidian 
manifesto, 11, 12-13: 
Mutatas itaque vanitates manifestare cupimus, non manifesta mutando fuscamus 
[…] 
 
What I wish to do is to expose alterations away from the truth, not obscure what is 
clear by altering it myself […] 
Relihan’s polarizing reading emerges more dramatically in his analysis of the first poem, 
the invocation to the Muses; he takes the last two lines, 8, 4-5 ad meum vetusta carmen 
saecla nuper confluant (“may the wealth of all the ages flow together for my lay”) as a 
deliberate inversion of the incipit Met. 1, 4 ad mea perpetuum deducite tempora carmen 
(“bring down my song in unbroken strains from the world’s very beginning even unto the 
present time”) observing that “[here] all ages meet in one poem for summation, and the 
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song is hardly perpetual.”45 Even though the Ovidian subtext is easily recognizable, a 
precise assessment of the extent of the inversion remains problematic; the inversion of 
complements (ad mea tempora vs. ad meum carmen) does not necessarily entail the 
subversion of content suggested by Relihan. For such subversion to hold, the scholar has 
to radically extend the scope of his ‘‘allegorical’’ reading to encompass all mythical 
allusions present in the Prologue; they would always have to appear in ‘‘negative’’ 
contexts (5, 3-6: even if Fulgentius were Midas, he could not pay his taxes; 6, 14: the 
ground is said to reject Triptolemus’ plow; 6, 20: Fulgentius hides from Phoebus’ beams), 
and every allusion to the Muses would be mocking in tone:46 Calliope meets Fulgentius 
after a walk through the thorny fields, which implies that she does not really belong to the 
locus amoenus (8, 14-16); the statement 7, 23-24 quicquid exantlata gazis vestra promunt 
horrea (“all the riches to be gathered from your emptied treasure-trove”)47 does not seem 
to be the most flattering description of the Muses’ creative powers; in the invocation, 
Virgil and Homer are mentioned, of course, but not for their most important works (the 
Georgics and the Batrachomyomachia instead of the Aeneid and the Iliad, 7,25-8,1); 
Fulgentius venerates Calliope, but he does not stand up when they meet – he simply raises 
himself up on his elbow (8, 17-18).  
All these are relatively small details, and yet the importance they are given in Relihan’s 
reading (per se quite free, we should perhaps note, from any “deconstructionist” bravado) 
is revealing of the procedures of sampling and magnifying inherent in all allegorical 
approaches: Relihan isolates details, fragments, and textual debris just to make them fit 
into the general hermeneutical picture he has presupposed, erasing their singularity, 
obliterating the specificity which, in the beginning, had made them stand out (in Michael 
Riffaterre’s words, their ungrammaticality).48  
 
 
45 Relihan 1984, p. 88.  
46 See Relihan 1986, pp. 542-543. 
47 The interpretation of exantlata gazis is controversial. Mattiacci 2002, p. 262 signals a parallel in Apu. met. 5, 
2, 1 horrea […] congesta gazis, but she also observes that exantlata (from the Greek ἐξαντλέω) means exactly 
the opposite and is quite confusing (how could anyone gather anything from empty horrea?). She has therefore 
suggested that we restore a manuscript variant, ex Atlantis gazis, a solution rejected by Venuti 2018, pp. 178-
179.       
48 More specifically, Riffaterre used this term to point to any anomaly in a text that attracts a reader’s attention 
and warns of latent (broadly meant) “intertext”, Riffaterre 1980, pp. 627-628: “The text’s ungrammaticality is 
but a sign of a grammaticality elsewhere, its significance a reference to meaning elsewhere […] Ambiguity is 
generally, if empirically, recognized as a feature typical of literary discourse. As I see it, ambiguity exemplifies the 
idiolectic ungrammaticalities that warn the reader of a latent intertext. Text and intertext alike derive from these 
ungrammaticalities.” Cfr. also Riffaterre 1987, where ungrammaticalities are interpreted as manifestations of the 
“intertextual unconscious”. 
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Such a mechanism becomes even more conspicuous when Relihan comments on the 
dialogue between Fulgentius and Calliope in the second section. The writer’s initial failure 
to recognize the Muse (8, 21-22 et quia non mihi evidenti manifestatione quaenam esset 
liquebat, cur venisset inquiro, “because it was not clearly apparent to me who she was, I 
asked why she had come”) is explained as follows: “Yet because it is not immediately 
apparent who she is, he asks why she has come. This is a subtle point, for such a statement 
makes no logical sense unless it means that Fulgentius did not expect a goddess of grade-
school rote learning to be elevated to the rank of Muse. He recognizes the effects of this 
goddess upon him, but is confused. He seems to have hoped for someone greater.”49 Apart 
from the question of whether or not the passage makes ‘‘logical sense’’, what is striking is 
the sudden shift to a psychologization of the narrator, that is, the overt assumption about 
what “he seems to have hoped”. Here, the interpretative gesture reveals itself, almost 
materially, as ventriloquism, as an act of appropriation, erasure and substitution of 
someone else’s voice.50 Relihan, with a curiously untimely (I would not dare to say 
outdated) critical movement, treats the Fulgentius-character as if he were a layered 
psychological subject and makes him say what the interpreter would like to hear. The 
homology with allegorical procedures is patent and, in the end, hardly surprising, if one 
recalls Northrop Frye’s well-known adage according to which literary commentary is 
always allegorical.51 The ultimate result of Relihan’s appropriation of Fulgentius is a 
dialectical reversal of the very position of the narrator: in Relihan’s reading, not only the 
Muses and pagan culture more generally, but even Fulgentius becomes a victim of the 
Prologue’s mocking tone. The Prologue would seem to stage a pretentious but self-
deluded character, still fascinated by the ‘‘old’’ (pagan) culture while eager to operate 
within the ‘‘new’’ (Christian) one. In this context, what may appear to be a typically late 
antique pattern of religious/cultural conversion, becomes instead a sharply ironic tool 
which helps to deconstruct almost every element of the textual surface. Thus, in Relihan’s 
estimation, the nocturnal poem “is intentionally bad […] Fulgentius is sufficiently sure of 
his literary abilities to write a bad poem and expect it to be read as such”; and the self-
portrait as “a raving poet and no prophet” (ut insanus vates versibus delirabam) represents 
a way to point through self-mockery to the futility of the pagan tradition.52  
Relihan’s interpretation develops in the space opened up between author, narrator, 
and character, and exploits its potential, self-directed violence: the Prologue thus ends up 
 
 
49 Relihan 1986, p. 543. 
50 For thorough overview of ventriloquism in cultural history, see Connor 2004, pp. 3-43, in particular, with focus 
on its psychoanalytical implications in the construction of the subject.  
51 Frye 1990 [1957], p. 89. 
52 Relihan 1986, p. 546.  
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being a wry self-parody, whose aim is to prove the inconsistency of the whole literary 
tradition at its base. This self-deconstructive trajectory is, at the end, summarized (or, 
indeed, allegorized) in Satira herself: Calliope “says that these three women [i.e. Urania, 
Philosophia, and Satira] will put Fulgentius in the stars […] but not through the means of 
poem, tragedy, oration satire, or comedy. To say that Satira will work her effects without 
satire is to show that there are two kinds of satire. The Satira of the third scene is not the 
promised Satira of the second. Calliope promised serious Muses and Satira as a diversion, 
and has produced the opposite. We have a serious Satira who has the same power to see 
hidden meanings as Fulgentius claims to have.”53 In other words, according to Relihan the 
Prologue serves to create a fissure, a form of distance between the author and his subject, 
and, more radically, between the author and his literary projection. The ultimate goal of 
satire is precisely to engender such an internal displacement;54 but where Relihan sees an 
intercultural clash (“The Mythologiae are a serious attempt – however bizarre its methods 
in treating individual myths – to contrast cultures and to define the beginning of a new 
order from the death of the old”) it is perhaps more hermeneutically promising to speak 
of an intra-cultural, if not intra-subjective, split.55  
The Mythologiae, which will later appear to Christian readers as a model for allegorical 
practice, and to modern interpreters as a notorious specimen of preposterous 
arbitrariness, are thus preceded by a text that questions the very idea of systematic 
coherency and seems to be constantly on the brink of self-contradiction. Satire, here, is 
not satire – pace Bruns, satire is allegory. Fulgentius’s text, in a way, radicalizes Relihan’s 
interpretative boldness: moving beyond the rigid opposition of pagan vs. Christian, what 
remains is a self-destabilizing narrative in which the narrator, the Muses, and the poems 
are not what they should be.56  
However, as noted earlier, Relihan’s interpretations have met a certain resistance, 
particularly his (all too simplistic) pagan/Christian opposition and the self-deconstructive 
implications of his reading; he has been accused of arguing for an “odd” (stravagante) 
 
 
53 Relihan 1986, p. 547. 
54 In this sense, satire somehow overlaps with intransitive parody as discussed in relation to Virgilius 
Grammaticus, cfr. supra pp. 45-46. 
55 Relihan 1986, p. 547. 
56 Hernández Lobato 2018 points insightfully out how “Ovid’s Metamorhposes represents the ever-changing, 
alluring but ultimately deceiving reflections on the river’s surface (i.e. the world of language, ‘illusions of 
presence’ and anecdotal narratives), whereas what Fulgentius is trying to show is the mysterious and immutable 
riverbed (the quid mysticum) underlying the apparent diversity and the noisy incoherence of myths and words 
(i.e. the realm of silence, essence and mystical encounter).”, p. 258.  My suggestion is that Fulgentius’ silence is 
(also) paroxysmal chaos, that his anti-logocentric project is carried out by exploiting all of the self-annihilating 
potentiality of logos. 
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theory and of contorting the text to force it to fit into an apologetic (pro-Christian) scheme. 
To the hermeneutical violence of contortion, other scholars have preferred the violence 
of dismembering: while refusing to adopt a unifying, generalized allegorical matrix, they 
are rather inclined to privilege reading practices which dissolve the text into myriads of 
intertextual networks. In so doing, they seem to be exploiting the potential of another 
typically satirical feature, that is, the polyphonic, opaque nature of the text (the other 
feature being its ‘‘iconoclastic’’ power, although Relihan’s proudly Christian Fulgentius 
might be properly described as a mythoclast).57 The Prologue is transformed into a mine 
for intertextual references: a saturated textual environment is made intelligible through 
its presentation as an embroidery of thickly interwoven, but still individually discernible, 
threads. Literary analysis thus becomes, first and foremost, an attempt at disentangling 
the compact mass of the text, at isolating its multiple voices. From a methodological point 
of view, this approach runs the risk of making an attuned choir out of what might be better 
understood as an agglomeration of interferences.  
Silvia Mattiacci argues for a deliberate authorial strategy; from her perspective, 
Fulgentius’s writing is “a continuous challenge to its readers, since Fulgentius’ readership 
is constantly urged to decipher his obscure and weird allusions, to recognize his more or 
less overtly cited literary models.”58 Fulgentius himself is described as a witty provocateur, 
moved by “what seems to be an undeniable willingness to fake sources and testimonies.” 
The echoes of a lato sensu post-modern fascination with ludic poetics and literary pastiche 
is clearly noticeable in analyses such as Mattiacci’s, who speaks of divertissements when 
referring to Fulgentius’s poems; the invocation to the Muses as well as the nocturnal 
hexameters are sedulously dismantled word by word and showed to be reminiscent of 
Vergil, Ovid, Statius, Tiberianus, Prudentius, Claudianus etc.59 Significantly, in at least two 
episodes where Fulgentius is called on to provide a kind of intellectual programme, 
Mattiacci stresses the decidedly derivative nature of the text: Fulgentius is the masks he 
wears throughout his work, his voice coincides with all the voices his text conjures up, 
even more so when it should prove to be ‘‘original’’. In the first, most obvious episode, 
 
 
57 This term is actually used with reference to Fulgentius by Albu 2009 and Cullhed 2015, pp. 402-432. 
58 Mattiacci 2002, p. 252: “una sfida continua all’acume del lettore, costantemente sollecitato a capire le allusioni 
oscure e stravaganti, a riconoscere i modelli letterari ora più ora meno palesemente evocati.” 
59 Almost every scholar working on Fulgentius has tried to tackled the problem of his intertextual network. Beside 
Venuti’s commentary on the Prologue (Venuti 2018), see at least Mattiacci 2002 and Ead. 2003; Hays 2003 and 
Id. 2004; Venuti 2011; Manca 2015. Baldwin 1988 provides a list of all of Fulgentius’ credited sources (potentially 
fake-sources included, p. 37: “it does seem that Fulgentius fabricated sources and texts; some particular 
dishonesties can be proved”). 
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Fulgentius has to answer Calliope’s question as whether or not it would be dangerous for 
him to indulge in literary activity while living in a barbaric time, 9,19-10,8: 
Tum illa: “Non paves – inquit – musicum tuis receptare dogma penatibus, cum 
barbarorum morem auscultaverim ita letterarios mercatos penitus abdicare, ut hos, 
qui primis elementorum figuris vel proprium descripserint nomen, cassata 
inquisitione, mutum in carnificinam reptassent?’. Tum ego: “Non ita est – inquam – 
ut ‘audieras, sed fama fuit’. Nam ‘carmina tantum nostra valent’, Musa, ‘tela inter 
Martia, quantum’ ‘dulcis aquae salientis sitim restinguere rivo’ ”. Et ut suum me 
amplius familiarem rescisset, illud etiam Terentianum adieci: “ ‘Olim isti fuit generi 
quondam questus apud saeclum prius’. Nunc itaque ita litterae <quo> quicquid 
Helicon verbialibus horreis enthecatum possederat in ipsis potestatum culminibus 
hereditario iure transferret catus extendunt.”     
 
Then she said: “Aren’t you afraid to receive the teaching of the Muses in your own 
home? For I have heard of the custom of barbarians to ban the business of literature 
in their houses, whereby those who wrote even their own unspoken name with the 
first shapes of their letters could reckon on a violent interrogation and the torture 
chamber.” Then I said: It is not as ‘you had heard, but the report was so,’ for ‘our 
songs serve as well,’ O Muse, ‘among the weapons of Mars’ ‘as to quench one’s thirst 
from a rivulet of sweet leaping water.’ ” Then to encourage her friendship all the 
more, I added this line of Terence: “Once that stamp of man drove a trade, a 
generation or so ago.” Now, therefore, literature, as […] its urns pour forth whatever 
contents in its storehouse of words Helicon possessed to pass on in due succession. 
Fulgentius, immediately thereafter, calls his own words “little verses” (versiculis, 10, 8), 
thus explicitly pointing to their being excerpta, namely quotations from Vergil, the most 
popular and studied Latin poet, who, as such, does not even need to be named (unlike 
Terentius, another protagonist of late antique Latin education). Fulgentius’ speech is, in 
some respects, a Virgilian cento. But we get still closer to Fulgentius’ usual practice with 
the second episode, taken from the first section of the Prologue, quoted before: 
Additur quia et mihi nuper imperasse dinosceris ut affatim feriatas tuarum aurium 
sedes libido quolibet susurro permulceam: parumper ergo ausculta dum tibi rugosam 
sulcis anilibus ordior fabulam, quam nuper Attica saporante salsura, nocturna 
praesule lucerna commentus sum, ita somniali figmento delusam, quo non poetam 
furente aspicias, sed onirocriten soporis nugas hariolantem advertas. 
 
Moreover, you will remember, you recently commissioned me to try to soothe your 
moments of leisure with some agreeable murmuring. For a short space, then, listen 
while I unfold for you a tale, wrinkled like the furrows of an old woman, which, 
performing by night lamp and mocking the pretense of sleep, I have just concocted 
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with a salty Attic flavor. In this you will not see a poet seized with frenzy, but you 
may be diverted by dreamlike nonsense expounding trifles suited to sleep. 
Although no auctor is explictly mentioned, Mattiacci rightly observes that the textual 
references embedded here are unlikely to go unnoticed and the whole passage might be 
seen as, this time, an Apuleian cento. The evoked Apuleian loci are indeed among the most 
well-known, coming from the Prologue of the Metamorphoses and the introduction to the 
fabula of Cupid and Psyche respectively: 
Met. 1.1.: At ego tibi sermone isto Milesio varias fabulas conseram auresque tuas 
benivolas lepido susurro permulceam, modo si papyrum Aegyptiam argutia Nilotici 
calami inscriptam non spreveris inspicere, figuras fortunasque hominum in alias 
imagines conversas et in se rursum mutuo nexu refectas ut mireris. Exordior. ‘Quis 
ille?’. Paucis accipe. Hymettos Attica […] mea vetus prosapia est. 
 
But I would like to tie together different sorts of tales for you in that Milesian style of 
yours, and to caress your ears into approval with a pretty whisper, if only you will not 
begrudge looking at Egyptian papyrus inscribed with the sharpness of a reed from the 
Nile, so that you may be amazed at men’s forms and fortunes transformed into other 
shapes and then restored again in an interwoven knot. I begin my prologue. Who am 
I? I will tell you briefly. Attic Hymettos and […] form my ancient stock. 
 
 
Met. 4.27.8: Sed ego te narrationibus lepidis anilibusque fabulis protinus avocabo. 
 
But right now I shall divert you with a pretty story and an old wife’s tale.60 
The overlapping is not only lexical. As is well-known, the story of Cupid and Psyche is told 
to Charite by an old woman, a bride kidnapped by pirates and held prisoner in a cave; in 
order to assuage the scared girl, the old woman decides to interpret her dreams (Met. 
4.27.5: Bono animo esto, mi erilis, nec vanis somniorum figmentis terreare, “Cheer up, my 
mistress, and don’t be frightened by the empty fictions of dreams”): just like Fulgentius (3, 
20), the old woman becomes a storyteller as well as an onirocrites, an interpreter of 
dreams. Fulgentius announces the project of his own allegoresis through someone else’s 
voice – through the persona of the anus (in her turn, of course, a persona of Apuleius). 
Asking when one should stop detecting intertextual references is not that different 
from wondering when one should arrest the search for the mysticum cerebrum, when one 
is supposed to bring allegorical interpretation to an end – or to arrest the allegorical drift. 
 
 
60 Tex and translation by Hanson 1996. 
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That intertextual analysis has remained common practice through the ages risks obscuring 
the (indeed fascinating) phenomenon of intertextual drift, intertextual over-
interpretation. In a way, an intertextual critical furor might be precisely what would 
prevent us from succumbing to the temptation to disentangle the text, rather than to 
confront its opacity. We should try to pursue a criticism that allows the text to be invaded, 
instead of being made, by the voices criticism can detect: an unleashed intertextual 
criticism as a response to the polyphonic density of satire – this could be a tentative 
formula for approaching the saturation of Fulgentius’ text in full awareness.  
One should never forget that satire is always, in at least one important respect, 
allegorical; but in satire the displacement implicates not so much the meaning as the very 
constitution of a text: allegory as the presence of the voice of the other, as the co-existence 
of many voices at the same time.  
It comes as no surprise, then, that critics are at odds when determining who is actually 
speaking at the end of the Prologue. In his commentary to the Mythologiae, Étienne Wolff 
attributes the last lines of the Prologue, which serve as a transition to the first myth-
interpretation, to the narrator: 
Ergo nunc de deorum primum natura, unde tanta malae credulitatis lues stultis 
mentibus inoleverit, edicamus. Quamvis enim sint quidam qui spreta capitis 
generositate aricinis atque arcaicis sensibus glandium quippiam sapiant atque 
eorum altiori stultitiae nubilo soporata caligentur ingenia, tamen nequaquam aput 
humanos sensus nisi fortuitis conpulsationibus moti nascuntur errores, ut etiam 
Crysippus de fato scribens ait: conpulsationibus lubricis volvuntur incursus. Itaque 
primum omisso circuitu, unde idolum tractum sit, edicamus. 
 
Let me now first explain about the nature of the gods, whereby such a plague of 
sinful superstition grows in foolish minds. Although there are those who, rejecting 
the noble resources of the intellect, merely let their stupid and dull senses nibble at 
a tiny morsel and let their sleepy brains grow dizzy in a fog of deep stupidity, yet 
errors of the human senses are not produced except when motivated by chance 
forces, as Chrysippus remarks: 'Insidious attacks are made by insidious compulsions.’ 
First, then, now the preamble has been completed, let me explain the origin of an 
idol. 
Wolff’s only argument is that edicamus seems to be a technical exegetical word, which 
appears again and again in the actual treatise when Fulgentius is about to introduce his 
interpretations.61 
 
 
61 See Wolff-Dain 2013, p. 146 n. 99. The signalled passages are: 29,8; 32,21; 37,20; 64,14; 76,116. 
 122 
Martina Venuti is more cautious and admits that “non è evidente chi stia parlando” (“it 
is not clear who is speaking”).62 This effet flou does not cease with the opening of the 
treatise proper; at the beginning of the second fabula, the fabula Saturni, Fulgentius gives 
Philosophia the floor as she starts a monologue: 
Saturnus Polluris filius dicitur, Opis maritus, senior, velato capite, falcem ferens; cuius 
virilia abscisa et in mari proiecta Venerem genuerunt. Itaque quid sibi de hoc 
Philosophia sentiat, audiamus. Tum illa: 
 
The name of the son of Pollus, and the husband of Ops, is Saturn, an elderly man, 
with his head covered, carrying a scythe. His manhood was cut off and, thrown into 
the sea, gave birth to Venus. Let us then hear how Philosophy interprets this. She 
says thus: 
Needless to say, this monologue is never explicitly interrupted, so that the readers may 
well forget that they are listening to Philosophia’s voice – indeed, they could also have 
missed the reference to Philosophia altogether. Such oscillation in the speaking (i.e. 
interpreting) voice is part and parcel of the overall sense of vagueness and incoherence 
that looms over Fulgentius’ text. In the Prologue, satire becomes allegorical by blurring 
and, finally, losing the origin of the linguistic utterance as well as of the hermeneutical 
process, in a total allegorization of satire. Now we shall seek to take a look at the 
satyrization of allegory. 
3.3 The Satirical Allegory of the Fabulae 
3.3.1 Of Sirens and Hermeneutic Circles 
In our discourse, satire has been so far characterized through an imagery of opaqueness 
and density, described as a field of intricacy and, perhaps tautologically, of saturation. On 
the contrary, in the following section, the discourse on allegory will be marked by concepts 
such as segmentation, disconnection and, more generally speaking, fragmentation.63 An 
 
 
62 Venuti 2018, p. 245. 
63 The most obvious reference to a theory of allegory permeated by ideas of disconnection and fragmentation 
remains Walter Benjamin’s contribution in the Ursprung des Deutschen Trauerspiels (“Origin of German Tragic 
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underlying idea of dissolution can be easily traced in many critical readings that aim to pin 
down Fulgentius’ allegorical technique. In current critical discourse, to define Fulgentius’ 
allegoresis as peculiarly fragmentary and disjointed seems to constitute a fair strategy for 
avoiding the traditional charges of exegetical arbitrariness and conceptual inconsistency 
that have haunted Fulgentius’ reception to the modern day. Martina Venuti is right to 
claim that we still lack a systematic description of Fulgentian allegorical procedures, but 
the actual question remains whether an analytical expositio of Fulgentius’ practice would 
be of any help in understanding his textuality.64 Be that as it may, Venuti identifies some 
major analytical strands in the Mythologiae: etymology, iconography, quotation, and 
moral/philosophical reading.65 When commenting on a fabula, Fulgentius sometimes 
draws on all of these domains, or selects just some of them; accordingly, a mythological 
figure is in each instance a name that can be etymologically deconstructed as well as an 
image that can be parceled out into its visual attributes – and finally, all of these conceal 
moral/philosophical meanings that can be shown and proved to be true by reference to 
auctores. A full-length example will suffice to provide a quick overview of Fulgentius’ 
allegoresis: we shall take the eighth fabula from the second book, the Fabula Ulixis et  
Sirenarum, 48,9-49,2: 
Sirenae enim Grece tractoriae dicuntur; tribus enim modis amoris inlecebra trahitur, 
aut cantu aut visu aut consuetudine, amantur enim quaedam <vocis suavitate, 
quaedam > specie venustate, quaedam etiam lenante consuetudine. Quas Ulixis socii 
obturatis auribus transeunt, ipse vero religatus transit. Ulixes enim Grece quasi 
oloxenos id est omnium peregrinus dicitur; et quia sapientia ab omnibus mundi rebus 
peregrina est, ideo astutior Ulixes dictus est. Denique Sirenas, id est delectationum 
inlecebras, et audivit et vidit id est agnovit et iudicavit, et tamen transiit. Nihilominus 
ideo et quia auditae sunt, mortuae sunt; in sensu enim sapientis omnis affectus 
emoritur; ideo volatiles, quia amantum mentes celeriter permeant; inde gallinaceos 
pedes, quia libidinis affectus omnia quae habet spargit; nam denique et Sirenes 
dictae sunt; sirene enim Grece trahere dicitur.  
 
The Sirens are named as “those who lure”66 in Greek, for the allure of love is 
interpreted in three ways, by song or by sight or by habit: some creatures are loved 
 
 
Drama”), Benjamin 1998 [1928], pp. 158-235. For a critical assessment, see at least Cowan1981; Kablitz 2016, 
pp. 17 ff.; Jameson 2019, pp. 22-37.  
64 Unless one is willing to embark upon an Expositio fulgentianae continentiae… 
65 See Venuti 2010, p. 89. 
66 Whitbread 1971, pp. 73-74 translates tractoriae with “deceivers” and, at the end of the passage, sirene with 
“betray”, thus losing the etymological pun. Wolff’s (Wolff-Dain 2013, p. 95) maintains it, but in his translation, 
“celles qui entraînent” and “entraîner”, to get lost is the implicit meaning of  “fascination, attraction”.  
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for [the pleasure of their song], some for beauty of appearance, and some for 
pleasant habits. The companions of Ulysses pass by these with ears stopped up, and 
he himself goes past tied up. For Ulysses in Greek is for olonxenos, that is, stranger 
to all; and because wisdom is a stranger to all things of this world, so Ulysses is called 
crafty. Then he both hears and sees, that is, recognizes and sizes up and still passes 
by the Sirens, that is, the allures of pleasure. And they die just because they are 
heard, in the sense that all self-indulgent feelings of a wise man die away. Also they 
are winged creatures, because they may quickly enter the minds of lovers; whereby 
they have feet like a hen’s, because the indulgence of lust dissipates all it possesses. 
And finally they are called Sirens, because sirene is the Greek for to lure. 
As is often the case, etymology here marks the initial threshold of interpretation: 
sirenae and Ulixes are, first and foremost, meaningful names whose etymological reading 
is supposed to disclose the truth about the res they refer to. The treatment of Ulixes is in 
many respects emblematic. The fact that a Greek etymology is applied to a Latin name 
makes it clear to what extent Fulgentius’ etymological thinking differs from its post-19th 
century analogues. Drawing on a set of phonic resemblances, Fulgentius creates a new 
compound which is designed to shed light on the original, apparently opaque name.67 
Ulixes is segmented and reshaped as oloxenos, a new string of characters to which the 
actual explanation is applied. It could be that not all the passages are explicitly present in 
the text, as is the case with sirenae: the opening statement Sirenae enim Grece tractoriae 
dicuntur leaves to the reader the task of filling in the gap and linking sirenae to the Greek 
verb σύρω, “to drag”.68   
Both etymologies are seamlessly followed by a moral/philosophical explanation, which 
is then interrupted by a sketchy narrative of the myth. The last paragraph (Nihilominus…), 
set up as a series of equations connecting an iconographic or diegetic component of the 
fabula to its allegorization, displays Fulgentius’ inclination towards segmenting mythic 
totality into signifying units. He isolates and magnifies narrative/visual elements in order 
to transform them into the meaningful elements of a new semantic system, a system 
embedded in and divergent from the ‘‘original’’. As for the thickly inscribed tabula rasa of 
the Prologue, the problem present here is the construction of meaning, that is, the 
 
 
67 See Amsler 1989, pp. 23 et passim, on the principal etymological techniques employed during Antiquity and 
early Middle Ages (namely interpretatio, compositio, derivatio, and expositio). Amsler himself draws consistently 
on the classic Klinck 1970. 
68 Fulgentius likes to display his familiarity with Greek, whose relatively copious presence in the Mythologiae has 
been taken as the sign of a certain (perhaps even active) mastery of the language. See Venuti 2018, p. 33, and 
Wolff 2009, pp. 16-17. For the possible interaction between Fulgentius and Greek mythography, see Cameron 
2004, pp. 308-310, and Manca 2011. 
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question of how to choose objects that can be pertinently connected in a signifying 
constellation. 
Emily Albu has compared Fulgentius’ hermeneutical procedures to late antique 
centones, texts in which lines are lifted from ancient authors and freely reassembled69 
(they have also provided a common critical metaphor for describing the late antique 
pseudomorphosis of ancient culture),70 although the comparison falls short of accurately 
describing the mechanisms of such a transference from one cultural code to another. 
More pertinently, Jon Whitman speaks of atomistic allegory when pointing to Fulgentius’ 
habit of dismembering words and stories while looking for new meanings: the ‘‘original’’ 
totality is fragmented into disconnected particles whose very existence seems to be 
independent from the system of origin. Once Fulgentius has discovered the hidden 
meaning, he draws a series of conceptual inferences that can be hardly harmonized with 
what could be designated as surface meaning: every hidden meaning is made into a 
semantic matrix on which a new semantic system can be built.  
If we follow Gordon Teskey’s suggestion that semantic matrixes function in allegory like 
vanishing points in traditional perspective,71 Fulgentius’ practice would seem to consist of 
multiplying the vanishing points – admitting the possibility, say, that every single point in 
the picture might possibly be a vanishing point towards which everything can be made to 
converge: if the sirens stand for lust, then their wings recall the quickness of lust in 
grasping lovers’ minds, their hen’s feet stand for dissipation, and so on. Fulgentius 
dissolves his objects into a network of signifiers depending on, or pointing to, a series of 
given semantic matrixes: what matters here is not so much the name Ulixes in its integrity, 
but rather the newly formed (and ad hoc) compound olo + xenos that is subsumed under 
the idea of peregrinitas; it is not so much the emblem of a bird-woman that responds to 
the unifying concept of libidinis affectus as the sum of wings + hen’s feet. Robert Edwards 
has assumed that “when they explicate complete texts, most allegorists, including 
Fulgentius, concentrate on small portions at a time. They do not feel the urgency of 
relating every part directly to a unifying whole.”72 I would slightly adjust his argument by 
observing that these portions, understood as pieces of allegorical information, are 
conceptually manageable and semantically loaded only when they are projected against a 
 
 
69 On Latin centones, see McGill 2005; Formisano-Sogno 2010; Hinds 2014; Elsner 2017. 
70 See Schnapp 1992; Formisano-Sogno 2010; Elsner 2017. The use of the crystallographic metaphor of 
pseudomorphosis to describe the reconfiguration of antique culture in the late antique period goes back to Henri-
Irénée Marrou, who borrowed it from Spengler’s Der Untergang des Abendlandes. Cfr. Marrou 1978, pp.71-72. 
71 See Teskey 1996 p. 5 ff. 
72 Edwards 1976 p. 20.  
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unifying background – the sirens’ feet are isolated because they function as part of a more 
general discursive structure opposing amor/libido to sapienta/virtus.  
The tension between the incessant segmentation of the material at hand (words, 
images, narratives) and the ongoing individuation of wide-ranging semantic matrixes 
through which the material is organized may account for the clash, in Fulgentius’ text as 
well as in the related critical debate, between fragmentation and circularity. Whereas 
Edwards has insisted that the whole Mythologiae can be seen to thematize the 
impossibility of constructing meaning as a monolithic object, arguing that it presents itself 
as a text often interspersed with references to fragmentation, multiplicity and semantic 
collapse,73 Venuti is convinced that Fulgentius’ analysis produces a hermeneutical circle, 
in quite a peculiar acceptation: a vortex that homogenizes everything and makes the myth 
“sink down under new interpretative layers, under which they are hardly recognizable.”74 
Although fragmentary and fragmenting, Fulgentius’ allegoresis seems to be circulating 
from detail to detail, from abstraction to abstraction, returning again and again to a few 
master ethical-philosophical oppositions (sapientia/ignorantia; libido/virtus etc.): the 
circularity pointed out by Venuti can also be described as a form of argumentative density 
which makes it difficult to follow the interconnections among the diverse, “atomistic” 
allegorical explanations – if there are interconnections at all. Fulgentius’ text is at once 
profoundly circular/continuous and deeply disjointed: it embodies the paradox of an 
argumentation without articulation. 
The dialectic between continuity and rupture, the tendency to collapse and merge 
which, by now, should be familiar from similar phenomena in Virgilius and Solinus,75 
affects not only Fulgentius’ hermeneutics, but also, as we have already seen while 
commenting on the structure of the Prologue, the whole architecture of the work. We 
shall now take a closer look at the general architecture of the three books in order to 
better investigate the collapsing (satirical) dimension of Fulgentius’ writing. 
3.3.2 Fragments, Totalities, and Architectures 
The tripartition of the Mythologiae has naturally prompted a discussion on the rationale 
underlying such a subdivision. Étienne Wolff feels confident enough to state that “the 
 
 
73 According to Edwards 1976 the very first fabula, Unde idolum (15,21-17,8), devoted to the birth of idols as 
substitutes for dead people, thematises absence and desire as the origin of signs, and the Mythologiae as the 
investigation of this absence; the multifariousness of knowledge is symbolised by Minerva’s triplex dress in 38,3; 
the stress on etymology and language implying that “a semantic order can replace an ontological one”, p, 22.  
74 Venuti 2018, p. 90.: “il mito […] sprofonda sotto nuovi strati, sotto i quali è perfino difficile riconoscerlo.” 
75 See supra p. 53 and pp. 72-74. 
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composition of the work is indeed justified.”76 According to his reading, the first book, 
opened by an etiological fabula about the birth of idols (1.1 Unde idolum), is a canonical 
representation of the Greco-Roman mythological world from the Olympian Gods down to 
heroes and simple men (1.2 Fabula Saturni – 1.22 Fabula Admeti et Alcestae); the sixteen 
fabulae of the second book revolve around the themes introduced by the allegorical 
analysis of the judgement of Paris as a moral choice between three kinds of life, activa, 
contemplativa, and voluptaria (2.1 Fabula de iudicio Paridis); the third book (sixteen 
fabulae) examines and condemns the nefarious effects of libido. Wolff’s scheme is 
constructed on the basis of two fundamental movements, from the general to the 
individual and from the mythographical to the philosophical/ethical: the first book is 
loosely structured as a genealogy of the Olympians with a quick overview of their 
attributes; the second one narrows the focus to a selection of stories chosen for “ethical” 
reasons; finally, the third book develops one of the strands touched upon in book two (the 
risks of lust connected with the vita voluptaria) with a stronger moralizing concern. 
The very fact that such an architecture has been individuated, regardless of whether 
we are willing to accept it or not, shows the power of semantic matrixes as ordering 
principles. In Wolff’s reading, the ethical dilemma presented by the allegoresis of the 
judgement of Paris sets the tone for the rest of the collection, as if its harmonics could be 
heard throughout this series of apparently disjointed fabulae. From a strictly 
hermeneutical point of view, the problem remains whether this attempt at interpretative 
unification is nothing but the result of a ‘‘quantitative’’ fallacy: does the fact that the 
Fabula de iudicio Paridis occupies a broad textual space at the beginning of book two (just 
as the long Fabula Bellerofontis opens the third book by stressing the importance of 
struggling against libido), does this fact, we should be wondering, somehow impact on 
Wolff’s decision to make it the dominant note of what follows? Or, is it perhaps their initial 
collocation that invites us to bestow a certain thematic relevance upon these fabulae? 
Thematic is no casually chosen adjective: despite its usual employment in reference to 
‘‘content’’, it still encapsulates an original notion of positioning (τίθημι, “to put, place, 
set”) – I employ it as a reminder of the subtle influence exerted by structural factors even 
when we try to isolate ‘‘thematic’’ threads. For their part, saturated texts are 
characterized, I would argue, by a problematic thematicity, by a resistance to structuring 
 
 
76 Wolff-Dain 2013, p. 17: “La composition de l’ouvrage en trois livres trouve donc sa justification”. 
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and ordering agents: the thematic moment, the creation of a determined interpretative 
space, seems to be systematically avoided. 77 
José Amarante has bracketed for a while any re-organization of the Mythologiae to 
pursue the hypothesis of continuous, “horizontal” reading of the text.78 Rather than 
relying on wide-ranging semantic matrixes, Amarante concentrates on the micro-level of 
the transitions from one fabula to another. He aims to demonstrate that the Mythologiae 
not only constitute a network, but also that this network is linearly organized: its rationale 
emerges through the succession of myths, which, far from being disjointed, are proved to 
be readable “cover-to-cover”.79 As a result, Amarante’s analysis substitutes Wolff’s 
structural cohesion by resorting to a kind of flow cohesion – but cohesion is still the goal. 
Both Wolff and Amarante’s hermeneutics are, in the end, hermeneutics of continuity, as 
they both look for a thread to follow, for links to bridge disconnected elements. 
In fact, it is not wholly unexpected that a work traditionally regarded as incoherent – 
and for this very reason often brutally dismissed – should prompt apologies insisting on 
consistency and meaningfulness. Although this is not the place to begin brooding over the 
possibility of a hermeneutics of discontinuity (something quite different, to be clear, from 
any aesthetics of fragments, ruins, or gaps), it is important to notice that any attempt to 
establish criteria for a morphology seems to lead inevitably to unification, or, in other 
terms, to synthesis. The same could be said for typology and any other classificatory 
enterprise. The fundamental and uncanny question is whether or not there might be an 
irreducible contrast between the text and that very synthetic gesture we call reading. 
Commenting on Walter Benjamin’s theory of allegory as outlined in the Ursprung des 
Deutschen Trauerspiels (“Origin of German Tragic Drama”), Karlheinz Stierle projects the 
characteristics of an allegorical reader onto Benjamin himself, depicting him as a reader 
attracted by pitfalls and inconsistencies, an interpreter whose analytical eye dismembers 
the text by breaking down its linearity – in Stierle’s own phrase, an innehaltende Leser 
(“pausing reader”).80 But even an innehaltende Leser, although she/he rejects linear 
continuity, in effect disseminates continuity by establishing connections where they are 
not expected to be found: instead of moving along the textual surface, such a reader cuts 
 
 
77 I understand the thematic moment as a consequence of the thetic moment investigated, among others, by 
Kristeva 1974, pp. 42-43 et passim. In Kristeva’s theory, thetic designates the moment in which subject and object 
come to be self-limited and determined: by thetic, in other terms, she defines the split (rupture) that engenders 
the subject through a process of self-identification; this positioning of the subject coincides with the passage 
from the semiotic regime to the symbolic one. For a critique of thematicity cfr. also Schwindt 2009, pp. 145-146.  
78 See Amarante 2019, pp. 71-103.  
79 Cfr. the similar discussion on Solinus supra pp. 76-77. 
80 See Stierle 1984, pp. 337-338. 
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through the text systematically and follows a multidimensional path, which, despite its 
multidimensionality, remains grounded in analogical thinking.81 If analogical thinking 
constitutes, in the end, the necessary substratum for all allegorical thinking, its satirization 
would then mean a radicalization of the analogical principle, its randomization to levels of 
chaos unacceptable for most readers, let alone those supporters of ‘‘literal’’ reading. The 
proliferation of the previously mentioned ‘‘vanishing points’’ therefore corresponds to an 
expansion of the analogical principle well beyond safe limits, a fact which, in turn, requires 
a hypertrophy of unifying potency. 
Trapped in this impossibility of not falling from the fragmentary into totality and from 
totality back into the fragmentary, interpreters struggle to tame both outcomes by 
synthetizing the fragmentary and by analyzing totality. The most common taming strategy 
consists, of course, in dissolving the singularity of the fragment into the totality of History. 
Gregory Hays has sought to demonstrate how some of Fulgentius’ “strangeness” becomes 
more comprehensible, and definitively less awkward, when considered in the context of 
late antique grammatical and scholastic practices.82 The internal disposition of some of the 
fabulae would thus recall the structure of progymnasmata, the school exercises we know 
from rhetorical handbooks;83 for instance, the moral maxims that from time to time 
appear in the fabulae (and are not to be found in canonical mythographers like Hyginus 
and Antoninus Liberalis) indeed resemble the short gnomic introductions known as 
promythia.84 Likewise, the alleged inconsistency of Fulgentius’ allegoresis finds several 
echoes in one of the most popular commentators of Vergil, Servius no less. In an old article, 
J. W. Jones tackled the problem of Servius’ allegorical technique and revealed the many 
points it has in common with previous allegorical practices (Stoic, Varronian, etc.).85 Ergo, 
Fulgentius’ allegoresis is neither less nor more preposterous than any predecessor. We 
 
 
81 The most provoking and fully-fledged treatment of analogy as a philosophical concept remains, to my 
knowledge, Enzo Melandri’s La linea e il circolo. Studio logico-filosofico sull’analogia (Melandri 1968). The second 
chapter (Teonimia) of the first section  (Topica: I luoghi naturali dell’analogia) is a thorough investigation of 
semiotics, allegory, symbolism, and Thomistic logic in the light of analogy, cfr. Melandri 1968, pp. 91-150. 
82 See Hays 2002, pp. 25-30. 
83 The bibliography on progymnasmata, school exercises, and rhetorical handbooks is vast and diverse. Still very 
useful as an introduction to actual scholastic practices is Cribiore 2001, although focused on Greek. For an 
overview of progymnasmata, see most recently Berardi 2017. 
84 Cfr. Berardi 2017, p. 212-213. A few examples: 42, 5-6 Si fumum fures eructuant, quis involantem dum negat 
agnoscat, “If thieves give out smoke, anyone can spot the despoiler even when he denies it”; 54, 1-5 Quamvis in 
omnibus libidinis amor sit turpior, numquam tamen deterior erit quam cum se honorato miscuerit, “Although love 
of lust is shameful in all men, yet it is never worse than when it is involved with honour”; 55,15 Quis plus quaerit 
esse quam licet, minus erit quam est, “He who seeks for more than he should have will be less than he now is”; 
etc. 
85 See Jones 1961. 
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could even build further on the argument by noting that Mark Amsler’s overview of 
etymological theories from Plato’s Cratylus to the Early Middle Ages suggests that if 
Fulgentius’ technique may seem arbitrary, it appears so only when compared with 
modern, historical-linguistic etymology.  
In other terms, the two major elements of awkwardness in Fulgentius’ hermeneutics, 
his unbridled allegoresis and arbitrary etymological analysis, turn out to be far less 
idiosyncratic once they are plunged into the flux of tradition. Yet I do not think the most 
trivial of historicistic postulates can really exhaust Fulgentius’ specificity. The scattered 
world of the Mythologiae cannot but exceed tradition.86 The very fact that 19th century 
classical philology, as exemplary proved by Domenico Comparetti’s harsh judgement, 
dismissed Fulgentius’ works as irremediably “bad”, points to their inadequacy, but we 
have to take this term literally: the Mythologiae – indeed, all the writings attributed to 
Fulgentius – can hardly be equated, they resist levelling, on both an internal (being 
flattened on a single semantic core) and external (being flattened on a genre paradigm) 
level.  
Such a resistance to categorization becomes all the more blatant when Fulgentius’ 
mythological readings expand their range to incorporate other fields of knowledge, in full 
accordance, after all, with their philosophical ambitions.87 It is probably not exaggerated 
to speak of a veritable encyclopaedic attitude in the Mythologiae, an attitude that emerges 
at its strongest in two fabulae from the third book, collocated, maybe not by chance, very 
close to the end of the work: the Fabula Apollinis et Marsyae (3, 9) and the Fabula Orphei 
et Euridicis (3, 10).   
Fabulae 3,9 and 3, 10 constitute a sort of diptych on music – where music is to be 
considered as representative of the artes and of knowledge in general: given Fulgentius’ 
own commitment to sapientia, it is perhaps not surprising that we find a good number of 
self-reflexive resonances in these fabulae.   
In spite of the title,88 the  Fabula Apollinis and Marsyae is only partially devoted to 
telling the well-known story of the satyr who challenged Apollo; the narrative is so 
shortened that it omits the most notorious episode in the myth, Marsyas’ gruesome 
agony. The narration revolves around the tibiae (double flute), the musical instrument 
 
 
86 “Tradition” is here to be taken in the reductive sense deplored by Bruns 1992, p. 204: “a conception […] which 
confuses tradition with the institutions that try to allegorize it or read it as a homogeneous master narrative in 
which everything is joined together in a vast program of conceptual integration.”  
87 See Hernández Lobato 2018, p. 259-261 for Fulgentius’ Neo-Platonism. 
88 Whether the titles go back to Fulgentius or were added by later copyists is controversial. Amarante, on the 
basis of the many divergences in the manuscript tradition of the titles and of his linear analysis, suggests entirely 
revising Helm’s subdivision of the text into 50 fabulae. See Amarante 2019, pp. 99-101. 
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invented by Minerva, rejected by the goddess because it disfigured her cheeks, and finally 
picked up by the satyr Marsyas, 73,11-16: 
Minerva ex osse tibias inuenit, de quibus cum in conuiuio deorum cecinisset eiusque 
tumentes buccas dii omnes inrisissent, illa ad Tritonam paludem pergens, in aqua 
faciem suam speculata, dum turpia adiudicasset buccarum inflamina, tibias iecit. 
Quibus Marsyas repertis doctior factus Apollinem concertaturus de cantibus 
provocavit. 
 
Minerva invented the double flute from a bone, but when she played on it at a 
banquet of the gods and all the gods laughed at her puffed out cheeks, she went to 
the salt lake Tritonia ; and observing her image in the water and having adjudged 
shameful the blowing out of her cheeks, she threw the flute away. Marsyas, finding 
it, made himself skillful at it and, eager for a hard contest, challenged Apollo to 
perform. 
The narrative line is intersected by the story of Mida, the king called to judge between 
Marsyas and Apollo (73,17 [Qui] sibi Midam regem iudicem deligunt…, “They chose king 
Mida as umpire…”), but also in this case only one aspect of Mida’s myth is retold, namely 
how he got his infamous asinine ears (the fabulous power that allowed Mida to transform 
whatever he touched into gold is narrated at 2, 10, Fabula Midae regis et Pactoli Fluvii). 
Thus, interestingly enough, fabula 3,9 seems to move entirely in the margins of myth, at 
its tangential points: in Fulgentius’ storytelling, this is first and foremost the story of an 
object – he diverts our attention from the narrative proper (a narrative of characters) to 
the object-based core of the tale: the tibiae become at once a curse (see Marsyas and 
Mida’s wretched destinies) and an emblem – they become the story itself. Fulgentius will 
have to break down the rough, thick bark of the object in order for it to release its 
allegorical marrow, 74, 8-9: Nunc ergo huius misticae fabulae interiorem cerebrum 
inquiramus, “Now, therefore, we may seek the hidden sense of this mysterious story”; and 
the marrow, we are told, is music: 75, 9: A musicis haec reperta est fabula, ut Orfeus in 
teogonia scribit, “The story is shown to be associated with musicians, as Orpheus wrote in 
his Theogonia.” A compendium of musical theory immediately follows, with particular 
reference to tibiae and cithara (Marsyas and Apollo’s instruments, respectively); only after 
this long digression (74,18-76,11, almost two pages in Helm’s edition), a complicated 
passage ostentatiously rich in technical vocabulary, the discourse returns to a more 
familiar mode of allegorical interpretation, 76,11 ff.: 
Ergo post Artem musicam Minerva repperit tibias, quas omnis doctus in musicis 
propter sonorum despuit paupertatem. Inflatas uero buccas ideo risisse dicuntur, 
quod tibia uentose in musicis sonet… 
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So, after the art of music,89 Minerva discovered the double flute, which anyone 
skilled in music despises for the poverty of its sounds. They are said to have laughed 
at her puffed out cheeks because the flute sounds windily with its music… 
I called the passage a compendium and a digression: both definitions somehow hint at the 
satirical nature of this fabula, at its being a heterogeneous conglomerate, but they are 
also meant to recall, of course, the literary model provided by Martianus Capella’s De 
nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii, arguably the most popular example of ‘encyclopaedic’ 
satire.  
‘‘Encyclopedism’’ lies at the heart of 3,10, Fabula Orphei et Euridicis: the musical motif 
– 77,15-16 Haec igitur fabula artis est musicae designatio, “Now this story designates the 
art of music”90 – now serves as a starting point for a schematic presentation of the artes, 
that is, of the late antique cultural/educational system, 77,17-78,6: 
In omnibus igitur artibus sunt primae artes, sunt secundae; ut in puerilibus litteris 
prima abecedaria, secunda nota, in grammaticis prima lectio, secunda articulatio, in 
rethoricis prima rethorica, secunda dialectica, in geometricis prima geometrica, 
secunda arithmetica, in astrologicis prima mathesis, secunda astronomia, in 
medicinis prima gnostice, secunda dinamice, in aruspicinis prima aruspicina, secunda 
parallaxis, in musicis prima musica, secunda apotelesmatice. De quibus omnibus 
breuiter rationem perstringam necesse est. 
 
In all the arts there is a first and a second stage; for boys learning their letters there 
is first the alphabet, second learning to write; at the grammar level, first reading, 
second clear speech; at the rhetorical level, first rhetoric, second dialectic; in 
geometry, first pure geometry, second arithmetic; in astronomy, first learning the 
Science, second applied astrology; in medicine, first the diagnosis, second the 
therapy; in divination, first the inspection of omens, second their application; and in 
music, first the melody, second the effect. Now I shall briefly explain them.91 
 
 
89 I modified Whitbread’s hardly tenable translation “So it was according to the art of music that Minerva 
discovered…”, Whitbread 1971, p. 94. Wolff-Dain 2013, p. 176 n. 108 rightly observes that Minerva did not 
discover music and suggests that Fulgentius might have misunderstood Ovid Fast. VI, 709, where the goddess, 
while referring to the flute, says sum tamen inventrix auctorque ego carminis huius, “I am the inventor and 
founder of this music.” 
90 Whitbread 1971, p. 96 gives “Now this legend is an allegory of the art of music”, but I have preferred to avoid 
the term “allegory”. Curiously enough, in Whitbread’s text Myth. 77, 10-15 (a short summary of Orpheus and 
Eurydice’s story) is missing. 
91 Again, Whitbread 1971, p. 96 omits the last sentence. 
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At the end of this second compendium (breviter rationem perstringam), an unexpected 
swerve brings us suddenly from music (apotelesmatice, defined at 78,19 as effectus 
tonorum uirtusque uerborum, “effects of scales and the power of words”) to 
hermeneutics, or, more precisely, to Fulgentius’ own practice: 78,18-20 uocis ergo 
pulchritudo delectans interna artis secreta uirtutem etiam misticam uerborum attingit, 
“for the beauty of the voice as it appeals to the inner secrets of the art also has to do with 
the mysterious power of words”. Just like Fulgentius’ interpretative efforts, music is tightly 
connected with the inner power of words – from the general ordo of knowledge we are 
transported back to Fulgentius’ own immediate concerns: this is a circular movement that 
seems to reproduce the organic systematicity of the encyclopaedic order itself. It is 
nonetheless worth noting how the totality typical of the encyclopaedic discourse is 
attained through a synecdochic procedure: the tibiae lead to music, music leads to the 
artes, the artes are necessarily related to signa and their cerebrum. The synecdochic chain 
could also be read backwards, from the interplay of signa to their objectification, from 
encyclopedism as a system of signs and codes to encyclopedism as a collection of Realien. 
In fact, the reversibility of the movement might be regarded as an exemplary mark of the 
late ancient ideology of kosmos, according to which the fragments of ‘‘reality’’ must be 
bound together and organized through an overarching principle (be it social, political, or 
theological)92; the investigation of truth, supreme goal for rethores (and philosophi), 
actually mirrors the tight interconnectedness of the kosmos, 78,7-9: aput rethores uero 
aliud est profuse et libero cursu effrenata loquacitas, aliud constricta ueritatisque 
indagandae curiosa nexilitas, “it is one thing for rethores93 to have profuse, unbridled, and 
unrestrained fluency, another to impose rigorous and scrupulous control over the 
investigation of truth.” Once again, the dialectic between fragment and totality, 
individuality and universality, seems to find a dynamic balance: at the end of the 
Mythologiae, the whole cultural system within which the three books are inscribed is now, 
in its turn, inscribed in the three books.  
Still, balance in Fulgentius is always doomed to break down. Fabula 3,10 ends with a 
consideration that has not yet received enough critical attention. Fulgentius is here 
explaining why Orpheus is not allowed to turn his head and to look at Eurydice, 79,3-11: 
dicere enim possumus quod Dorius tonus aut Frigius Saturno coiens feras mulceat, si 
Ioui, aues oblectet. At uero si rei expositio quaeritur cur hoc fiat, uestigandae rationis 
captus inmoritur. Ideo ergo et ne eam respiciat prohibetur et dum uidet amittit; nam 
perfectissimus Pithagoras dum modulos numeris coaptaret simphoniarumque 
 
 
92 See Chin 2015. 
93 Withbread 1971, p. 96 translates, quite inaccurately, “instructors in rhetoric”. 
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pondera terminibus arithmeticis per mela et rithmos uel modulos sequeretur, 
effectus uero rationem reddere non potuit. 
 
for we can say that the Dorian mode or the Phrygian is like Saturn in soothing wild 
beasts, or like Jove in charming the birds; but if the explanation why this happens is 
sought for, the theory of the subject inquired into dies away. Therefore, Orpheus is 
forbidden to look upon Eurydice, and loses her when he does look upon her; 
therefore the highly skilled Pythagoras when he adapted tunes to numbers and 
pursued the depths of musical composition in arithmetical terms through their 
melodies and rhythms and tunes, yet could not explain the reason for their effect. 
Commenting on this fabula, Étienne Wolff laconically remarks that “the whole passage 
is obscure.”94 Certainly more audacious, if not completely acceptable, is Robert Edwards’ 
suggestion that at the end of fabula 3,10, “Orpheus’ loss of Eurydice symbolizes the 
impossibility of comprehending art. Fulgentius also observes that Pythagoras’ adaptation 
of mathematics to musical notes cannot account for the effects of music. In its application 
to other fields of knowledge in the liberal arts, the explanation represents the final 
breakdown of hermeneutics. The systems of interpretation remain unable to grasp the 
essence of the arts or to offer special insights into them. At most, they constitute a realm 
of discourse around their topics.”95  
For all its boldness, Edwards’ reading is fascinating. More than the plea for an irrational 
appreciation of the work of art, what is striking here is the realization that the most 
encyclopaedic fabula comes to an end with a “breakdown of hermeneutics”; apparently 
not even the cogent constricta curiosa nexilitas suffices to account for every effectus: the 
kosmos of knowledge has room for epistemological failure, the system of signs for the un-
signifiable. The ultimate synthesis is thus a silent one – similarly, the satirical conglomerate 
of fragments we call Mythologiae resists any final explanation, but not allegorization, since 
the very idea of a definitive allegory is simply absurd: and once allegorized, the 
conglomerate announces its own silence. 
3.3.3 Labyrinthus in silentio 
We have traversed Fulgentius’ Mythologiae with an eye to their opacity and I am not sure 
that such an approach makes any sense at all. I began with a pseudo-analysis, then only 
pretended to abandon its paralogical tenets. After Virgilius Grammaticus’ condensing 
 
 
94 Wolff-Dain, p. 178 n. 123: “tout le passage demeure obscure”. 
95 Edwards 1976, p. 29. 
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strategies, after Solinus’ divergent and centrifugal drives, what Fulgentius bequeaths is 
precisely the collapsing of frames, the blurring of codes. The Mythologiae are exemplarly 
epitomic less for their being a juxtaposition of short, radically summarized narratives, than 
for the hermeneutical drama they stage: the drama of cultural transference from 
Paganism to Christianity, from one semiotic code to another one. Epitomic is the blurred 
intricacy of the textual surface of the Mythologiae, its self-deployment which, as we have 
seen in the awkward fate of its encyclopaedic ambitions, is a form of self-limitation at one 
and the same time. In the end, the fragments are unified, but this can only be achieved at 
the cost of silencing ratio – and still, this will be an inscribed silence. Only by losing Eurydice 
will Orpheus’ severed head be able to perpetually sing.  
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Conclusions 
 
My initial obsession with breaking circular patterns has gone, now we can see it, 
spectacularly wrong. I have ended up exactly where I began: with a severed head. There 
the Baptist, here Orpheus. Instead of disrupting the circle, instead of showing repetition 
in its liberating potentiality, I have fallen victim to the enticements of rhythm, to repetition 
as recursive structure. But if Virgilius, Solinus, and Fulgentius have been shown to be 
characterized by an inherent textual motility, and if such motility, being epitomic, is 
profoundly connected to repetition (Virgilius repeats previous grammatical discourses; 
Solinus the geographical-encyclopaedic tradition and Pliny; Fulgentius the mythical 
discourse), why should I be concerned? Where does such repulsion for repetition stem 
from? My very insistence on the intrinsic dynamicity of epitomic texts might seem to 
reveal, indeed, some critical inability to carry the burden of static repetition, to overtly 
confront its uncanniness. Why do I seem to be unable to truly accept the idea of an 
immobilizing repetition?  
Connected to this inability is the uneasiness running through the present work – the 
uneasiness, I must admit, of someone who cannot really manage repetition but 
neurotically. The entire investigation shows several symptoms of neurosis. Praising 
movement, divergence, mutability etc. is, maybe, simply a way to conceal some deeper 
difficulty in conceptualizing these terms without resorting to stasis, order, and coherence. 
Much of the analysis in these three chapters is based on dichotomies. Tension, to various 
degrees and in various forms, plays a most prominent role exactly because of the neurotic 
inclination of the analysis – an inclination to totalization, schematism, reductionism. 
Objects are viewed through the prism of a polarized world in which sense and non-sense 
remain distinct, although questioned, concepts: and objects are trapped in this polarity. 
They are studied as meaningful artifacts, while, at the same time, recognised as pointing 
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to the very impossibility of meaning. As a result, in spite of their purported idiosyncrasy, 
Virgilius, Solinus and Fulgentius’ texts seem to be doing almost the same thing: they all 
appear to be variations on the theme of opacity and linguistic excess. Has my gaze 
annihilated the object of its contemplation? Is epitomic writing not rather a fig leaf for a 
tyrannical modality of reading? For this was, in the end, the question looming all along 
over the present research: fragmenting and re-composition, isn’t this an apt description 
of any reading act? Isn’t this the formula of critical thinking? Of academic discourse?  
Isn’t Salome’s plate, in the end, a frightening mirror? 
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